Moyer v. Nelson, Civ. No. 10-56-C-1.

• Decision Date: 26 February 1971
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 10-56-C-1.
• Citation: 324 F. Supp. 1224
• Parties: William MOYER, Plaintiff, v. Dorothy NELSON, Gordon Duffield, Justices of the Peace, Polk County, Iowa, Ray A. Fenton, County Attorney, Polk County, Iowa, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

324 F. Supp. 1224

William MOYER, Plaintiff, v. Dorothy NELSON, Gordon Duffield, Justices of the Peace, Polk County, Iowa, Ray A. Fenton, County Attorney, Polk County, Iowa, Defendants.

Civ. No. 10-56-C-1.

United States District Court, S. D. Iowa, C. D.

February 26, 1971.

Donald A. Wine and Dan Johnston, Des Moines, Iowa, for plaintiff.

John Perkins and Philip F. Miller, Asst. County Atty., Des Moines, Iowa, for defendants.

G. Douglas Essy and Michael J. McLaughlin, State of Iowa, for intervenor.

Before VAN OOSTERHOUT, Circuit Judge, STEPHENSON, District Chief Judge, and HANSON, District Judge.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

STEPHENSON, District Chief Judge.

This action is one instituted by William Moyer for injunctive and declaratory relief. At issue is the constitutionality of the Iowa justice of the peace fee system, the claim being that it is unconstitutional on the ground that the fee justice has a substantial pecuniary interest in the outcome of the litigation he handles. A district court of three judges has been convoked, oral argument has been heard, briefs and supporting affidavits have been submitted and the case is before us on the motion of Intervenor to dismiss.

The principal defendants are Dorothy Nelson and Gordon Duffield, Justices of the Peace, Polk County, Iowa, and Ray A. Fenton, County Attorney, Polk County, Iowa. The State of Iowa has been granted leave to appear herein as an intervening defendant.¹ Jurisdiction is premised on 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1343, 2201 and 2281.

The background facts, naturally, are important. And, the specifics of the statutory scheme about which plaintiff complains deserve mention so that the case's nature is apparent. All this may be summarized as follows:

1. There is no real dispute as to the background facts. Plaintiff was arrested while operating a motor truck on Interstate 80 on August 18, 1969, for violation of § 327.6 of the Iowa Code.² He was taken promptly before defendant Nelson, the nearest or most accessible magistrate and a fee justice, where he entered a plea of not guilty and posted bond of $300. The matter was set down for trial for August 22, 1969.

2. Thereafter, on August 20, 1969, plaintiff filed an Affidavit for Change of Venue and the case was transferred to the docket of defendant Duffield, also a fee justice, where it is still pending.

3. By this action filed July 1, 1970, plaintiff seeks: (a) an order enjoining his prosecution in the court of Justice Duffield or in that of any other fee justice, and (b) an order declaring "the currently existing fee system of the Iowa Justice of the Peace courts as presently constituted illegal and unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."

4. With this factual background we look at the statutory scheme. Preliminarily we note that § 601.131, Iowa Code Annotated, 1966, sets forth the compensation of justices of the peace and provides that justices serving in townships of less than 10,000 population are compensated out of fees they collect, while those serving in larger townships are paid a fixed salary. We observe, however, that the fee justice's salary is not dependent on conviction. That is, the fee justice receives his compensation without regard to the outcome of the litigation which he handles.³ Compare Bennett v. Cottingham, 290 F.Supp. 759 (Three-judge court, N.D.Ala.1969).⁴ Of significance though, is the relationship between the compensation of the fee justice and the volume of business he transacts. For example, § 601.131(2) (a) permits and authorizes a fee justice serving in a township of more than four thousand but less than ten thousand population to retain the first $1200 of fees he collects, plus fifty percent of the remainder of fees he collects. Thus, the more business the fee justice can generate, the higher the amount of his compensation.

5. The pertinent Iowa statute dealing with the place of trial is § 321.485, and perhaps § 758.1, although on its face the latter purports to relate to a different situation. Of these, § 321.485, entitled "Notice to appear", deals specifically with the disposition of violators of Iowa traffic laws. This is a venue statute which empowers a peace officer having reasonable cause to believe that a person has violated any provision of the Iowa traffic law to: a immediately arrest such person and take him before any magistrate of the county in which the apparent violation occurred, or b without effecting an arrest, either: (1) issue a summons to appear in the court of any magistrate of the county in which the alleged violation occurred, or (2) prepare a memorandum of the alleged violation for use by the Department of Motor Vehicles.

