Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp.

Decision Date09 June 1977
Docket NumberNo. 74-1282,74-1282
Citation555 F.2d 687
Parties1977-1 Trade Cases 61,465 MT. HOOD STAGES, INC., dba Pacific Trailways, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The GREYHOUND CORPORATION and Greyhound Lines, Inc., Defendants-Appellants. Ninth Circuit
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

William W. Schwarzer, San Francisco, Cal., argued, McColloch, Dezendorf, Spears & Lubersky, Portland, Or., for defendants-appellants.

Michael N. Khourie, argued, Broad, Khourie & Schulz, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon.

Before BROWNING and WRIGHT, Circuit Judges, and LINDBERG, * District Judge.

BROWNING, Circuit Judge:

Greyhound Corporation and Greyhound Lines, Inc., appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding damages to Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., for injuries resulting from violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2. 1 We affirm.

I. Immunity

Greyhound is the largest common carrier by bus of passengers and package express in the United States, moving more than 80 percent of this traffic in the western states and operating over routes throughout the country. Mt. Hood is one of Greyhound's small competitors, operating over routes in Oregon, Idaho, and Utah. The essence of Mt. Hood's antitrust claim is that Greyhound acquired bus companies whose routes circled those of Mt. Hood and thereafter deprived Mt. Hood of connecting or "bridge" traffic with the purpose and effect of eliminating Mt. Hood as a substantial competitor.

Greyhound does not deny the sufficiency of the evidence to establish a violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, assuming that statute applies. Its principal contention is that Mt. Hood bases its claim upon acquisitions approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission and implementation by Greyhound of control over the acquired companies, and that such activities are immune from antitrust attack by virtue of section 5(11) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5(11), applied in light of the Supreme Court's analysis in Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 93 S.Ct. 647, 34 L.Ed.2d 577 (1973).

Section 5(2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5(2), provides that one carrier may acquire another with Commission approval; the Commission is required to grant such approval, subject to any terms and conditions it deems reasonable, if the acquisition "will be consistent with the public interest," id. Section 5(11) provides that carriers participating in transactions approved by the Commission are "relieved from the operation of the antitrust laws . . . insofar as may be necessary to enable them to carry into effect the transaction so approved or provided for in accordance with the terms and conditions, if any, imposed by the Commission, and to hold, maintain, and operate any properties and exercise any control or franchises acquired through such transaction."

From 1947 to 1956 Greyhound acquired eight bus companies operating in the area relevant here. Each acquisition was approved by the Commission pursuant to section 5(2). Mt. Hood opposed four of the acquisitions. It argued that if the acquisitions were approved, Mt. Hood would be encircled and Greyhound could route traffic around it, depriving the public of the most convenient service and Mt. Hood of revenues necessary to its survival. Mt. Hood's argument to the Commission thus foreshadowed its present antitrust claim.

Greyhound responded by representing to the Commission that the acquisitions "would not adversely affect connecting carriers; that arrangements with such carriers, including interchange of traffic and open gateways, would be maintained; that it was not the policy of Greyhound to route passengers over circuitous routes; that its agents were instructed to quote the direct route as well as the Greyhound route and give passengers their choice; and that Greyhound had always carried (Mt. Hood's) schedules in its folders and cooperated in every way to acquaint the public with its service and thus promote additional traffic and business for their lines." 2 Greyhound also represented to the Commission that Greyhound would continue a joint through-bus arrangement with Mt. Hood. 3 As the Commission later found, Greyhound intended the Commission to rely upon these representations in determining whether the proposed acquisitions were in the public interest, and the Commission did in fact rely upon them in approving the acquisitions.

In 1964 Mt. Hood filed a petition with the Commission pursuant to section 5(9) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5(9), 4 asking it to reopen the acquisition proceedings and enter a supplemental order requiring Greyhound to live up to its representations. The allegations in Mt. Hood's petition to the Commission were essentially the same as those Mt. Hood later made in this antitrust suit namely, that Greyhound had cancelled the through-bus connection, had scheduled connecting service so as to preclude reasonable connections with Mt. Hood, had directed Greyhound's agents and independent joint ticket agents to send traffic by longer routes around those of Mt. Hood, and had interfered in various ways with the distribution of Mt. Hood's schedules and the quotation of Mt. Hood's rates and services, all with the intent of injuring Mt. Hood. The United States intervened in support of Mt. Hood.

After an extensive evidentiary hearing, a hearing examiner resolved all issues against Greyhound and recommended entry of the order sought by Mt. Hood. In April, 1968, the Commission issued an opinion sustaining the examiner's findings that Greyhound had made the representations alleged, that Greyhound had intended the Commission to rely on them, that the Commission had relied on them in approving the acquisitions, that Greyhound had not fulfilled the representations, and that Greyhound's actions "were inspired by a desire to stifle competition" and "injure or destroy" Mt. Hood. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 104 M.C.C. 449, 459-63 (1968). The Commission concluded that Greyhound's failure to abide by its commitment "constitutes destructive competition in contravention of the national transportation policy, is not consistent with the public interest, and provides good cause" for a supplemental order under section 5(9) of the Act. The Commission deferred entry of a supplemental order to allow voluntary negotiations between the parties. Id. at 462-63.

Two months later, in July, 1968, Mt. Hood filed this suit alleging violations of the antitrust laws and common law and statutory unfair competition. With respect to the antitrust violations the complaint alleged that, beginning in 1947 and continuing to the date of the complaint, Greyhound had restrained and monopolized commerce in the carriage of passengers and their luggage between points in Oregon, Idaho, and Utah by means essentially the same as those that were the subject of the Commission's proceeding; that is, the acquisition of independent bus lines with Commission consent obtained by the misrepresentations outlined by the Commission and thereafter engaging in the destructive competitive tactics found by the Commission. Greyhound sought, unsuccessfully, to eliminate these issues from the litigation on the ground that they fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission.

