Mudd v. City of New Haven

• Decision Date: 25 July 2016
• Docket Number: Cause No.: 1:15-CV-177
• Citation: 196 F.Supp.3d 882
• Parties: James A. MUDD, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN, INDIANA, and Officer James Krueger, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

196 F.Supp.3d 882

James A. MUDD, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF NEW HAVEN, INDIANA, and Officer James Krueger, Defendants.

Cause No.: 1:15-CV-177

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

Signed July 25, 2016

Lori W. Jansen, Christopher C. Myers, Ilene M. Smith, Christopher C. Myers & Associates, Rachel J. Guin-Lowry, Eilbacher Fletcher LLP, Fort Wayne, IN, for Plaintiff.

Kenneth A. Collier-Magar, Law Office of Collier-Magar, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

William C. Lee, Judge, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Indiana

This matter is before the court on the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants City of New Haven, Indiana, and Officer James Krueger on April 18, 2016 (DE 30). Plaintiff James Mudd filed a response in opposition to the motion on May 12, 2016 (DE 35) and Defendants filed a reply brief on May 23, 2016 (DE 36). For the reasons discussed below, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND

The material facts giving rise to this lawsuit are mostly undisputed. On December 29, 2013, at approximately 2:30 a.m., Mudd was pulled over for speeding by New Haven police officer James Krueger. After Krueger stopped Mudd's vehicle, he saw Mudd lean over to reach for something in the vehicle. Fearing that Mudd might have a weapon, Krueger drew his service revolver and kept it pointed at Mudd until backup arrived,¹ at which time Mudd was instructed to exit his vehicle and show his hands to officers. Mudd did so and Krueger saw that Mudd was holding his wallet in his left hand, so Krueger holstered his weapon. Krueger suspected that Mudd was intoxicated and administered a field sobriety test and portable breathalyzer test, the latter of which indicated a blood alcohol level of .16, twice the legal limit in Indiana. Krueger also obtained a search warrant for a blood draw, but Mudd refused to allow anyone to draw blood from him the morning of his arrest. A state court eventually ruled that Mudd was in contempt of court as a result of his refusal to submit to a blood draw and sentenced Mudd to 30 days in jail. The state court acquitted Mudd of the other charges arising out of his arrest on December 29, 2013. Mudd contends that he was not speeding or intoxicated when he was stopped. At no point during his encounter with police did Mudd resist officers, threaten them, or attempt to flee.

The parties present and argue about many more facts, but most of them are either not determinative or not really relevant at all. The facts just recited form the foundation of Mudd's complaint, in which he asserts the following:

1) a claim against the City of New Haven for "unconstitutional/constitutionally deficient policies, practices, procedures, and/or customs in effect (including the custom and policy of inadequate training) that resulted in the excessive and unreasonable force Plaintiff suffered the hands of Officer Krueger in violation of Plaintiff's federally protected rights under the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [.]" (Third Amended Complaint (DE 23)), p. 1-2;

2) an excessive force claim against Krueger (Id. , p. 2); and

3) a Fourth Amendment claim and/or state law claim against Krueger for false arrest (Id. , p. 3).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) ; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Disputes concerning material facts are genuine where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In deciding whether genuine issues of material fact exist, the court construes all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. However, neither the "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties," id. , 477 U.S. at 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, nor the existence of "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), will defeat a motion for summary judgment. Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc. , 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir.2000).

Summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial on the merits nor is it a vehicle for resolving factual disputes. Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp. , 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir.1994). Therefore, after drawing all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the non-movant, if genuine doubts remain and a reasonable fact-finder could find for the party opposing the motion, summary judgment is inappropriate. See Shields Enterprises, Inc. v. First Chicago Corp. , 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir.1992) ; Wolf v. City of Fitchburg , 870 F.2d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir.1989). If it is clear that a plaintiff will be unable to satisfy the legal requirements necessary to establish his or her case, summary judgment is not only appropriate, but mandated. See Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ; Ziliak v. AstraZeneca LP , 324 F.3d 518, 520 (7th Cir.2003).

DISCUSSION

I. Claim against City of New Haven.

Mudd brought his claim against the City of New Haven pursuant to Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of City of N.Y. , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Amended Complaint, pp. 1, 3. In his response brief, however, Mudd states that he "agrees to dismiss his Monell claims against the City of New Haven, with prejudice." Plaintiff's Response, pp. 9-10. Accordingly, Mudd's claim against the City of New Haven is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

II. Excessive force claim.

" ‘In order to establish an excessive force claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must demonstrate that a state actor's use of force was ‘objectively unreasonable’ under the circumstances.' " Jones v. Phil l ips, et al. , 2016 WL 3255022, at *3 (E.D.Wis. June 13, 2016) (quoting Thom ps on v. City of Chicago , 472 F.3d 444, 454 (7th Cir. 2006) ).... "An officer's use of force is unreasonable from a constitutional point of view only if, ‘judging from the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest, the officer used force greater than necessary to make the arrest.’ " Id. (quoting Gonzalez v. City of Elgin , 578 F.3d 526, 539 (7th Cir.2009) ).

The analytical framework the court follows to assess such claims is as follows:

Where, as here, an excessive force claim "arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment..." Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). Determining whether force used to effect a seizure is "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment[:]

requires a careful balancing of " ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests' " against the countervailing governmental interests at stake ... Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or an investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.

Graham , 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. at 1871 (citations omitted). The test, in short, is one of "objective reasonableness," to be determined from the totality of the circumstances. O'Toole v. Kalmar , 1990 WL 19542 ... (N.D.Ill.1990). Because the governing test is objective, excessive force claims are "susceptible to summary judgment determinations...fewer cases should require a full-blown trial for resolution." Id.

Smith v. City of Joliet , 809 F.Supp. 48, 49–50 (N.D.Ill.1991), aff'd , 965 F.2d 235 (7th Cir.1992). The Supreme Court explained in Graham v. Connor that "[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Graham , 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. Furthermore, "[t]he ‘reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Id.

So, in every claim for excessive force, the issue is the reasonableness of the officer's conduct, the assessment of which is based on the totality of the circumstances of the specific incident giving rise to that claim. Krueger claims he saw Mudd lean over and reach for something inside his vehicle as Krueger was approaching Mudd's car. Fearing for his safety, Krueger pointed his weapon at Mudd until backup arrived, then holstered his weapon once he realized that Mudd was holding only his wallet. In his incident report, Krueger wrote the following:

I could see the driver moving his hands around quickly inside the cab of the vehicle and was not sure of [sic] what he was doing. I could see in the rear view mirror the driver had a shirt or mask over the bottom portion of his face. In fear he was getting a gun with his quick hand movements I un-holstered my duty weapon and pointed it at the vehicle and waited for back up. I yelled at the driver to open his window but he would not comply. The driver then started to open the back passenger side window and then partially opened his window. When [backup] Officer Lewis arrived I ordered the driver to step out of the vehicle with his hands shown [sic].

Krueger Incident Report (DE 31-3), p. 5. It was at that point that Krueger realized Mudd was holding his wallet, not a weapon, so Krueger holstered his weapon.

In his deposition testimony, Mudd confirmed that he leaned over to retrieve his wallet after Krueger stopped him. Mudd Deposition (DE 31-1), pp. 57-58. In...