Moyle v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 96-70875

Decision Date29 June 1998
Docket NumberNo. 96-70875,96-70875
Citation147 F.3d 1116
Parties, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5106, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7200 Raymond V. MOYLE, Petitioner, v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS; Jones Oregon Stevedoring Co., Respondents.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Meagan Flynn (argument), and Kevin Keaney (brief), Pozzi, Wilson, Atchison, LLP, Portland, Oregon, for the petitioner.

Laura J. Stomski, United States Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, Washington, DC, for the respondents.

Petition for Review of an Order of the Benefits Review Board. B.R.B. No. 94-2390.

Before: LAY, * GOODWIN, and PREGERSON, Circuit Judges.

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:

Raymond V. Moyle petitions for review of the Benefits Review Board's ("Board") summary affirmance of an Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") decision. The ALJ found that Moyle's disability benefits could be garnished to satisfy his delinquent spousal support payments. Moyle challenged the garnishment as prohibited by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 916 ("LHWCA Anti-Alienation provision"). But the ALJ found that a later-enacted Social Security Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 659 ("SSA Garnishment provision"), impliedly repealed the LHWCA Anti-Alienation provision and permitted the garnishment. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Raymond V. Moyle was awarded compensation for permanent total disability on June 26, 1981. Since 1982, those benefits have been paid out of the Special Fund established by 33 U.S.C. § 944 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA"). 1

In 1991, an Oregon state court ordered the garnishment of Moyle's LHWCA disability benefits to satisfy his delinquent spousal support payments. The Director of the Division of Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation ("Director") notified Moyle that the division would comply with the court order. Moyle then requested a hearing before an ALJ. Before the ALJ, Moyle argued that the LHWCA Anti-Alienation provision prohibited garnishment of his disability payments to satisfy his delinquent spousal support payments. The LHWCA Anti-Alienation provision provides that:

No assignment, release, or commutation of compensation or benefits due or payable under this chapter, except as provided by this chapter shall be valid, and such compensation and benefits shall be exempt from all claims of creditors and from levy, execution, and attachment or other remedy for recovery or collection of a debt, which exemption may not be waived.

33 U.S.C. § 916.

The ALJ granted the Director's motion for summary judgment, finding that garnishment of Moyle's benefits was proper. The ALJ determined that the LHWCA Anti-Alienation provision had been repealed in relevant part by the later-enacted SSA Garnishment provision, 2 which provides that Notwithstanding any other provision of law ... moneys (the entitlement to which is based upon remuneration for employment) due from, or payable by, the United States or the District of Columbia (including any agency, subdivision, or instrumentality thereof) to any individual, including members of the Armed Forces of the United States, shall be subject, in like manner and to the same extent as if the United States or the District of Columbia were a private person, ... to any ... legal process brought, by a State agency administering a program under a State plan approved under this part or by an individual obligee, to enforce the legal obligation of the individual to provide child support or alimony.

42 U.S.C. § 659(a) (West Supp.1998). 3 Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Moyle's disability benefits could be garnished under the SSA Garnishment provision.

In reaching this decision, the ALJ noted that the Office of Personnel Management promulgated a regulation that expressly provides that LHWCA benefits are subject to garnishment pursuant to the SSA Garnishment provision. See 5 C.F.R. § 581.103(c)(5) (authorizes garnishment of "[b]enefits received under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act").

Moyle then appealed to the Benefits Review Board. The ALJ's decision was summarily affirmed by operation of law when the Board failed to decide the appeal within a year of its filing. We have jurisdiction under 33 U.S.C. § 921(c).

ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review

We review decisions of the Benefits Review Board for errors of law. See Sproull v. Director, OWCP, 86 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied 520 U.S. 1155, 117 S.Ct. 1333, 137 L.Ed.2d 493 (1997). No special deference is given to the Board's interpretations of the LHWCA. Id. But we accord "considerable weight" to the Director's statutory construction of the LHWCA. See Mallott & Peterson v. Director, OWCP, 98 F.3d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1239, 117 S.Ct. 1842, 137 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1997). "This deference extends not only to regulations articulating the Director's interpretation, but also to litigating positions asserted by the Director in the course of administrative adjudications...." Id.

