Mpras v. Dist. of Columbia
Decision Date | 21 November 2014 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2014–cv–00220 TSC |
Citation | 74 F.Supp.3d 265 |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Parties | Emanuel Nikolaos Mpras, Plaintiff, v. District of Columbia, Defendant. |
Matthew August Lefande, Law Offices of Matthew August Lefande, Arlington, VA, for Plaintiff.
Stephanie Litos, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
Before the Court is the District of Columbia's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 5) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Plaintiff Emanuel Nikolaos Mpras's Opposition (ECF No. 7), and the District's Reply (ECF No. 8). Upon consideration of the briefing and for the reasons that follow, the Court grants Defendant's Motion.
Plaintiff Mpras filed a four-count Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deprivation of a property interest, deprivation of a liberty interest, deprivation of equal protection under the law, and defamation per se . The first three of Mpras's counts are based on his allegation that the District wrongfully deprived him of the photographic identification referred to in subsection (d) of the Law Enforcement Officer's Safety Act (the “LEOSA”), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 926C. . In his fourth count, for defamation, Mpras alleges that the District maintains false information in its official records concerning Mpras's employment, that the District has “transmitted such false information” concerning his “fitness for employment as a law enforcement officer” to third parties, and in doing so, “directly and proximately injured the Plaintiff in his profession” and “wrongfully impede[s] and prevent[s] the Plaintiff's future employment as a law enforcement officer.” (Id. ¶¶ 36–40).
Additionally, Mpras seeks relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) in the form of a declaration that the District's failure to issue him the photographic identification card “and the attendant immunities of the [LEOSA]” is unlawful, and an injunction ordering the District to provide him such a card. (Id. ¶¶ 41–43). Lastly, Mpras seeks monetary and punitive damages.
LEOSA provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the law of any State or any political subdivision thereof, an individual who is a qualified retired law enforcement officer and who is carrying the identification required by subsection (d) may carry a concealed firearm that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce....
18 U.S.C. § 926C(a). In order to meet the identification requirements of subsection (d), retired law enforcement officers must possess:
Id. § 926C(d). In sum, LEOSA allows a “qualified retired law enforcement officer” who possesses photographic identification that meets the requirements of subsection (d) to carry a concealed firearm notwithstanding any other provision of the law of any state or political subdivision thereof.
Mpras alleges that the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) “has established procedures for establishing eligibility [for] and the issuance of photographic identification for all qualified former [MPD] officers in furtherance of the [LEOSA].” (Compl.¶ 21). However, Mpras has not identified what these procedures are, nor has he cited any authority wherein they appear. The only statute or regulation cited in his Complaint is LEOSA. (Id. ¶ 9).
Mpras's Complaint demonstrates what appears to be a fundamental misunderstanding of the operation of LEOSA. Mpras claims that “a police officer” who meets the seven qualifications he lists in paragraph nine of the Complaint1 “may carry a concealed firearm that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, notwithstanding any other provision of the law of any State or any political subdivision thereof, subject to some additional other limitations not applicable herein.” (Id .). That is, Mpras alleges that an officer who meets the qualifications he lists is entitled to carry a concealed firearm. This is an incorrect reading of the statute. LEOSA requires that one must be a “qualified retired law enforcement officer” under § 926C(c)and possess a photographic identification in the form recognized by § 926C(d) in order to obtain the right Congress conferred in § 926C(a).
“In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must construe the complaint ‘in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’ ” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C.Cir.2012) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C.Cir.1979) ). The plaintiff's factual allegations are assumed to be true and must “be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Pleadings that “are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief ... it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
The District's motion to dismiss Mpras's § 1983 constitutional claims relies on Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), which holds that it is only when “a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell remains the standard under which a municipality qualifies as a “person” subject to suit under § 1983 for constitutional violations. E.g., Singletary v. District of Columbia, 766 F.3d 66, 72 (D.C.Cir.2014) ( ).
In determining whether Mpras has stated claims for municipal liability under § 1983, the Court must conduct a two-step inquiry. Baker v. District of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C.Cir.2003) (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992) ). “First, the court must determine whether the complaint states a claim for a predicate constitutional violation.” Id. If Mpras has adequately pled a constitutional violation, the Court then considers “whether the complaint states a claim that a custom or policy of the municipality caused the violation.” Id. “Each inquiry is separate,” Id. (citations omitted) and therefore the Court will first address whether Mpras sufficiently pled a predicate constitutional violation before moving on to the District's municipal liability.
Section 1983 provides for a civil action against:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws....
42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 is not the source of substantive rights but rather ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’ ” Blackman v. District of Columbia, 456 F.3d 167, 177 (D.C.Cir.2006) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979) ); see also Pitt v. District of Columbia, 491 F.3d 494, 510 (D.C.Cir.2007) (citing Baker, 443 U.S. at 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689 ). It follows that if a plaintiff has not sufficiently pled an injury to a federally conferred right, then the plaintiff...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Melton v. Dist. of Columbia
...were similarly situated, as he must in order to state a viable equal protection claim. See Mpras v. District of Columbia, 74 F.Supp.3d 265, 272, 2014 WL 6603303, at *5 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2014) (dismissing equal protection claim in light of plaintiff s failure to “allege any facts ... about wh......
-
BEG Invs., LLC v. Alberti
...situated businesses,” Am. Compl. ¶ 115, is no substitute for factual allegations. See Mpras v. District of Columbia, No.2014–CV–00220, 74 F.Supp.3d 265, 271, 2014 WL 6603303, at *5 (D.D.C.2014) (rejecting as conclusory the complaint's allegation that the plaintiff was treated differently fr......
-
Duberry v. Dist. of Columbia
...the conditional right afforded by section 3 of LEOSA, albeit in dicta. See also Mpras v. District of Columbia, No.2014–cv–00220, 74 F.Supp.3d 265, 268, 2014 WL 6603303, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2014) ("LEOSA requires that one must be a ‘qualified retired law enforcement officer’ ... and posse......
-
Robles v. Kerry
... ... Civil Action No.: 1479 RC United States District Court, District of Columbia. Signed November 21, 2014 74 F.Supp.3d 256 Jean Paul Vissepo Garriga, Vissepo Law Group, P.S.C, San ... ...