In the Commission proceedings, meanwhile, the efforts of the parties to agree upon an order failed. The Commission entered its own order requiring Greyhound to restore the practices and traffic patterns existing when the acquisitions at issue were authorized, and, specifically, to restore the joint through-bus service, to revise Greyhound's schedules to permit reasonable connections with Mt. Hood, to see that through routes and fares were quoted and quoted accurately, and to eliminate other destructive practices. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. United States, 308 F.Supp. 1033, 1037 (N.D.Ill.1970). A three-judge district court affirmed the Commission and issued its own order in similar terms. Id. at 1040-41. Following entry of the district court order enforcing the Commission decision, Mt. Hood amended the complaint in this antitrust proceeding to eliminate the prayer for injunctive relief.

In June, 1971, the United States and the Commission filed petitions with the district court in the enforcement proceeding, asking that Greyhound be held in contempt for failing to comply with the court's order enforcing the Commission's decision. The court found Greyhound had willfully failed to comply with portions of the order and held Greyhound in criminal and civil contempt. United States v. Greyhound Corp., 363 F.Supp. 525 (N.D.Ill.1973). The court imposed fines totaling $600,000, United States v. Greyhound Corp., 370 F.Supp. 881, 883-85 (N.D.Ill.1974), ordered Greyhound to file semiannual reports of compliance efforts for five years, and granted members of the Department of Justice staff "visitorial and document examination rights so that they may further monitor Greyhound's compliance efforts," id. at 886. Because Greyhound appeared to be attempting to comply fully, no further injunctive relief was ordered.

While the proceeding to enforce the Commission's order was in progress, this antitrust case had come to trial and concluded with the verdict in Mt. Hood's favor. The opinion of the court in the enforcement proceeding noted that "many of Greyhound's actions that were found to be in violation of the order, were also found to be in violation of the antitrust laws" in this private suit. Id. at 884 n. 2. The enforcement court denied Mt. Hood's prayer for damages for expenses related to the contempt action and for injury to its business as a result of the contempt, on the ground that the damages awarded in this antitrust proceeding "will adequately compensate (Mt. Hood) for any damages it may have also suffered as a result of Greyhound's contempt. This is particularly true since many of the same...

To continue reading

Request your trial
36 cases
  • Shaffer v. Heitner
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • June 24, 1977
    ...plus attorneys fees was entered against Greyhound in Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 1972-3 Trade Cas. P 74,824, aff'd, 555 F.2d 687 (CA9 1977). App. 10. 3. See United States v. Greyhound Corp., 363 F.Supp. 525 (ND Ill.1973) and 370 F.Supp. 881 (ND Ill.), aff'd, 508 F.2d 529 (CA7 ......
  • Essential Communications Systems, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • November 23, 1979
    ...not within exemption is subject to antitrust laws); Cain v. Air Cargo, Inc., 599 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1979); Mt. Hood States, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir. 1977), Cert. denied on this ground, 434 U.S. 1008, 98 S.Ct. 716, 54 L.Ed.2d 750 Rev'd on other grounds, 437 U.S. 3......
  • Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • October 6, 1982
    ...are not immunized when used in the adjudicatory process." 404 U.S. at 513, 92 S.Ct. at 613.32 See, e.g., Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687, 696 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 437 U.S. 322, 98 S.Ct. 2370, 57 L.Ed.2d 239 (1978).The lengthy (jury) ......
  • Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • July 29, 1982
    ...are not immunized when used in the adjudicatory process.' 404 U.S. at 513, 92 S.Ct. at 613.32 See, e.g., Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687, 696 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 437 U.S. 322, 98 S.Ct. 2370, 57 L.Ed.2d 239 (1978).The lengthy [jury] ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
4 books & journal articles
  • Statute of Limitations
    • United States
    • ABA Antitrust Library Proving Antitrust Damages. Legal and Economic Issues. Third Edition Part I
    • December 8, 2017
    ...of damages for price fixing that occurred prior to limitation period but during tolling period); Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687, 698-700 (9th Cir. 1977) (upholding recovery of damages for twenty-year period where statute of limitations was tolled by virtue of fraudul......
  • Table of Cases
    • United States
    • ABA Antitrust Library Proving Antitrust Damages. Legal and Economic Issues. Third Edition Part III
    • December 8, 2017
    ...2000), 59, 67, 76, 78 Mt. Hood Stages v. Greyhound Corp., 616 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1980), 70, 79 Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded , 437 U.S. 322 (1978), 81 Muhonen v. Cingular Wireless Emple. Servs., LLC, 802 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (D. Min......
  • Table of Cases
    • United States
    • ABA Antitrust Library Antitrust Law Developments (Ninth Edition) - Volume II
    • February 2, 2022
    ...2003), 770, 1569 Mountain Pure, LLC v. Turner Holdings, 439 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 2006), 1021 Mount Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated, 437 U.S. 322 (1978), 859, 870, 871 Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998), 1213 Movie 1 & 2 v. ......
  • Private Antitrust Suits
    • United States
    • ABA Antitrust Library Antitrust Law Developments (Ninth Edition) - Volume I
    • February 2, 2022
    ...action. 409 Where all three conditions are satisfied, the private plaintiff is 403. See, e.g., Mount Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687, 698 n.26 (9th Cir. 1977) (tacking suspension of limitations period from pendency of government action and fraudulent concealment during pe......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT