Moye, In re

• Court: California Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: RICHARDSON; BIRD
• Citation: Moye, In re, 149 Cal.Rptr. 491, 22 Cal.3d 457, 584 P.2d 1097 (Cal. 1978)
• Decision Date: 17 October 1978
• Docket Number: Cr. 20330,Cr. 20332
• Parties: , 584 P.2d 1097 In re James H. MOYE on Habeas Corpus. to

Page 491

149 Cal.Rptr. 491

22 Cal.3d 457, 584 P.2d 1097

In re James H. MOYE on Habeas Corpus.

Cr. 20330 to Cr. 20332.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Oct. 17, 1978.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Nov. 15, 1978.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert F. Katz and Robert R. Anderson, Deputy Attys. Gen., for appellant.

Wilbur F. Littlefield, Public Defender, Harold E. Shabo, Dennis A. Fischer, Terry Kohl and Leighton A. Nugent, Deputy Public Defenders, for petitioner.

Paul Halvonik, State Public Defender, Gary S. Goodpaster, Chief Asst. State Public Defender, Richard E. Shapiro, Paul Fogel and Quin Denvir, Deputy State Public Defenders, as amici curiae on behalf of petitioner.

RICHARDSON, Justice.

In these consolidated cases only one issue is presented for our determination: May a person who is committed to the Department of Health following his acquittal of criminal charges because of insanity be held in the department's custody for a period in excess of the maximum term provided for the underlying offense of which he was charged and acquitted? (See Pen.Code, § 1026; all further statutory references are to that code, unless otherwise cited.) We have concluded that well established constitutional principles of equal protection require that the duration of institutional confinement of such persons cannot exceed the maximum term for the underlying offense, unless the People or other committing authority establish grounds for an extended commitment, as outlined below. After the expiration of such maximum term, as extended, if further confinement and treatment is sought the People must either proceed in accordance with the civil commitment provisions of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (hereafter LPS act) (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 5000 et seq.) or rely upon outpatient supervision.

In 1970 James H. Moye, defendant and petitioner herein (hereafter petitioner), was charged with felony hit and run driving, an offense then punishable by a maximum term of five years' imprisonment. (Former Veh.Code, § 20001.) During the period from August 1970 to January 1972, the criminal proceedings were suspended and petitioner, having been found incompetent to stand trial, was committed to Atascadero State Hospital. (§§ 1367, 1368.) In December 1971, he was certified as competent, and on January 3, 1972, criminal proceedings were resumed. Petitioner pleaded not guilty, and not guilty by reason of insanity; he waived a jury trial and stipulated that the cause might be submitted on the transcript of the preliminary examination. The court found him guilty of one count of hit and run driving, and also found that he was insane at the time of the offense and that he had not yet regained his sanity. Accordingly, the court suspended further criminal proceedings and ordered him committed to the Department of Mental Hygiene to be placed in a state hospital until his sanity had been restored. (See Id., § 1026.)

In August 1974, the Director of Atascadero State Hospital determined that petitioner's condition had improved, and he was ordered released on outpatient status. (See Welf. & Inst.Code, § 7375, subd. (c).) Subsequently, in July 1976, this status was terminated and he was returned to the hospital; on February 17, 1977, he was again released on outpatient status. Both the People and petitioner here challenged certain trial court procedures concerning termination of petitioner's status as an outpatient. We conclude, however, that these issues have become moot following rendition of the decision in In re Anderson (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 38, 140 Cal.Rptr. 546.

Petitioner now seeks habeas corpus relief to terminate the custody of the Department of Health over him, contending that he may not be held in either actual or constructive custody under section 1026 for a period in excess of the five-year maximum term prescribed for the underlying offense of which he was charged. Because petitioner presently remains within the department's constructive custody while on outpatient status, his recent release has not rendered this issue moot.

In evaluating petitioner's contention we briefly review the statutory procedures for the commitment and release of persons acquitted of a criminal offense on the ground of insanity. Under section 1026, the issue of defendant's guilt is determined prior to proceedings on the sanity issue. If a guilty verdict or plea is entered, then the sanity issue is decided. If defendant is found to have been insane when he committed the offense then, unless the court finds that he has fully recovered his sanity, the court must direct either that defendant be confined in a state hospital or other mental health facility, or that he undergo outpatient treatment. (The parole and outpatient procedures contained, respectively, in section 1026.1 and Welfare and Institutions Code section 7375 are not presently before us and need not be considered.)

