Mueller v. Davis

• Decision Date: 04 February 2016
• Docket Number: No. 06-14-00100-CV,06-14-00100-CV
• Citation: Mueller v. Davis, 485 S.W.3d 622 (Tex. App. 2016)
• Parties: Mark J. Mueller, Appellant v. James H. Davis, Individually, James H. Davis d/b/a J.D. Minerals, and JDMI, LLC, Appellees
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

485 S.W.3d 622

Mark J. Mueller, Appellant

v.James H. Davis, Individually, James H. Davis d/b/a J.D. Minerals, and JDMI, LLC, Appellees

No. 06-14-00100-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Texarkana.

Submitted: November 18, 2015

Decided: February 4, 2016

Bob Whitehurst, Whitehurst & Whitehurst, Tyler, TX, for appellant

Douglas D. McLallen, Anderson, Lehrman, Barre & Maraist, LLP, Corpus Christi, TX, Marshall C. Wood, Norton & Wood, LLP, Texarkana, TX, for appellee

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice Burgess

James Davis doing business as both J.D. Minerals and JDMI, LLC (Davis), and Mark J. Mueller each claim title to the same mineral rights in Harrison County, Texas, through separate conveyances from the same grantors—Virginia Mitchell Cope and James Mills. Mueller filed suit to quiet title to the minerals, asserting that Davis' deeds were invalid as a matter of law. Davis answered and moved for summary judgment on the basis that his deeds were valid and obtained first, leaving Cope and Mills with no mineral interests remaining to convey to Mueller. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Davis, and Mueller appealed. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

I. Factual And Procedural Background

In September 1991, Virginia Rose Mitchell (later known as Virginia Cope) executed a mineral and royalty deed to Davis. Shortly thereafter, James Hammond Mills also executed a mineral and royalty deed to Davis. Neither of Davis' deeds contains a metes and bounds description or a reference to a volume and page of the Harrison County deed records. Rather, each deed states that the grantor is conveying "[a]ll of those certain tracts or parcels of land out of the following surveys in Harrison County, Texas, described as follows ...." Each deed then lists certain parcels identifying a specific number of acres contained within what appear to be oil and gas production units.¹

Between 1994 and 2011, Mueller acquired various Harrison County mineral and royalty interests from Cope and Mills. Mueller subsequently filed suit to quiet title to the mineral and royalty interests, asserting that Davis' deeds were void under the Statute of Frauds and that Davis violated Chapter 12 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code.² Mueller also alleged claims for adverse possession, fraud, failure of consideration, and conversion. Davis entered a general denial and asserted the affirmative defenses of statute of limitations, offset, waiver, estoppel, standing, estoppel by deed, and denial of proof of adverse possession.

Davis moved for traditional summary judgment,³ arguing (1) that the 1991 deeds satisfied the Statute of Frauds and conveyed to him all of the grantors' mineral interests in Harrison County, (2) that Mueller's claim of adverse possession was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, (3) that Mueller's claim under Chapter 12 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code was baseless because the 1991 deeds granted Davis a valid interest in the property at issue, and (4) that Mueller lacked standing to raise his remaining claims. Although the order failed to specify the grounds for its ruling, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Davis.⁴

II. Standard of Review

A trial court's entry of summary judgment is subject to de novo review by an appellate court. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex.2003). In performing the required review, we deem as true all evidence which is favorable to the nonmovant, indulge every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence, and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's favor. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex.2005). "When the trial court does not specify the basis for its ruling, a summary judgment must be affirmed if any of the grounds on which judgment is sought are meritorious." Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex.2013).

To be entitled to traditional summary judgment, a movant must establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX.R. CIV. P. 166a(c) ; Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex.2009). Once the movant produces evidence entitling it to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex.1996). A defendant who conclusively negates a single essential element of a cause of action or conclusively establishes an affirmative defense is entitled to summary judgment on that claim. Frost Nat'l Bank v. Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 508–09 (Tex.2010).

