MUCC v. Secretary of State
| Decision Date | 31 July 2001 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 233331. |
| Citation | 630 N.W.2d 376,246 Mich. App. 82 |
| Parties | MICHIGAN UNITED CONSERVATION CLUBS, Michigan Coalition for Responsible Gun Owners, Ross Dykman, David K. Felbeck, and Corrie Williams, Plaintiffs, v. SECRETARY OF STATE and Board of State Canvassers, Defendants, and People Who Care About Kids, Intervening-Defendant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Dickinson Wright PLLC (by Peter H. Ellsworth, Jeffery V. Stuckey, and Scott R. Knapp), Lansing, for the plaintiffs.
Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Gary P. Gordon and Katherine C. Galvin, Assistant Attorneys General, for the defendants.
Timothy A. Baughman, Royal Oak, for the intervening defendant. Mika, Meyers, Beckett & Jones, PLC (by Michael A. Zagaroli and Elizabeth K. Bransdorfer), Grand Rapids, amicus curiae for Michigan Association of Chiefs of Police.
Before McDONALD, P.J., and O'CONNELL and METER, JJ.
ON REMAND
Plaintiffs seek a writ of mandamus that orders defendants to reject a petition for referendum filed by intervenor-defendant.1 For the reasons stated in this opinion, we deny the request for mandamus.
At issue is 2000 PA 381, a comprehensive piece of legislation that modified the standards for the issuance of concealed weapon permits in Michigan. See M.C.L. § 28.421 et seq. The legislation takes effect on July 1, 2001. However, if the power of referendum is properly invoked, the legislation will not take effect unless it is approved by voters at the next general election in November 2002. Const. 1963, art. 2, § 9; MCL 168.477(2).
.]
The crux of plaintiffs' argument in this mandamus action is that 2000 PA 381 is not subject to referendum because it appropriates funds to a state institution. Plaintiffs' assertion implicates Const. 1963, art. 2, § 9, which provides in pertinent part:
The people reserve to themselves the power to propose laws and to enact and reject laws, called the initiative, and the power to approve or reject laws enacted by the legislature, called the referendum.... The power of referendum does not extend to acts making appropriations for state institutions or to meet deficiencies in state funds and must be invoked in the manner prescribed by law within 90 days following the final adjournment of the legislative session at which the law was enacted. [Emphasis supplied.]
Plaintiffs also direct our attention to M.C.L. § 28.425b(5) and M.C.L. § 28.425w, arguing that these provisions appropriate funds for state institutions within the meaning of Const. 1963, art. 2, § 9. M.C.L. § 28.425b(5) provides:
Each applicant shall pay a fee of $55.00 ... plus an additional assessment of $5.00 for deposit in the concealed weapon enforcement fund under [MCL 28.425v] at the time of filing an application under this section.... The county treasurer shall deposit $10.00 of each fee collected under this section in the general fund of the county to the credit of the county clerk and forward the balance to the state treasurer. The state treasurer shall deposit the balance of the fee in the general fund to the credit of the department of state police. The state treasurer shall deposit the assessment in the concealed weapon enforcement fund created in [MCL 28.425v]. Each county shall report to the senate and house fiscal agencies by October 1 of each year its costs per applicant to implement this section.
Moreover, M.C.L. § 28.425w(1) states:
(e) Creating and maintaining the database required under [MCL 28.425e].
In their appellate brief, plaintiffs concede that 2000 PA 381 is not an act directed at meeting existing deficiencies in state funds within the meaning of Const. 1963, art. 2, § 9. Therefore, we confine our analysis to whether 2000 PA 381 is an act appropriating funds to state institutions as contemplated by Const. 1963, art. 2, § 9. Further, our analysis does not consider the merits of the policy supporting 2000 PA 381. It is not within the province of the judiciary to question the wisdom of the Legislature's policy decisions. See American States Ins. Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 220 Mich.App. 586, 597, 560 N.W.2d 644 (1996).
We begin our analysis against the backdrop of well-settled principles regarding the construction of constitutional provisions. Paramount to our analysis is the maxim that constitutional provisions are to be construed in accordance with "`common understanding.'" American Axle & Mfg., Inc. v. Hamtramck, 461 Mich. 352, 363, 604 N.W.2d 330 (2000) (citation omitted). As this Court recently observed in Reynolds v. Bureau of State Lottery, 240 Mich.App. 84, 86-87, 610 N.W.2d 597 (2000):
"When interpreting the constitution, the primary duty of the judiciary is to `ascertain as best the Court may the general understanding and therefore the uppermost or dominant purpose of the people when they approved the provision or provisions.'" [Id., quoting Bingo Coalition for Charity—Not Politics v. Bd. of State Canvassers, 215 Mich. App. 405, 409, 546 N.W.2d 637 (1996), in turn quoting Michigan Farm Bureau v. Secretary of State, 379 Mich. 387, 390-391, 151 N.W.2d 797 (1967).]
In addition to the general principles of constitutional construction, we are mindful that "under a system of government based on grants of power from the people, constitutional provisions by which the people reserve to themselves a direct legislative voice ought to be liberally construed." Kuhn v. Dep't of Treasury, 384 Mich. 378, 385, 183 N.W.2d 796 (1971) (footnote omitted); see also Bingo, supra at 410, 546 N.W.2d 637. However, though we are cognizant that this Court is required to enforce strict compliance with constitutionally mandated procedures that relate to the exercise of the referendum power, we are not permitted to "`stretch' "the language of the constitution to limit the legitimate exercise of that power. Id., quoting Kuhn, supra at 386, 183 N.W.2d 796.
With the foregoing principles in mind, we conclude that 2000 PA 381 is not an "act[ ] making appropriations for state institutions" within the meaning of Const. 1963, art. 2, § 9 and therefore deny plaintiffs' request for a writ of mandamus. We reach this conclusion in light of the principles set forth by our Supreme Court in Detroit Automobile Club v. Secretary of State, 230 Mich. 623, 203 N.W. 529 (1925), and its progeny. Construing Const. 1908, art. 5, § 1, the predecessor of Const. 1963, art. 2, § 9, our Supreme Court articulated governing principles that are of guidance in the instant case. Specifically, the Court framed the relevant inquiry with regard to whether an entity is a state institution in the following terms:
The question is not solely whether the highway department may be correctly termed a State institution, but rather whether, in view of the functions which it exercises, it comes within the meaning of that term as used in the Constitution. [Detroit Automobile Club, supra at 625, 203 N.W. 529.]
The Court went on to observe that the framers of our state constitution, by enacting a provision that limited the exercise of the referendum power to certain pieces of legislation, sought "to enable the State to exercise its various functions free from financial embarrassment." Id.
In Detroit Automobile Club, supra, the legislation at issue imposed a tax of two-cents a gallon on all gasoline sold and used within Michigan. Id. at 624, 203 N.W. 529. The legislation clearly provided that the proceeds of this tax were to (1) "`meet deficiencies in appropriations'" for money owed to the counties, (2) aid in the payment of interest on state highway bonds, and (3) facilitate the "`betterment of the public highways within the State.'" Id.
Concluding that the highway department "exercise[d] State functions," and that it "must have money to carry on its activities," the Court declined to allow a referendum on the legislation. Id. at 626, 203 N.W. 529. Rather, the Court opined:
Without the money appropriated by this act for its immediate use, [the highway department] would cease to function. The constitutional purpose was to prevent such a contingency. And so we hold it a fair conclusion that the framers of the...
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