MS v. E. New Mexico Mental Retardation Servs.

• Decision Date: 16 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. CIV 13-628 RB-GBW,CIV 13-628 RB-GBW
• Parties: MS, through his next friend and parent, FLORINDA HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. EASTERN NEW MEXICO MENTAL RETARDATION SERVICES, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

MS, through his next friend and parent, FLORINDA HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. EASTERN NEW MEXICO MENTAL RETARDATION SERVICES, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV 13-628 RB-GBW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

June 16, 2015

OMNIBUS MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff MS is a developmentally disabled adult who formerly resided at and worked for Defendant Eastern New Mexico Mental Retardation Services, which operates as Eastern New Mexico Rehabilitative Services for the Handicapped, Inc., locally known as "ENMRSH." Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, including ENMRSH, its employees, and local healthcare providers, violated his constitutional and state law rights by abusing him, involuntarily committing him, and using his governmental benefits for their own purposes. Defendants filed three motions to dismiss (Docs. 84, 90, 95) and two motions for summary judgment (Docs. 103, 130). Having reviewed the parties' arguments and submissions, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Defendants Houfek and Spencer (Doc. 84); grants Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Workplace Injury Claim (Doc. 90); grants Defendant Robert B. Spencer Foundation's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 95); denies Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Plaintiff's Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act Claims (Doc. 103); and grants Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Plaintiff's Constitutional Claims (Doc. 130).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff MS, a developmentally disabled adult, first became an ENMRSH client in 2006 when he was 26 years old. (Third Am. Compl. ("TAC") ¶¶ 1, 6.) His parents sought ENMRSH's services and enrolled him in ENMRSH's programs. (Doc. 130 ¶ 9.) At first, Plaintiff attended ENMRSH for habilitation services during the day. (TAC ¶ 6.) In 2008, Plaintiff began living at ENMRSH full time. (Id.) He also participated in ENMRSH's vocational training program and eventually began performing work through ENMRSH. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 29-32.) Due to various impairments, Plaintiff was, and is, "entirely dependent on others to protect him from harm." (Id. ¶ 2.)

During his time at ENMRSH, Plaintiff claims he was physically abused and neglected on numerous occasions. On June 22, 2006, Plaintiff claims he suffered serious eye damage and vision loss while working for ENMRSH. (Id. ¶¶ 30, 47.) Allegedly, Plaintiff was told to hold an uncovered bucket of caustic chemicals during a bumpy car ride. (Id. ¶¶ 39, 41.) Defendant Tisha Lovelady, his ENMRSH supervisor, knew he had been splashed with the chemicals. (Id. ¶¶ 39, 42-43.) Despite this knowledge, neither Defendant Lovelady nor any other ENMRSH employee did anything when Plaintiff developed an obvious eye irritation. (Id. ¶ 44.) Three years later, on September 15, 2009, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Chris Sena, an ENMRSH employee, violently punched and kicked Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 55.) The alleged abuse was so severe that a neighbor called the police to investigate. (Id. ¶¶ 55-57.) Furthermore, Plaintiff claims that he was regularly assaulted, injured, taunted, and teased by ENMRSH employees. (Id. ¶¶ 59-60.) He started receiving scars from cigarette burns around January 2010. (Id. ¶ 60.)

Plaintiff next alleges that ENMRSH improperly medicated him and then committed him to inpatient psychiatric care. Around 2009, a doctor began prescribing Plaintiff psychotropicmedications, even though Plaintiff never exhibited any psychotic symptoms. (Id. ¶ 65, 66.) The medications were intended to treat Plaintiff's "behavior problems and depression," but were not tailored to Plaintiff's needs. (Id. ¶ 66.) ENMRSH allegedly did not consider less restrictive medical or therapeutic alternatives. (Id. ¶ 67.) Due to the medications, Plaintiff now suffers from edema and other side effects. (Id. ¶ 68.) Additionally, in 2010, based on so-called behavior issues, ENMRSH committed Plaintiff to the Sunrise Mental Health Center at the Eastern New Mexico Medical Center. (Id. ¶¶ 69, 71.) Not only was Plaintiff's family never consulted before Plaintiff's commitment, his family was barred from visiting him. (Id. ¶¶ 70, 79.) Defendant Dr. Reza Mirin allegedly ordered Plaintiff's commitment based on "exaggerated" reports from ENMRSH staff and failed to conduct an individualized evaluation. (Id. ¶¶ 72, 75.) After five days, Plaintiff was discharged. (Id. ¶ 80) Plaintiff argues that he was improperly medicated and committed based on his developmental disability, not based on medical necessity. (Id. ¶ 82.)