But we owe no deference to an agency's resolution of statutory conflicts that implicate legislation that is not administered by that agency. See Shanty Town Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. EPA, 843 F.2d 782, 790 n. 12 (4th Cir.1988) (citing New Jersey Air Nat'l Guard v. FLRA, 677 F.2d 276, 281-82 n. 6 (3d Cir.1982)). Following this rule, our court has held that it must independently resolve conflicts between statutes administered by one agency and regulations promulgated by another agency. See Internal Revenue Serv. v. FLRA, 706 F.2d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir.1983).

Therefore, we do not defer to the Director's resolution of the apparent conflict between the LHWCA Anti-Alienation provision and the SSA Garnishment provision. Similarly, we owe no deference to an agency's regulation that attempts to resolve a conflict between the LHWCA Anti-Alienation provision and the SSA Garnishment provision.

B. Law of Implied Repeal 4

The only issue in this case is whether the SSA Garnishment provision impliedly There are two kinds of implied repeal:

repealed the LHWCA Anti-Alienation provision, thereby permitting garnishment of Moyle's disability benefits.

(1) where provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one; and (2) if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act.

Kee Leasing Co. v. McGahan (In re the Glacier Bay), 944 F.2d 577, 581 (9th Cir.1991) (quoting Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154, 96 S.Ct. 1989, 48 L.Ed.2d 540 (1976)). In either case, "the intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest. " Id. (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). "Repeals by implication ... are not favored and will only be found when the new statute is clearly repugnant, in words or purpose, to the old statute...." Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).

The second type of implied repeal is not present here because the legislation that included the SSA Garnishment provision did not cover the entire subject of workers' compensation. See generally Pub.L. No. 93-647, sec. 101(a), § 459, 88 Stat. 2337, 2357 (1975). Therefore, our analysis focuses on whether the SSA Garnishment provision irreconcilably conflicts with the LHWCA Anti-Alienation provision. See Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d at 581. If the statutes are irreconcilable, the SSA Garnishment provision controls because it is the later-enacted statute. See Id. 5

C. Irreconcilable Conflict

"When interpreting a statute, we ordinarily first look to the plain meaning of the language used by Congress. But if the statute is ambiguous, we consult the legislative history, to the extent that it is of value, to aid in our interpretation." Straub v. A.P. Green, Inc., 38 F.3d 448, 452 (9th Cir.1994) (citations omitted).

The plain language of the SSA Garnishment provision permits garnishment of "moneys (the entitlement to which is based upon remuneration for employment) due from, or payable by, the United States ... to any individual...." 42 U.S.C. § 659(a) (emphasis added). The provision further provides a definition of the types of payments that qualify as "remuneration for employment." The provision explains that such moneys include:

periodic benefits ... or other payments ... under any other system or fund established by the United States which provides for the payment of pensions, retirement or retired pay, annuities, dependents' or survivors' benefits, or similar amounts payable on account of personal services performed by the individual or any other individual....

42 U.S.C. § 659(h)(A)(ii)(II). Thus, the Director argues that the SSA Garnishment provision permits garnishment of Moyle's LHWCA benefits because they are periodic benefits paid from a special fund established by the United States pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 944.

Moreover, the SSA Garnishment provision also defines "remuneration for employment" to include "worker's compensation benefits paid or payable under Federal or State law...." 42 U.S.C. § 659(h)(A)(iii). 6 a. Legislative History

Moyle's LHWCA disability payments can thus also be characterized as "remuneration for employment" that may be garnished under the SSA Garnishment provision because such payments are worker's compensation benefits that are payable pursuant to federal law. Therefore, the plain language of the SSA Garnishment provision and its definitions suggest that the provision does apply to Moyle's LHWCA benefits. However, because the SSA Garnishment provision does not explicitly mention benefits paid under the LHWCA, we also look to legislative history to determine whether Congress intended to repeal the LHWCA Anti-Alienation provision with the SSA Garnishment provision.

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