Mucklow v. John Marshall Law School

• Decision Date: 23 November 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-3124,87-3124
• Citation: 126 Ill.Dec. 314,531 N.E.2d 941,176 Ill.App.3d 886
• Parties: , 126 Ill.Dec. 314, 50 Ed. Law Rep. 1106 David A. MUCKLOW, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL, and Charles Padden, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 941

531 N.E.2d 941

176 Ill.App.3d 886, 126 Ill.Dec. 314,

50 Ed. Law Rep. 1106

David A. MUCKLOW, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL, and Charles Padden, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 87-3124.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Third Division.

Nov. 23, 1988.

David A. Mucklow, Chicago, pro se.

Melvin B. Lewis, Chicago, for defendants-appellees.

Justice McNAMARA delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff David Mucklow appeals from the trial court's award of judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendants John Marshall Law School and Charles Padden in plaintiff's action based on breach of contract and tort. On appeal, plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings and committed further error by entering section 2-611 sanctions against plaintiff. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 110, par. 2-611.) Plaintiff has suggested the death of Padden, and the appeal proceeds only against the Law School.

On September 16, 1986, plaintiff, a 1986 graduate of John Marshall Law School, filed an eight count complaint against defendants. Count I was an action alleging breach of contract and count II alleged breach of confidence. These counts claimed that Padden, then a professor at the Law School, wrongfully intercepted the student teacher evaluation written by plaintiff, in which plaintiff made detailed critical comments about Padden. Plaintiff alleged that Padden identified the author of the anonymous evaluation through handwriting sample comparison, and retaliated against plaintiff by giving him a grade of "D."

Count III of the complaint, for invasion of privacy, alleged that Padden, without proper authorization and by falsely misrepresenting his basis to gain access, accessed plaintiff's student record book. Plaintiff asserted that his record book was personally identifiable information within his personal zone of privacy and that the improper and unauthorized intrusion caused mental anguish.

Count IV, directed against the Law School, alleged negligent control of information within the Federal Educational Records and Privacy Act. Count V alleged that the Law School committed willful and wanton misconduct because despite being on notice of Padden's previous misconduct, it retained him in his position as a professor. Count VI alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress. Count VII alleged that Padden interfered with business expectancies of plaintiff in regards to his employment with another professor with the intent of causing emotional distress. Count VIII sought permanent injunctive relief to protect plaintiff's transcripts and alumni privileges in the Law School's future dealings with plaintiff.

The Law School filed both a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion for summary judgment. It asked for sanctions for pleadings not founded in fact or warranted by law under section 2-611 of the Code of Civil Procedure in both motions. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 110, par. 2-611.) On March 23, 1987, the trial court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendants and dismissed the case. At the time of the ruling, counsel for the Law School stated that it was also seeking sanctions. The trial court requested that defendants present a motion for sanctions, set a briefing schedule, and schedule a hearing.

On April 22, 1987, the Law School presented a motion for sanctions. Plaintiff filed a response and on May 19, 1987, the trial court entered a sanction judgment against plaintiff, ordering him to pay $12,637.75 in fees and costs.

Prior to reaching the merits of plaintiff's appeal, we must address the Law School's contention that this appeal must be dismissed because plaintiff's appeal from the dismissal of his complaint is not timely. Judgment on the pleadings was entered in favor of defendants on March 23, 1987. On the thirtieth day following that judgment, the Law School filed a motion for imposition of sanctions against plaintiff. That motion was granted on May 19, 1987, and plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration limited to the judgment for sanctions. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration on September 9, 1987, and on October 1, 1987, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal of both the dismissal of the complaint and the sanctions order. The Law School has filed a cross-appeal of the trial court's denial of its plea for additional sanctions.

The Law School contends that plaintiff was required to appeal the dismissal within 30 days of the dismissal order because it was a final appealable order pursuant to Rule 301 when entered. (107 Ill.2d R. 301.) Plaintiff urges that the Law School's plea for sanctions constituted a separate claim in the case and thus, without a Rule 304(a) finding (107 Ill.2d R. 304) that there was no reason to delay enforcement or appeal of the March 23 dismissal order, that order was not final and appealable. Thus, plaintiff asserts that appeal of the dismissal of the complaint, within 30 days after his motion for reconsideration of the sanctions order was denied, was timely.