III. Analysis of Issues Related to the Descriptions in Davis' Deeds

A. Introduction

In Mueller's first three points of error, we are asked to construe the Davis deeds and determine whether the identical language contained in each deed is capable of a single, reasonable interpretation. Mueller contends that summary judgment was improper because the Davis deeds are (1) void as a matter of law because the property descriptions are not legally sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, (2) insufficient as a matter of law to have conveyed all of Cope's and Mills' mineral interests in Harrison County, or (3) ambiguous, in which case a fact issue remains regarding what property the parties intended to convey.⁵

1. Law Governing Deed Interpretation

"A deed is subject to the same rules of interpretation and construction as a contract." Cooke v. Morrison, 404 S.W.3d 100, 111 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.). "Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law that must be decided by examining the contract as a whole in light of the circumstances present when the contract was entered."⁶

Colum bia Gas Transmission Corp., 940 S.W.2d at 589 ; see also Hausser, 345 S.W.3d at 467.

"The construction of an unambiguous contract is a question of law for the court" to decide de novo. Willis v. Donnelly, 199 S.W.3d 262, 275 (Tex.2006) ; Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex.1991). In conducting a de novo review, we exercise our own judgment and give no deference to the trial court's decision. Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex.1998). Our primary duty when construing an unambiguous deed or contract is to ascertain the parties' true intent as expressed within the four corners of the deed or contract. Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 461 ; Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex.1983).

We consider the instrument as a whole, attempting to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions.⁷ Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 462 ; Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393. The deed's terms are given their plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meanings unless the deed itself shows them to be used in a technical or different sense. Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex.1996).

2. Law Governing Property Descriptions

The adequacy of a property description in any instrument transferring an interest in real property is a question of law within the purview of the Statute of Frauds. Long Trusts v. Griffin, 222 S.W.3d 412, 416 (Tex.2006) (per curiam); Mayor v. Garcia, 104 S.W.3d 274, 276 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. dism'd w.o.j.) (citing Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex.1972) ). "To satisfy the Statute of Frauds, a contract ‘must furnish within itself, or by reference to some other existing writing, the means or data by which the [property] to be conveyed may be identified with reasonable certainty.’ " Long Trusts, 222 S.W.3d at 416 (quoting Morrow, 477 S.W.2d at 539 ); Templeton v. Dreiss, 961 S.W.2d 645, 658 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied). The instrument's property description need not be mathematically certain, but only "reasonably certain" so as to enable a person familiar with the area to identify the property to be conveyed to the exclusion of other property. See Gates v. Asher, 154 Tex. 538, 280 S.W.2d 247, 248–49 (Tex.1955) ; Templeton, 961 S.W.2d at 659. The purpose of a written land description is not merely to identify the property, but also to provide an actual means of identification. Reiland v. Patrick Thomas Props., Inc., 213 S.W.3d 431, 437 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (citing Jones v. Kelley, 614 S.W.2d 95, 99–100 (Tex.1981) ); Fears v. Texas Bank, 247 S.W.3d 729, 736 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. denied).

The legal description in the conveyance must not only furnish enough information to locate the general area, as in identifying it by tract, survey and county, it must also contain information regarding the size, shape, and boundaries of the interest conveyed. See Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex.1972) ; Matney v. Odom, 147 Tex. 26, 210 S.W.2d 980, 982 (Tex.1948). If the contract does not sufficiently describe the real property interest to be conveyed, the conveyance is void under the Statute of Frauds. Pick v. Bartel, 659 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex.1983) ; Wilson v. Fisher, 144 Tex. 53, 188 S.W.2d 150, 152 (Tex.1945). However, a deed should not be declared void for uncertainty if it is possible, by any reasonable rules of construction, to ascertain from the description, aided by extrinsic evidence, what property the parties intended to convey. Hahn v. Love, 394 S.W.3d 14, 25 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied).

B. Analysis

1. The Specific Property Descriptions in the Davis Deeds Are Insufficient to Identify the Property Conveyed

In this case, the grantors of both deeds purported to convey to Davis:

all of [their] interest[s] in and to all oil, gas, and other minerals in, on, and under ... the following lands (the "Lands") ... situated in the County of Harrison, State of Texas, to-wit:

All of those certain tracts or parcels of land out of the following surveys in Harrison County, Texas described as follows:

1) 704.00 acres out of the G.W. PETTY, ET AL, A–582, ET AL, known as the "AMOCO PRODUCING COMPANY—JOHN HARRISON JR ‘B’."

....

Grantor agrees to

...