Mucy v. Nagy
| Decision Date | 03 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 20-1950 |
| Parties | MICHAEL MUCY, Plaintiff, v. TROOPER RICHARD NAGY and TROOPER ZACHARY WEBB, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Plaintiff Michael Mucy brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Richard Nagy (“Nagy”) and Zachary Webb (“Webb”) both of whom are troopers with the Pennsylvania State Police. Plaintiff contends that their actions violated his constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. He also asserts a state law claim for malicious prosecution.
Presenting pending is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 17). For the reasons that follow, their motion will be granted with respect to Counts II, III, IV and V and denied with respect to Counts I, VI and VII. Because it would be futile to allow amendment of the dismissed claims dismissal will be with prejudice.
Plaintiff commenced this action in December 2020. After Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 14). Federal question jurisdiction is based on the civil rights claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction is asserted over the state law claim, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
The Amended Complaint alleges claims of retaliation in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments (Count I), unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment (Count II), malicious prosecution, reckless investigation and an unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment (Counts III, IV and VI, respectively), a stigma plus procedural due process claim in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Count V) and a state law claim of malicious prosecution (Count VII).[1]
Defendants' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 17) has been fully briefed (ECF Nos. 18, 20).
Late in the evening on December 20, 2018, Plaintiff was traveling home on Route 40 when his vehicle hydroplaned and spun out of control. Plaintiff was the only person in his vehicle and no other were vehicles involved in this incident. When his vehicle came to a stop on Route 40, it was facing the wrong direction in the opposite lane of travel. In order to avoid a further collision, Plaintiff immediately drove his car to the nearby Brownsville Walmart. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5-11.)
Once in the Walmart parking lot, Plaintiff noticed that although his vehicle was operable, one of the airbags had deployed. He decided to have the vehicle towed. He entered the Walmart where he made arrangements for his vehicle to be towed to a secure location. He did not abandon his vehicle. He also arranged for someone pick him up and drive him home and notified the Walmart management of the situation. (Id. ¶¶ 12-17.)
After Plaintiff arrived home, he received a telephone call from Webb demanding that he return to the Walmart to speak to Webb and Nagy about the accident. At the time, it was the middle of the night, pouring rain, and Plaintiff had no vehicle. As a result, Plaintiff exercised his freedom of speech and right to remain silent and refused Webb's demand that he meet the state troopers at Walmart. (Id. ¶¶ 18-21.)
In retaliation for Plaintiff's exercise of these rights, Defendants insisted that the tow truck driver give them the key to his vehicle; then searched the vehicle, seizing two firearms and magazines; and instructed the tow truck driver to impound and hold the vehicle. Defendants did not obtain a search warrant to search and/or seize the vehicle or to seize any of Plaintiff's personal property. There were no circumstances that would permit Defendants to conduct a search or seizure without a warrant. Defendants also failed to review the Walmart video surveillance tapes to confirm Plaintiff's actions or proceed to Plaintiff's home in order to question him. (Id. ¶¶ 22-25.)
In further retaliation for Plaintiff's exercise of his freedom of speech and right to remain silent, Nagy unlawfully filed the following citations against him on December 22, 2018: (1) Driving Vehicle at Unsafe Speed (2) Driving on Roadways Laned for Traffic; (3) Careless Driving; (4) Reckless Driving; (5) Immediate Notice of Accident to Police Department; and (6) Duty to Give Information and Render Aid. Plaintiff alleges that Nagy lacked probable cause to file any of these charges and had no reasonable basis to believe that he had committed any of them. (Id. ¶¶ 26-29.)
At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was the elected constable of Redstone Township. He performed constable services throughout Fayette County, including serving warrants for various Fayette County offices including Fayette County magistrates. In retaliation for Plaintiff's exercise of his rights, Nagy contacted the offices of multiple Fayette County magistrates and officials and made false statements about Plaintiff. This included allegations that he had flipped his car and fled through the woods on foot. According to Plaintiff, these false statements were stigmatizing and damaged his reputation. He avers that Nagy's sole purpose in contacting various Fayette County officials was to have the Plaintiff suspended from performing constable services. (Id. ¶¶ 30-34.) As a direct result of Nagy's false statements and the issuance of meritless citations, Plaintiff was suspended by the President Judge of Fayette County. Notice of this suspension was then forwarded to every Fayette County office.
In order to prolong Plaintiff's suspension, Nagy made multiple requests to continue the summary proceedings regarding the citations that had been issued. At the end of January 2019, Plaintiff was notified that his vehicle could be released from impound. All of Nagy's citations were dismissed in February 2019 and shortly thereafter, Fayette County officials lifted Plaintiff's suspension. After Plaintiff's attorney sent a written demand, Nagy notified him that he could pick up his firearms and magazines. (Id. ¶¶ 36-43.)
“Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds that plaintiff's claims lack facial plausibility.” Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). “This requires a plaintiff to plead “sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is facially plausible, ” thus enabling “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)). While the complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations ... a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
As noted by the Third Circuit in Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011), a 12(b)(6) inquiry includes identifying the elements of a claim, disregarding any allegations that are no more than conclusions and then reviewing the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint to evaluate whether the elements of the claim are sufficiently alleged. When dismissing a civil rights case for failure to state a claim, a court typically must allow a plaintiff to amend a deficient complaint, irrespective of whether it is requested, unless doing so would be “inequitable or futile.” Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007). “An amendment is futile if the amended complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Alston v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 121 (3d Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff asserts various civil rights claims in Counts I through VI. These claims are made under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). “The first step in any such claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). See also Baker, 443 U.S. at 140; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989).
Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not stated a claim for retaliation under either the First or Fifth Amendments because Plaintiff has not identified any protected activity. Plaintiff asserts that he exercised his right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment by refusing Defendants' request to return to Walmart as well as his Fifth Amendment right not to be a witness against himself. He claims that as a result of this refusal, he was retaliated against in various ways, including the issuance of citations without probable cause and false statements about his conduct.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that ...
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