Moya v. Aurora Healthcare, Inc.
Decision Date | 04 May 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 2014AP2236,2014AP2236 |
Citation | 2017 WI 45,375 Wis.2d 38,894 N.W.2d 405 |
Parties | Carolyn MOYA, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, v. AURORA HEALTHCARE, INC. and Healthport Technologies, LLC, Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioners, there was a brief by Robert J. Welcenbach and Welcenbach Law Offices, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Robert J. Welcenbach.
For the defendants-appellants, there was a brief by John Franke, Daniel A. Manna and Gass, Weber and Mullins, LLC, Milwaukee, and oral argument by John Franke.
¶1 This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals that reversed the Milwaukee County circuit court's1 denial of Aurora Healthcare, Inc. and Healthport Technologies, LLC's (collectively referred to as "Healthport") motion for summary judgment and remanded the case with directions to grant Healthport's motion for summary judgment. Moya v. Aurora Healthcare, Inc. , 2016 WI App 5, 366 Wis.2d 541, 874 N.W.2d 336.
¶2 Today, we are asked to interpret the meaning of the phrase "person authorized by the patient" in Wis. Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b)4.-5. (2013-14),2 which exempts a "patient or a person authorized by the patient" from paying certification charges and retrieval fees for obtaining copies of the patient's health care records. More particularly, we are asked to determine whether an attorney whose client authorized him via a HIPAA3 release form to obtain her health care records may benefit from this fee exemption. Because the phrase "person authorized by the patient" is defined in Wis. Stat. § 146.81(5) to include "any person authorized in writing by the patient," we hold that an attorney authorized by his or her client in writing via a HIPAA release form to obtain the client's health care records is a "person authorized by the patient" under Wis. Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b)4.-5. and is therefore exempt from certification charges and retrieval fees under these subdivisions. Consequently, the decision of the court of appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶3 We begin with a brief factual background and description of the procedural history. We then set forth the standard of review and the relevant rules for statutory interpretation. We then conclude that Carolyn Moya's ("Moya") attorney is a "person authorized by the patient" under Wis. Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b)4.-5. and is therefore exempt from the certification charge and retrieval fee authorized by that statute. Next, we address Healthport's arguments that the doctrines of voluntary payment and waiver bar Moya's claim.
¶4 Access to patient health care records is governed by Wis. Stat. § 146.83. Under subsec. (3f), a health care provider shall, subject to exceptions that are inapplicable here, provide copies of a patient's health care records "if a person requests copies of a patient's health care records, provides informed consent, and pays the applicable fees under par. (b)." § 146.83(3f)(a).
¶5 Pursuant to para. (b), health care providers may impose certain costs on the person requesting health care records under para. (a):
Wis. Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b) (emphasis added). According to subd. 4. and subd. 5., the patient and a person authorized by the patient are exempt from the certification charge and retrieval fee. This statute, though, does not provide a definition for a "person authorized by the patient."
(Emphasis added). Because this definition uses the disjunctive "or," see Hull v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. , 222 Wis.2d 627, 638, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998) ( ), in order to be a person authorized by the patient under Wis. Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b)4.-5., and therefore enjoy exemption from the certification charge and retrieval fee, a person must fall into only one of the above categories of persons. One of the categories in the above definition is "any person authorized in writing by the patient," and it is this category on which Moya relies in arguing that her attorney is a "person authorized by the patient" under § 146.83(3f)(b)4.-5.
¶7 This case comes to us by way of a class action lawsuit filed by Moya on behalf of not only herself but all other similarly situated persons who have been billed the certification charge and retrieval fee by Healthport for obtaining their own healthcare records. The class action arose from Moya's personal injury claim4 in which Moya hired Welcenbach Law Offices, S.C. to represent her and the law firm had to pay the certification charge and retrieval fee, despite the fact that Moya had authorized the law firm in writing to obtain those records.
¶8 Moya authorized her attorney, Robert Welcenbach, to obtain her health care records by signing HIPAA release forms giving to Welcenbach Law Offices, S.C. "authoriz[ation] to receive [her] health information."
¶9 Atty. Welcenbach subsequently submitted requests for Moya's health care records,5 and Healthport, when fulfilling the requests, imposed certification charges and retrieval fees pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b)4.-5. Atty. Welcenbach paid the certification charges and retrieval fees and passed the associated costs to Moya by deducting the costs from the settlement proceeds resulting from her personal injury claim.6
¶10 At the time Healthport invoiced Atty. Welcenbach, he paid the costs, and he did not specifically dispute them. However, he had on multiple previous occasions disputed the imposition of such costs in other cases.
¶11 In response to Healthport's imposition of the certification charges and retrieval fees, Moya filed this class action lawsuit. She argues that Healthport violated Wis. Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b)4.-5. when it imposed the certification charges and retrieval fees because her attorney is a "person authorized by the patient," thereby exempting her attorney from paying the certification charges and retrieval fees.
¶12 Healthport moved to dismiss Moya's complaint for failure to state a claim, and the circuit court7 denied Healthport's motion. Healthport filed an answer, and the parties underwent limited discovery. After the limited discovery, Healthport filed a motion for summary judgment asking the circuit court to dismiss Moya's claim with prejudice. The circuit court8 denied Healthport's motion. Healthport filed a motion for reconsideration, and the circuit court9 again denied Healthport's motion.
¶13 Healthport filed an interlocutory appeal, and the court of appeals reversed the circuit court's denial of Healthport's motion for summary judgment and remanded the case with instructions to grant Healthport's motion. Moya , 366 Wis.2d 541, ¶1, 874 N.W.2d 336. The court of appeals determined that Moya's attorney was not a "person authorized by the patient" and therefore Healthport could impose the certification charges and retrieval fees on Moya's attorney. Id. , ¶16. Judge Kessler dissented stating that she would uphold the circuit court's denial of Healthport's motion for summary judgment and would conclude that Healthport could not impose the certification charge and retrieval fee. Id. , ¶¶28-29 (Kessler, J., dissenting).
¶14 Moya petitioned this court for review, which we granted in order to determine whether her attorney is a "person authorized by the patient" and thus exempt from paying the certification charge and the retrieval fee found in Wis. Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b)4.-5.
¶15 "Whether the circuit court properly granted summary judgment is a question of law that this court reviews de novo." Racine County v. Oracular Milwaukee, Inc. , 2010 WI 25, ¶24, 323 Wis.2d 682, 781 N.W.2d 88 (quoting Hocking v. City of Dodgeville , 2009 WI 70, ¶7, 318 Wis.2d 681, 768 N.W.2d 552 ). Summary judgment must be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions...
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