Mrowka v. Bd. Of Zoning Appeals Of Town Of Plainville.
| Decision Date | 14 November 1947 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | MROWKA et al. v. BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS OF TOWN OF PLAINVILLE. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Hartford County; Pickett, Judge.
Appeal by Peter Mrowka and others from the action of the Board of Zoning Appeals of the Town of Plainville in refusing to grant a certificate of approval of a location for a gasoline station. Trial to the court resulted in a judgment sustaining the appeal, and defendant board appeals.
Error and case remanded with directions.
Wallace W. Brown, of Hartford, and Arnold M. Sweig, of Plainville, for appellant.
Leo V. Gaffney, of Hartford, for appellees.
Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, ELLS and DICKENSON, JJ.
The plaintiffs made an application to the board of zoning appeals of the town of Plainville ‘to put up gas station and have repairer's permit on corner of Woodford and Woodland St.’ and ‘to establish a business.’ The board denied the application. The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, alleging that they had filed with the board an application for a certificate of approval of a location for a gasoline station at the place designated. The court sustained the appeal and the defendant board has appealed to this court.
A primary question arises out of the claim by the zoning board that the court had no jurisdiction of the appeal because of the joinder in the application to the board of a request for a permit to put up a gasoline station and a permit to make repairs to motor vehicles. While the application lacked formality, it is quite evidence that, as the parties viewed it at the trial, the request had two aspects: It sought the certificate of approval of the location required before a license to sell gasoline and other products used in motor vehicles can be obtained from the commissioner of motor vehicles; General Statutes, Sup.1941, § 242f; Cum.Sup.1939, § 552e; and the like certificate required before the commissioner can issue a license for the conduct of the business of repairing motor vehicles. Sup.1941, §§ 212f, 214f. In both instances the statutes require that the certificate be issued by the zoning board of appeals if there is one in the town where the business is to be carried on. In the case of a certificate of approval of a location for the sale of gasoline, the statute was amended in 1941 to provide that an appeal lies only to the Court of Common Pleas; §§ 243f, 810f. Later, at the same session, the statute concerning the licensing of repairers of motor vehicles was enacted and signed by the Governor, and it provided that an appeal from a zoning board with reference to the location for carrying on that business must be taken to the Superior Court. Sup.1941 § 217f. While it would have been better practice for the plaintiffs to have made separate applications for the two certificates, we can see no fatal objection to the joinder of the two in a single application. When the board denied the application as a whole, the issues presented by the two requests were so separable that an appeal from the denial of the certificate as to the gasoline station only might not improperly be taken. Even in the strict procedure of the courts an appeal may be taken from a separable portion of a judgment. Town of Enfield v. Hamilton, 110 Conn. 319, 322, 149 A. 353. Indeed, the zoning board, after it had treated the application as properly presenting both questions instead of requiring a separation, can hardly claim before the court that the applicants could not appeal from its decision in so far as it denied the certificate of approval for the gasoline station. The appeal was properly before the court.
The facts as presented in the finding, with slight amendments to which the defendant is entitled, may be summarized as follows: Of the two streets at the intersection of which the premises in question are located, Woodford Avenue is a main traveled highway, substantially straight in either direction for a quarter of a mile or more. About 250 feet easterly of the location on Woodford Avenue there is a bridge over a stream, at that point the highway narrows, and because of this the traffic flow is retarded. To the south and east of the site are substantial residential areas including an extensive housing project and residents in them travel along Woodford Avenue, walking or in vehicles; children of school age customarily pass the location in question going to and from school, some walking, some on bicycles and some riding in busses. Busses use the avenue, and there is a bus stop in front of the premises in question for those going east and also one on the opposite side of the avenue for those going west. On the north side of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Stamford
...use is permitted in the zone in question. That perception is contrary to established precedent. In Mrowka v. Board of Zoning Appeals , 134 Conn. 149, 149–51, 55 A.2d 909 (1947), the applicants sought licenses to sell gasoline and to conduct automobile repairs on a property in Plainville, bo......
-
White v. City of Twin Falls
...supra [49 Idaho 89, 286 P. 358]; McPherson v. First Presbyterian Church, 120 Okl. 40, 248 P. 561, 51 A.L.R. 1215; Mrowka v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 134 Conn. 149, 55 A.2d 909; Anderson v. City of Holland, 344 Mich. 706, 74 N.W.2d 894; Garrett v. Borough of Beaver, 367 Pa. 626, 81 A.2d 900.......
-
Ben Lomond, Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls
...Russell Sage Foundation 1940); Olp v. Town of Brighton, 173 Misc. 1079, 19 N.Y.S.2d 546 at 552-553 (1940).42 Note 40, supra.43 134 Conn. 149, 55 A.2d 909 (1947).44 Id. at 154-155, 55 A.2d 911-912; see also Zelazny v. Town Board of Town of North Hempstead, Sup., 101 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1950); cf. ......
-
Jennings v. Connecticut Light & Power Co.
...body are entitled to consider facts which they have learned through personal observation, if properly made. Mrowka v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 134 Conn. 149, 154, 55 A.2d 909. Even if it were conceded that knowledge from personal observation was improperly acquired by a member of the commis......