Moyer v. Gordon
| Decision Date | 03 December 1887 |
| Docket Number | 13,010 |
| Citation | 14 N.E. 476,113 Ind. 282 |
| Parties | Moyer et al. v. Gordon |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the LaPorte Circuit Court.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
M. Nye D. J. Wile, F. E. Osborn and J. B. Langworthy, for appellants.
M. H Weir and L. A. Cole, for appellee.
This was a suit by Gordon against Moyer and others, to recover damages for an alleged unlawful invasion of, and entry into and upon, the house and premises of the former, by the latter, and for forcibly ejecting the plaintiff, with his family, household goods and other personal property therefrom.
The defendants answered by a general denial, and also pleaded specially a second paragraph of answer. In the latter it was alleged, in substance, that Gordon had become the tenant of the defendant Moyer, and had entered into possession of the premises in question under a parol lease, by the terms of which the latter was authorized, upon the breach of certain conditions to be kept and performed by the lessee, to enter upon the demised premises and expel the plaintiff without in any manner becoming a trespasser. The answer alleged further, that such breaches in the conditions of the lease had occurred as authorized the expulsion of the tenant by the landlord. It then alleged that, acting under and in pursuance of the advice of a competent and responsible attorney, to whom a full statement of all the facts and circumstances concerning the lease, and the default of the plaintiff, had been made, the defendant Moyer, and the other defendants, as his employees, without any malice, or in any wise damaging the plaintiff or his family, removed them, together with their goods and chattels, from the premises, etc.
On motion, the court struck out and rejected from the answer all that part thereof which alleges that, in doing what they did, the defendants acted under and in pursuance of advice obtained from a competent and responsible attorney. This ruling is complained of as error.
In an action for civil damages for forcible entry upon, or for malicious injury to, property belonging to another, either of which constitutes an offence punishable by the criminal law of the State (sections 1972 and 1955, R. S. 1881), only actual compensatory damages are recoverable. State, ex rel., v. Stevens, 103 Ind. 55 (53 Am. R. 482, 2 N.E. 214); Koerner v. Oberly, 56 Ind. 284 (26 Am. R. 34); Schafer v. Smith, 63 Ind. 226.
If the plaintiff is entitled to recover at all, in such a case, he is justly entitled to recover full compensation, without regard to the motives which induced the defendant's wrongful act. It is only where the jury are, or may be, called upon to give exemplary or punitive damages, or damages beyond actual compensation, that the facts and circumstances which go to explain the motive or disclose the intent of the party committing the wrongful act may be pleaded or proved.
Where an essential ingredient of the action is malice, or where the elements of fraud, deliberate oppression, or malice enter into or induce the commission of a wrong, for which the wrong-doer is not amenable to the criminal law, in addition to full compensation, exemplary or punitive damages may, sometimes, be recovered by the plaintiff. In cases of that class, it may be competent for the defendant to show that, in what he did, he acted for an honest purpose, upon the advice of a competent lawyer, after having given him a full and true statement of all the facts within his knowledge. Lytton v. Baird, 95 Ind. 349, and cases cited.
The court committed no error in striking out that part of the answer referred to above.
What has been said disposes of all questions made upon rulings of the court which had reference to the motives or intent with which the defendants acted. As has been seen, their intent and purpose in invading the plaintiff's possession, or whether they acted in good faith or not, was wholly immaterial. The sole question was, whether in doing what they did the plaintiff's legal rights were invaded to his damage.
The evidence tended to show that on the 28th day of August, 1885, Gordon was occupying certain lands belonging to the defendant Moyer, having taken possession on the 6th day of the preceding April. Gordon went into possession under an agreement, as he claims, that a written lease was to be made thereafter, defining the terms and duration of the tenancy, and the rights of the parties. The plaintiff and Moyer met soon after at the office of an attorney, where a lease was found prepared containing conditions of a character so stringent, and having in it such other objectionable features, which Gordon claimed had never been agreed upon, that the latter refused to accept it. The lease was never signed by either party. Both agreed in their testimony that a written lease was contemplated. They disagreed as to the terms and conditions that were to be written therein. The evidence showed that Gordon continued along on the farm, sowed oats and planted corn, cultivated the land, harvested the hay and oats, with the consent of Moyer, who received his full share of the crops.
There was from thirty-five to forty acres of corn growing on the land, which had been planted and cultivated by Gordon and "laid by," when, on the date above mentioned Moyer, accompanied by the other appellants, whom he had employed for the purpose, went to the house on the farm in which Gordon and his family resided, and in his absence forcibly ejected his wife, and put their household goods and other property into the highway. The appellants took possession of the house and premises. Upon...
To continue reading
Request your trial