Plaintiff further alleges that ENMRSH took financial advantage of him. ENMRSH became Plaintiff's representative payee, and so received all of Plaintiff's Social Security income and Medicaid benefits. (Id. ¶ 15.) Instead of using these funds for Plaintiff's benefit, Plaintiff alleges that ENMRSH's officers "used these financial resources to benefit themselves and their employees." (Id. ¶¶ 84, 100, 103.) According to the Third Amended Complaint, in his role as Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") and President of ENMRSH, Defendant Spencer earned an average $450,000 annually for the years 2005-2010. (Id. ¶ 101.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Spencer established the Robert B. Spencer Foundation, which has received millions of dollars from ENMRSH since 2007. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 102.) Defendant Spencer created the Foundation, Plaintiff alleges, to be a joint venture with ENMRSH and used it to divert funds. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 14, 16, 103.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that ENMRSH, a subsidized participant in theDevelopmentally Disabled waiver program, underpaid Plaintiff for the work he performed and otherwise violated New Mexico's regulatory standards. (Id. ¶¶ 54, 91, 92.)

In sum, Plaintiff avers that ENMRSH was not the institution it held itself out to be. Plaintiff claims he was inadequately supervised and denied services which he was entitled to receive. (Id. ¶¶ 85-86.) ENMRSH represented itself as a quality service-provider, yet Plaintiff claims that ENMRSH failed to abide by basic legal requirements. (Id. ¶¶ 176-77, 198.)

Plaintiff filed suit, bringing state and federal claims, against Defendants on July 8, 2013. (Doc. 1.) After amending his Complaint several times, Plaintiff settled on the currently operative Third Amended Complaint. (TAC, Doc. 81.) The parties have not yet begun discovery. Presently, before the Court, are three motions to dismiss and two motions for summary judgment. For organizational reasons, the Court first addresses the two motions for summary judgment.

II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS

Plaintiff brings several constitutional claims against ENMRSH and its employees for violations of his First Amendment rights, Fourth Amendment rights, substantive due process rights, and procedural due process rights. (Compl. ¶¶ 127-36, 144-48.) Alleging a failure to train and an unlawful custom, Plaintiff also seeks to hold ENMRSH liable for Section 1983 municipal liability claims. (Compl. ¶¶ 137-44.) ENMRSH and its employees assert that these causes of action must fail because they are not state actors and did not act under color of state law. (Doc. 130.) Because the facts are undisputed, the Court will decide the motion for summary judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment is appropriate when disputes are purely legal. See Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 631 F.3d 1153, 1160 (10th Cir. 2011)(affirming summary judgment on statutory interpretation as "a matter of law appropriate for resolution on summary judgment").

ENMRSH is a private non-profit corporation and its employees are privately-employed.¹ (Doc. 130 ¶ 2.) To support its programs, ENMRSH receives some funding from the state of New Mexico. (Id. ¶ 4.) ENMRSH agreed to comply with New Mexico Department of Health regulations in order to receive funds through the state's Developmental Disabilities waiver program. (Id.) With these funds, ENMRSH continues to offer private habilitation and supported-living services. (Id. ¶ 2, 4-7.) Plaintiff's parents enrolled him at ENMRSH in 2004 on a voluntary basis. (Id. ¶ 9.) After becoming unhappy with Defendant's services, Plaintiff's mother withdrew Plaintiff from ENMRSH's care. (Id. ¶ 12.) At no point was Plaintiff committed to the custody of the State of New Mexico. (Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff acknowledges these facts, but alleges that ENMRSH and its employees nonetheless acted under color of state law. (TAC ¶ 129; Doc. 136 at 1.)

"[M]ost rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments." Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978). In particular, all of the constitutional provisions that Plaintiff invokes—the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments—require some form of state involvement. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991) (requiring "'state action' within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment" to trigger "the protections of the First Amendment"); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983) (finding that the First Amendment "restrains only official conduct"); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) ("This Court hasalso consistently construed [the Fourth Amendment's] protection as proscribing only governmental action; it is wholly inapplicable 'to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental official.'"); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) (holding that a claim for the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a showing of state action). "Careful adherence to the 'state action' requirement preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial power. It also avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed." Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936.

Accordingly, the...