Mueller Co. v. Department of Labor

Decision Date17 August 1989
Docket NumberNo. 4-88-0894,4-88-0894
Citation543 N.E.2d 518,187 Ill.App.3d 519,135 Ill.Dec. 135
Parties, 135 Ill.Dec. 135, 114 Lab.Cas. P 56,191 MUELLER COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Gwen R. Martin, as Director of the Illinois Department of Labor, Defendants-Appellants (Hugh Ford, Defendant).
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen. State of Illinois, Robert J. Ruiz, Sol. Gen., Deborah L. Ahlstrand, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, for defendants-appellants.

Michael J. Kehart, James E. Peckert, Kehart, Shafter & Hughes, P.C., Decatur, for plaintiff-appellee.

Presiding Justice McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

This case comes on appeal from the circuit court of Macon County. The defendant Hugh Ford was employed by the plaintiff Mueller Company from March 3, 1986, until he left the company voluntarily on September 11, 1987. Upon leaving the firm, Ford sought to be paid for the pro rata vacation time which he had earned but not taken during his second year of employment. The plaintiff refused Ford's request.

Faced with this refusal, Ford filed a claim with the Department of Labor (Department). On February 26, 1988, the Department, after holding a hearing on Ford's complaint, issued a wage payment demand letter to the plaintiff finding Ford was entitled to $914.19. This amount represented the value of his pro rata unused vacation time.

On March 18, 1988, the plaintiff filed a two-count complaint in the circuit court of Macon County. Count I sought administrative review of the Department's finding and count II sought declaratory judgment that the Department's findings were contrary to law. On May 4, 1988, count I of the complaint was dismissed on motion of plaintiff, leaving only the declaratory judgment action.

The circuit court heard argument on the legal issues and on November 9, 1988, found the decision of the Department was contrary to law. The court decided the authority relied on by the Department had been superseded by an amendment to the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 48, par. 39m-1 et seq.) and the terms of the employment contract would control in this case. The court found that because the contract provided an employee became entitled to vacation time only after the end of the plaintiff's fiscal year and Ford had not completed the fiscal year, he was not entitled to any compensation for vacation time. The Department, which was also a defendant in the circuit court action, filed a notice of appeal on December 7, 1988.

The fundamental issue in contention here is the application of the Act to the employment contract. Both parties concede that under the prior language of the Act Ford would be entitled to be paid for his unused vacation time. The plaintiff argues the legislature, by amending the Act, has materially altered its meaning and overturned prior precedent. The defendants argue the amendment merely represents a clarification of the Act and existing precedent is still valid.

Plaintiff's vacation policy provided in part:

"INITIAL VACATION

After six months of service, new employees may take one-half of the vacation that they will have earned upon completion of their one-year anniversary. Then upon completion of one years service, the employee may take the other one-half of vacation due. Employees hired in October or November should attempt to complete their initial vacation before the end of the fiscal year. In unusual circumstances, special arrangements can be made to ensure the employee is able to schedule a vacation.

SUBSEQUENT VACATION

After the initial vacation, an employee becomes eligible for subsequent vacations at the beginning of each fiscal year. An exception to this is those years when vacation allotments advance. During these years, the employee will be allotted his regular vacation at the start of the fiscal year and the additional vacation on his anniversary date.

TERMINATION

Upon termination, the employee will be paid for any unused vacation for the current fiscal year."

The language of the Act provides in part:

"Unless otherwise provided in a collective bargaining agreement, whenever a contract of employment or employment policy provides for paid vacations, and an employee resigns or is terminated without having taken all vacation time earned in accordance with such contract of employment or employment policy, the monetary equivalent of all earned vacation shall be paid to him or her as part of his or her final compensation at his or her final rate of pay and no employment contract or employment policy shall provide for forfeiture of earned vacation time upon separation." (Emphasis added.) Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 48, par. 39m-5.

Prior to January 1, 1984, the Act read:

"Whenever a contract of employment or employment policy provides for paid vacations, and an employee resigns or is terminated without having taken all of his earned vacation time, all earned vacation shall be paid to him as final compensation at his final rate of pay in accordance with such contract of employment or employer policy respecting eligibility or time served; provided, however, that an employment contract or employer policy shall not provide for forfeiture of earned vacation time upon separation." (Emphasis added.) Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 48, par. 39m-5.

The appellate court has previously considered the application of the Act prior to its amendment. In Golden Bear Family Restaurants, Inc. v. Murray (1986), 144 Ill.App.3d 616, 98 Ill.Dec. 459, 494 N.E.2d 581, the court was presented with a case where two employees were fired shortly before completing their first year with the employer and becoming eligible for their vacations. In its opinion the court stated:

"We conclude that the Department's interpretation of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act--that an employee earns vacation pay pro rata--was reasonable and consistent with Illinois law and the law of other jurisdictions. Giving the language of the Act its plain and ordinary meaning, we disagree with plaintiffs' contentions that the statute looks to the employment contract or employment policy to define an earned vacation. The Act expressly includes the monetary equivalent of earned vacation as part of the final compensation to...

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    ...their employer and the evil it seeks to remedy is the forfeiture of any of those benefits." Mueller Co. v. Department of Labor, 187 Ill.App.3d 519, 524, 135 Ill.Dec. 135, 543 N.E.2d 518 (1989). As part of its scheme to further the purposes of the IWPCA, the legislature has enacted section 1......
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    ...employees receive all earned benefits upon leaving their employer." 820 ILCS 115/1 et seq.; Mueller Co. v. Department of Labor, 187 Ill.App.3d 519, 524, 135 Ill.Dec. 135, 543 N.E.2d 518, 521 (1989). As with the IMWA, the IWPCA makes it a misdemeanor to knowingly discharge an employee becaus......
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    ...Restaurants, Inc. v. Murray, 144 Ill.App.3d 616, 98 Ill.Dec. 459, 494 N.E.2d 581 (1986), and Mueller Co. v. Department of Labor, 187 Ill.App.3d 519, 135 Ill.Dec. 135, 543 N.E.2d 518 (1989), employees earn vacation benefits pro rata where the employer's vacation policy provides for vacation ......
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