Thereafter, under section 1026a, a person committed may apply for his release on the ground that his sanity has been restored. No hearing on such application is allowed until the person has been confined, or placed on outpatient status, for at least 90 days from the date of the commitment order. If the application is denied, a new application may be filed following the expiration of one year from the date of the last hearing. The section further provides that ". . . the burden of proving that his sanity has been restored shall be upon the applicant."

Petitioner does not challenge the validity of his initial commitment to state hospital, nor does he attack the constitutionality of section 1026a or its allocation of the burden of proof on the sanity issue. Instead, he contends that his commitment "became unconstitutional by virtue of its excessive duration." As noted above, it is petitioner's position that as soon as his commitment extended beyond the five-year maximum period of imprisonment under former Vehicle Code section 20001, the burden of proof shifted to the People to demonstrate grounds for civil commitment under the LPS act.

Notwithstanding petitioner's concession that section 1026a is valid as applied to cases in which confinement for the maximum term of the underlying offense has not as yet terminated, we examine the issue. Although section 1026a is silent regarding the appropriate standard for determining whether one's "sanity" has been restored, we have recently held that the proper test "is not whether the person committed is no longer legally insane, but whether he has improved to the extent that he is no longer a danger to the health and safety of others, including himself. (Citations.)" (In re Franklin (1972) 7 Cal.3d 126 at p. 145, 101 Cal.Rptr. 553 at p. 565, 496 P.2d 465 at p. 477.) Persons committed under section 1026 may discharge this burden by establishing "by a preponderance of the evidence, that they are no longer a danger to the health and safety of themselves or others." (Id., at p. 148, 101 Cal.Rptr. at p. 567, 496 P.2d at p. 479.) A jury hearing is available, if requested, on the issue of release. (Id., pp. 148-149, 101 Cal.Rptr. 553, 496 P.2d 465.)

In contrast, as noted in Franklin, in commitment and release situations other than those presented under sections 1026 and 1026a, "Presumably, the burden would be upon the person or agency applying for the initial commitment . . . to establish to the satisfaction of the court or jury that the facts which would justify commitment truly exist." (Id., at p. 146, 101 Cal.Rptr. at p. 565, 496 P.2d at p. 477; see, e. g., Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 3050, 3051, 3106, 3108 (narcotics addicts), 5304 (persons dangerous to others), 6316, 6316.2, 6318, 6321 (mentally disordered sex offenders), 6500.1, 6509 (mentally retarded persons).)

Despite the foregoing differences in the allocation of the burden of proof, Franklin upheld section 1026a against an equal protection challenge. We first observed that "there seems to be no serious dispute among the authorities regarding the propriety of requiring one who has proved himself insane at the time of the offense to prove that he has recovered his sanity. (Citations.)" (7 Cal.3d at pp. 145-146, 101 Cal.Rptr. at p. 565, 496 P.2d at p. 477.) Citing several cases from other states, we explained that by reason of the prior judicial determination of insanity, "persons acquitted by reason of insanity fall within a special class, thereby providing a rational basis for differences in the treatment afforded them. . . . (P) (W)e agree with the Supreme Court of Maine, in Chase (Chase v. Kearns (Me.1971) 278 A.2d 132), that 'The special interest which the public has acquired in the confinement and release of people in this exceptional class results from the fact that there has been a judicial determination that they have already endangered the public safety and their own as a result of their mental conditions as distinguished from people civilly committed because of only potential danger.' (278 A.2d at p. 138.)" (7 Cal.3d at pp. 146-147, 101 Cal.Rptr. at p. 566, 496 P.2d at p. 478; see also Note (1973) 24 Hastings L.J. 487, 509 (burden of proof allocation under Pen.Code, § 1026a is "another measure of the greater precautions surrounding the handling of persons acquitted by reason of insanity, in order that the public interest may be protected").)

As previously indicated, petitioner does not challenge our holding in Franklin that the initial burden of proof properly may be imposed on persons acquitted as insane to prove their restoration to sanity. Petitioner contends, however, that Franklin did not consider the problem herein presented, namely, whether equal protection principles require a shifting of that burden to the People at the time when confinement, actual or constructive, has exceeded the maximum term for the underlying offense. Confronting the issue in this case we have concluded that statutory...