Moyer v. Scott

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Campbell, J.:
• Citation: Moyer v. Scott, 30 Mich. 345 (Mich. 1874)
• Decision Date: 13 October 1874
• Parties: Abraham Moyer v. Aaron L. Scott

30 Mich. 345

Abraham Moyer v. Aaron L. Scott

Supreme Court of Michigan

October 13, 1874

Heard October 6, 1874

Error to Lapeer Circuit.

Judgment reversed, with costs, and a new trial granted.

W. W Stickney and Gaskill & Geer, for plaintiff in error.

W Hemingway and C. P. Thomas, for defendant in error.

OPINION

Campbell, J.:

Scott sued Moyer for the conversion of timber cut in 1870 on certain lands once owned by Henry H. Crapo, and contracted by him to be sold to one Kinsley S. Hunt. The contract to Hunt was made in 1863, and provided for the conveyance of the land upon the payment of certain installments of purchase money annually for ten years, the last being due September 14, 1873. In 1870, when the alleged trespass was committed, the ownership of this contract was in John P. Smith and John S. Fellows, and Moyer then held a mortgage on the equitable title under the assignment for two thousand dollars. Scott purchased the interest of Smith and Fellows on the 8th of December, 1870, and at the same time took an assignment of their right of action against Moyer. The action was brought on the 7th day of August, 1872. The declaration does not set forth the cause of action as having been assigned, but declares as for a conversion of Scott's own property.

Upon the trial Scott's interest was deduced through the assignment, and he was allowed to introduce a deed from Crapo's executor, dated and given in September, 1872, after the suit was commenced. This was allowed and introduced for the purpose of establishing a title to recover damages by giving to the deed (which was made in fulfillment of Crapo's contract) such effect by relation as to entitle the holders of the contract to the damages for the trespass, although until after the suit was commenced the title to the land had continued in Crapo's estate.

The contract given by Crapo was very carefully drawn, and contained no license or grant of possessory rights. It simply covenanted to convey by warranty deed upon the payment of the several installments, but subject to taxes, which the purchaser was to look after. There was nothing in the case to show any possessory rights in the purchaser or his assigns, and it is not seriously disputed that when the suit was commenced, the plaintiff had no cause of action, and without the deed from Crapo's estate could not have recovered, unless the contract gave such an ownership as carried an original right of action.

Whatever may be the rights of contract purchasers when they have fulfilled all the conditions, and become absolutely entitled to a conveyance, there is no foundation for the claim that they are the owners of the land before that time. Unless they have acquired possessory rights, the holder of the title must be the only person who can legally complain in a court of law of injuries to the freehold. There can be no double recovery for trespasses and spoliations, and until the contract is complied with, the land and timber belong in law to the legal owner. Our statutes allow purchasers from the United States to depend on their duplicate certificates in advance of patents, and also allow similar privileges to purchasers of state lands. They also, in certain cases, allow actions of waste in favor of execution purchasers: Comp. Laws, § 4658. But the law is well settled that a purchaser from the United States who has lawfully obtained his certificate is the actual owner, and the United States retains no beneficial interest whatever: Carroll v. Safford, 3 How. R., 441. The purchasers under our state land...