Moyer v. Conti, CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-CV-744 (E.D. Pa. 10/5/2000)

• Decision Date: 05 October 2000
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-CV-744.
• Parties: CORY MOYER, Plaintiff, v. JOSEPH CONTI, ET AL., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

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CORY MOYER, Plaintiff, v. JOSEPH CONTI, ET AL., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-CV-744.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

October 5, 2000.

MEMORANDUM

BERLE M. SCHILLER, Judge.

On September 28, 2000, Plaintiff Cory Moyer filed notice of appeal to the Court's August 31, 2000, Order granting Defendants W. Russell Faber and the Pennsylvania Senate's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Document No. 23). I write pursuant to Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 3.1 to explain my ruling.¹

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Cory Moyer ("Mr. Moyer"), a quadriplegic confined to a wheelchair, alleges that on January 4, 1999, he attempted to enter the offices of Pennsylvania Senator Joseph Conti ("Senator Conti") located at 10 East Court Street in Doylestown, Pennsylvania. (Compl. at ¶¶ 3, 10; Moyer affidavit² at ¶ 2). Mr. Moyer intended to discuss "disability issues" with Senator Conti and his staff because he was concerned about "the lack of accessibility throughout the Doylestown area." (Compl. at ¶ 10; Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 1). Mr. Moyer asserts that he was prevented from gaining entry into Senator Conti's office because he was unable to climb the steps leading to the door. (Compl. at ¶ 11). In addition, Mr. Moyer contends that Senator Conti's office was inaccessible because it lacks "disabled parking." (Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 1). Thus, Mr. Moyer claims that he was "excluded from the services of defendant's [sic] based on his disability" in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA") (Compl. at ¶¶ 6-9, 12). Mr. Moyer alleges that he "still desires to use the services of the defendants." (Compl. at ¶ 14).

Mr. Moyer originally filed suit against Senator Conti and the Pennsylvania State Senate ("Senate") on February 12, 1999, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking damages for emotional distress, equitable relief, costs and attorney's fees. (Compl. at ¶ 13, 4). On July 27, 1999, the Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, granted defendants' uncontested motion to dismiss with prejudice as to claims against Senator Conti with prejudice and all claims for damages. See Moyer v. Conti, No. 99-744 (E.D.Pa. July 17, 1999) (order granting uncontested motion to dismiss) (Document No. 4).

The Court then granted Mr. Moyer's motion for leave to file an amended complaint. See Moyer v. Conti, No. 99-744 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 15, 1999) (order granting Plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended complaint). Mr. Moyer amended his complaint to bring suit against W. Russell Faber ("Mr. Faber"), in his capacity as chief clerk of the Pennsylvania Senate. In addition to the Senate (collectively "Defendants") and to relinquish his claim for damages. (Amended Compl. at 1). Mr. Moyer asks the Court to order Mr. Faber to ensure that the Senate complies with the ADA, alleging that Mr. Faber, as the Chief Clerk of the Senate, "is the individual who has the authority to ensure defendant Pennsylvania State Senate obeys the mandates of the ADA." (Amended Compl. at ¶¶ 17, 18).

Defendants then filed a notice of constitutional challenge pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(c) challenging the constitutional propriety of Congressional abrogation of the immunity from suit provided to the states by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Document No. 10). Subsequently, Judge Robreno ordered that a copy of Defendants' notice of constitutional challenge be served on the Attorney General of the United States and the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(c). See Moyer v. Conti, No. 99-744 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 17, 1999) (order requiring service of notice of constitutional challenge on U.S. Attorney General and U.S. Attorney for Eastern District of Pennsylvania) (Document No. 12).

Also on December 13, 1999, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting several arguments that can be categorized as follows: (1) Plaintiff lacks standing; (2) There exists no genuine issue of material fact and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law; (3) Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under the ADA; (4) Plaintiff's claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Document No. 9).

On February 22, 2000, the United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, requested that the Court wait to decide Defendants' motion for summary judgment pending the United States Supreme Court's decision in Florida Dept. of Corrections v. Dickson, No. 98-829, and Alsbrook v. Arkansas, No. 98-829, which the Department of Justice claimed would likely control the disposition of the motion then before the Court. (Document No. 17). The next day, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari in Dickson pursuant to Rule 46.1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.³ See Florida Dept. of Corrections v. Dickson, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 1236 (2000). The Supreme Court similarly dismissed the writ of certiorari in Alsbrook one week later. See Alsbrook v. Arkansas, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 1265 (2000).

In July, this case was reassigned to my calendar through the Court's random reassignment procedures. See Moyer v. Conti, No. 99-744 (E.D.Pa. July 13, 2000) (reassignment order) (Document 18). On August 16, 2000, I granted Defendants' motion for leave to file a supplemental brief and also granted plaintiff leave to file a supplemental brief.⁴ See Moyer v. Conti, No. 99-744 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 16, 2000) (order granting motion for leave to final supplemental brief) (Document No. 20). On August 31, 2000, I granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's case.⁵ See Moyer v. Conti, No. 99-744 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 31, 2000) (order granting summary judgment) (Document 22). Plaintiff then filed notice of appeal. (Document 23).

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when there exists no genuine question of material fact for resolution at trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, 974 F.2d 1358, 1362 (3d Cir. 1992); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The substantive law determines which facts are material. See Medical Protective Co. v. Watkins, 198 F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Armbuster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994)). In evaluating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, inferences must be drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Electric Indus., Co., Ltd., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-89 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)). Summary Judgment is particularly appropriate where the unresolved issues are primarily legal rather than factual. See Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1004 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Crain v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 920 F.2d 1402, 1405-06 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. dismissed sub nom. Alsbrook v. Arkansas, 120 S.Ct. 1265 (2000)).

III. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY

The Eleventh Amendment states: "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI.

As interpreted through a series of United States Supreme Court decisions over the course of more than 100 years, the Eleventh Amendment embodies a general prohibition against suits brought against the States. See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 631, 650 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).

In Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 479 (1793), a case decided before the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, the Supreme Court ruled that the state of Georgia could be sued by a citizen of South Carolina. Following the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, the Supreme Court adopted a broad reading of the text, barring an individual from commencing suit against his state of citizenship as well as against another state. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 21.

Plaintiff, in his brief in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, does not offer any argument or cite any authority for the proposition that suit against a state senate is not a suit against the state itself for Eleventh Amendment purposes. (Document No. 15). To the extent that Mr. Moyer contends that the Senate is not the state, I will address that claim. The Third Circuit has articulated a three-prong test for determining whether an entity is an alter ego of the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See Peters v. Delaware River Port Auth., 16 F.3d 1346, 1350 (3d Cir. 1994). The most important factor, according to the court in Peters, is whether payment of any judgment to plaintiff would be paid by the State. Id. Second, the court must consider the status of the agency under state law. Id. Third, the court must assess the degree of autonomy the entity has from the state. Id. As Article 2, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution⁶ makes clear, the Senate is an arm of the Commonwealth. In applying the Peters test, the court in Larsen v. Senate of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 955 F. Supp. 1549, 1560-1 (M.D.Pa. 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 152 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 1998), determined that...