Having reviewed the background facts and the relevant statutory materials we are in a position to make certain observations relative to plaintiff's claims:

(1) Plaintiff's position here, buttressed by affidavits,⁵ comes down to this: the foregoing statutory scheme permits forum shopping by peace officers for "friendly" fee justices of the peace; that a peace officer, having this choice of forum, is encouraged to select only those fee justices who are most likely to return convictions; that fee justices who do not please peace officers with high conviction rates are blacklisted and do not receive any business; that the fee system is so structured as to promote a fee justice's pecuniary interest in the outcome of cases before him because of the direct and substantial relationship between his compensation and the volume of business he transacts. In short, plaintiff contends that the fee system in combination with the choice-of-forum provisions of § 321.485, which vest peace officers with complete latitude as to choice of forum, is unconstitutional. The defendants urge, first, that plaintiff has failed to raise a substantial federal question. They argue, secondly, that plaintiff's failure to pursue available state remedies precludes him from proceeding in this Court. The defendants press upon us, finally, their argument that we should invoke the doctrine of abstention and thereby avoid proceeding to decision on the merits.

(2) Plaintiff's is an arrest situation. As to traffic arrests, § 321.485, at first reading, seems clearly to preserve for a peace officer acting thereunder, discretion as to place of trial. It is at this point, however, that § 758.1 takes on particular pertinency. By it a peace officer who effects an arrest of any type without a warrant must bring his arrestee before the nearest or most accessible magistrate in the county in which the arrest is made. Thus, as to the disposition of arrested persons generally, the arresting peace officer has little or no discretion with regard to the magistrate before whom his arrestee is to be taken.

(3) These differing requirements naturally present some element of confusion as to the Iowa legislature's basic attitude toward traffic arrestees. And, we can find no definitive statement as to the interrelationship between these two statutes by the Supreme Court of Iowa. We suspect, however, that this inconsistency has simply been overlooked by the legislature. We feel that the correct interpretation of these statutes, and the one intended by the Iowa legislature, is that §§ 758.1 and 321.485 are to be construed with reference to each other, and that § 758.1 is to be interpreted as a restriction on § 321.485, thereby compelling an arresting peace officer to bring his traffic arrestees before the nearest or most accessible magistrate. We think too, that the Supreme Court of Iowa would reach this result. All this being so, we doubt that a peace officer who effects a traffic arrest has any meaningful discretion as to forum.

(4) From the foregoing it follows, it seems to us, that if § 321.485 permits forum shopping at all, it does so in summons situations only. Here, however, we do not have a summons situation. We have, instead, a strict compliance with § 758.1: an arrest coupled with a prompt taking before the nearest or most accessible magistrate. And, plaintiff subsequently obtained a change of venue to the court of a fee justice other than the one chosen by the peace officer.⁶ We are therefore immediately confronted with an important question concerning the litigative posture of this plaintiff. In short, is he a person harmed by the supposed wrong?

(5) It seems clear that Moyer has an injury of the sort requisite to give him standing if on the basis of his substantive contentions there exists a nexus between the status asserted by him and the claim he presents. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968) and Doe and Roe v. Scott, 321 F.Supp. 1385, 1387-1388 (Three Judgment Court, N.D.Ill.1971). Moyer suggests and argues (a) that the proclivity to convict is as great in arrest cases as in summons cases because, (b) to obtain the choice-of-forum (summons) cases, a fee justice must "cooperate" with peace officers in all cases. Thus, as to himself, Moyer seems to be saying that the action he challenges here has caused injury in fact. Compare Flast, supra, and Doe and Roe, supra, with Association of Data Processing v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151-152, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970) and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164, 90 S.Ct. 832, 25 L.Ed.2d 192 (1970).

(6) Although from the standing aspect we regard Moyer's position as being at the law's edge, we recognize that the nature and force of his attack goes to the practices of all fee justices in arrest and summons cases alike. Thus, all in all, and in spite of some deficiencies in his posture here, we regard Moyer's factual situation as being within the general atmosphere of Flast, Association of Data Processing and Barlow.

We raise on our own a serious and important question concerning the jurisdiction and administration of statutory three-judge courts convoked under 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2281 and 2284.

We repeat that the complaint before us requests injunctive and...