MTR. OF BURNS v. Kooperstein
Decision Date | 28 July 2003 |
Citation | 764 N.Y.S.2d 160,196 Misc.2d 963 |
Parties | In the Matter of GLENN BURNS, JR., Petitioner,<BR>v.<BR>DEBORAH KOOPERSTEIN, as Town Judge for the Town of Southampton Justice Court, et al., Respondents. |
Court | New York Supreme Court |
Butler & Kaiteris, P.C., Bohemia, for petitioner.
O'Brien & O'Brien, LLP, Nesconset, for respondents.
Ordered that this CPLR article 78 proceeding by petitioner Glenn Burns, Jr. brought on by order to show cause (Kent, J.), dated June 3, 2003, seeking an order in the nature of prohibition of respondent modifying the released in own recognizance conditions ordered by respondent Judge Deborah Kooperstein which impose a curfew and require petitioner to submit to a supervised drug testing procedure as a condition of his release in his own recognizance after having been arrested and charged with unlawful possession of marijuana is denominated as a proceeding pursuant to CPL 530.30 and is determined as follows:
On February 26, 2003 petitioner Burns was charged with the violation unlawful possession of marijuana in violation of Penal Law § 221.05 and was issued a desk appearance ticket. Burns appeared for arraignment on May 28, 2003 and was released on his own recognizance by respondent provided that he submit to a supervised drug test and that he report home by 10:00 P.M. each night. This petition seeks an order in the nature of prohibition claiming that the respondent Judge exceeded her authority by imposing conditions which were not relevant to the issue of bail and which violate petitioner's due process rights.
In support of the application Burns submits a verified petition and an attorney's affirmation and claims that the court exceeded its authority by imposing preventive detention. It is petitioner's position that when considering whether to release a defendant charged with a criminal offense a court is obligated to impose reasonable conditions related solely to assure the accused's appearance for subsequent court appearances. Petitioner claims that respondent was without authority to impose a curfew and to require drug testing as a condition of Burns's release and that a writ of prohibition must be granted striking the respondent's order.
In opposition respondents submit a verified answer and return together with an attorney's affirmation and claim that no legal basis exists upon which to grant petitioner's application since the court had jurisdiction and authority to impose reasonable conditions related to petitioner's custody status. It is respondents' position that the imposition of a curfew and drug testing are legitimate conditions of bail and are not excessive punishment in violation of petitioner's constitutional rights.
The extraordinary remedy of prohibition lies only where there is a clear right, and only when a court, body or officer acts or threatens to act either without jurisdiction or in excess of its authorized powers in a proceeding over which it has jurisdiction. (Rush v Mordue, 68 NY2d 348 [1986]; Matter of Dondi v Jones, 40 NY2d 8 [1976].) The determination of whether prohibition is available in a particular case lies within the court's discretion. (Town Bd. of Wallkill v Owen, 127 AD2d 589 [2d Dept 1987].) Factors to be considered in exercising this discretion include (1) the gravity of the harm caused, (2) the availability or unavailability of an adequate remedy on appeal or at law or in equity, and (3) the remedial effectiveness of prohibition if such an adequate remedy does not exist (Matter of Greenwald v Scheinman, 94 AD2d 842 [3d Dept 1983]).
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