In Hise v. Hull (1983), 116 Ill.App.3d 681, 72 Ill.Dec. 247, 452 N.E.2d 372, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a cause of action, but reserved for future hearing the defendant's motion for section 2-611 attorney fees. This court dismissed the appeal finding that the demand for section 2-611 attorney fees is a "claim" as that term is used in Rule 304(a) and therefore without a Rule 304(a) finding that there is no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal, a judgment which does not dispose of all the claims in an action is not appealable.

In the present case, the Law School made a request for sanctions in its motion for judgment on the pleadings and for summary judgment. Therefore, sanctions became part of the same action. Under the reasoning of Hise, because the trial court did not enter a Rule 304(a) finding with the order of dismissal, that portion of the case was not appealable until judgment on the issue of sanctions was entered. We find that plaintiff's appeal within 30 days of the denial of his motion for reconsideration is timely.

In turning to the merits of the case, both parties agree that the present case is governed by Connelly v. University of Vermont (D.Vt.1965), 244 F.Supp. 156, which states the general rule regarding judicial review of academic decisions. This federal standard has been used by Illinois courts. (Tanner v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois (1977), 48 Ill.App.3d 680, 6 Ill.Dec. 679, 363 N.E.2d 208; DeMarco v. University of Health Sciences/The Chicago Medical School (1976), 40 Ill.App.3d 474, 352 N.E.2d 356.) In Connelly, the court held that a plaintiff who was victimized by an arbitrary grading process can obtain judicial relief. Connelly involved a medical student dismissed from school for academic reasons.

Plaintiff stresses that he has not asked for reconsideration of the grade received. Rather, through his complaint alleging breach of contract and commission of several intentional torts, plaintiff claims the Law School acted in bad faith, and in an arbitrary and capricious manner. We note at the outset, keeping in mind plaintiff's claim for monetary damages, the anticipated difficulty of assessing damages where plaintiff claims the injury sustained consists of having received a "D" in a course and the resulting reduction in class rank. We find no validity in plaintiff's claim that awards of damages against educational institutions in favor of mistreated students have long been the rule. Plaintiff has not cited a case where damages were assessed against a school for student mistreatment. Most cases are in the nature of mandamus seeking reinstatement in a program of academic studies or compelling the school to confer a degree. (See Connelly; DeMarco v. University of Health Sciences/The Chicago Medical School; Paulsen v. Golden Gate University (1979), 93 Cal.App.3d 825, 156 Cal.Rptr. 190.) Every case in which damages were sought for breach of contract or tort, the issue was remanded and the cases cite no disposition of the issue. See Tanner v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois; Litka v. University of Detroit Dental School (E.D.Mich.1985), 610 F.Supp. 80.

Count I of plaintiff's complaint alleges a breach of contract based upon an implied term. Plaintiff alleges that Padden threatened the students with retaliation if the student teacher evaluations were not to his favor and that Padden improperly maintained the evaluations at the end of the last class. Plaintiff alleges that the law affords a legal protection of confidentiality to the student evaluating a teacher under these circumstances and that Padden breached this confidentiality causing damages.

Plaintiff relies on E.E.O.C. v. University of Notre Dame Du Lac (7th Cir.1983), 715 F.2d 331, where the court used Federal Rule of Evidence 501 to create a qualified academic freedom privilege protecting academic institutions against the disclosure of the names and identities of persons participating in the peer review process in the context of university tenure decisions. Plaintiff cites no judicial authority for the type of privilege urged here. We note however, that the Law School values the confidentiality of the teacher student evaluations and thus provides for anonymous evaluations and procedures to ensure that such evaluations remain anonymous. Nonetheless, without alleging some protection due under the law, plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action for breach of an implied term which is deserving of judicial recognition.

Count II of plaintiff's complaint relies on the same facts pled in count I and alleges a breach of confidence, a judicially recognized intentional tort. Plaintiff relies both on Illinois common law and statutory law to urge that the facts of this case constitute a breach of confidence. We find that neither branch of law allows a cause of action for...