Mueller v. McMillian Warner Insurance Company, 2006 WI 54 (Wis. 5/25/2006)
| Decision Date | 25 May 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 2005AP121.,2005AP121. |
| Citation | 2006 WI 54 |
| Parties | Lina M. Mueller, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. McMillian Warner Insurance Company, Defendant-Respondent, Merlin A. Switlick and Stephani Switlick, Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners, Apollo Switlick and Security Health Plan of Wisconsin, Inc., Defendants, Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company, Intervenor-Defendant. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Marathon County, Vincent K. Howard, Judge.
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed. 2005 WI App 210 Reported at: ___ Wis. 2d ___, 704 N.W.2d 613 (Ct. App. 2005 — Published)
For the defendants-respondents-petitioners, there were briefs by Paul E. David and Wendorff, Ellison & David, LLP, Wausau, and oral argument by Paul E. David.
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief by Russell T. Golla and Anderson, O'Brien, Bertz, Skrenes & Golla, Stevens Point; Carl L. Ricciardi and Law Offices of Carl Ricciardi, Appleton, and oral argument by Russell T. Golla.
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William C. Gleisner, III and Law Offices of William Gleisner, Milwaukee; Robert L. Jaskulski and Habush Habush & Rottier, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers.
¶ 1 This is a review of that part of a published decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court for Marathon County, Vincent K. Howard, Judge, granting summary judgment to defendants Merlin and Stephani Switlick.1 The circuit court dismissed plaintiff Lina Mueller's claims for damages against the Switlicks for their alleged negligence in caring for her. We affirm the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court in favor of the Switlicks.
¶ 2 The dispositive issue is whether the actions taken by the Switlicks between the time they initially evaluated and immediately assisted and treated Lina Mueller and intervened on her behalf and the time they called 911 six to seven hours thereafter constitute emergency care at the scene of any emergency or accident in good faith for the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 895.48(1) (2003-04),2 the Good Samaritan immunity statute.
¶ 3 This case involves the interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. § 895.48(1), which establishes "Good Samaritan"3 immunity from tort claims, to the undisputed facts in the instant case. Section 895.48(1) states in relevant part:
Any person who renders emergency care at the scene of any emergency or accident in good faith shall be immune from civil liability for his or her acts or omissions in rendering such emergency care.
¶ 4 The Switlicks argue that they are immune from liability under the Good Samaritan statute for their acts or omissions in rendering care to the plaintiff. In particular, the Switlicks argue that all their acts or omissions regarding the plaintiff occurred at the scene of the emergency and constitute emergency care rendered in good faith.
¶ 5 The plaintiff argues that the care rendered by the Switlicks was not at the scene of any emergency or accident. She further argues that the Switlicks did not provide emergency care or that the care they rendered ceased to be emergency care after their initial evaluation and immediate assistance, treatment, and intervention ended.
¶ 6 We hold that whatever the precise scope of "scene of any emergency or accident" in Wis. Stat. § 895.48(1), the phrase "scene of any emergency" is sufficiently broad to include the Switlicks' home where the injured, bleeding plaintiff arrived after being hurt in an incident involving an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) in the woods. We further hold that, in the circumstances of the present case, "emergency care" under § 895.48(1) refers to the initial evaluation and immediate assistance, treatment, and intervention rendered to the plaintiff during the period before care could be transferred to professional medical personnel.
¶ 7 While the Switlicks' initial evaluation and immediate assistance, treatment, and intervention on behalf of the plaintiff may have constituted emergency care under the statute,4 the care the Switlicks rendered after this initial evaluation and immediate assistance, treatment, and intervention and before Ms. Switlick called 911 six to seven hours later was not "emergency care." Professional medical assistance could have been summoned. When the Switlicks decided not to seek professional medical assistance after initially assessing the plaintiff's injuries and placed her in bed for continued observation, emergency care ceased and non-emergency care began.5 Because a caregiver is not immunized by the Good Samaritan statute for non-emergency care, the caregiver is subject to the common-law rules governing the conduct. It does not necessarily follow that the caregiver will be liable for damages under common-law negligence rules. We agree with the court of appeals that the Switlicks are not entitled to Good Samaritan immunity for their non-emergency care.
¶ 8 Accordingly we affirm the decision of the court of appeals and remand the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings on the plaintiff's negligence claims against the Switlicks.
¶ 9 The following facts are undisputed for the purposes of the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of the Switlicks on their Good Samaritan defense.
¶ 10 Merlin and Stephani Switlick are the parents of Apollo Switlick, who was 19 years old at the time of the plaintiff's injury. On the day the plaintiff was injured, the Switlicks were hosting a party on property they owned in Lincoln County. The Switlicks regularly host guests at their Lincoln County property, and guests often spend the night in the family "shack," which has a number of "bunkhouse-style" bedrooms. Apollo arrived at the party around 2:00 p.m. He drank what he described as a couple of twelve-ounce beers before 6:00 p.m. and a few more beers between 6:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m.6
¶ 11 The plaintiff, Apollo's girlfriend of two years, arrived at the party sometime between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. Apollo and the plaintiff went inside to play pool. The plaintiff may have consumed alcohol while inside.7
¶ 12 At around 10:00 p.m. Apollo and the plaintiff joined the Switlicks and their guests outside at a bonfire. Apollo testified that once outside he heard the sound of a malfunctioning ATV and decided to go check on his sister and her children, who had taken a family ATV to look for deer. Apollo got on an ATV belonging to one of the guests. The plaintiff got on behind him. Neither wore a helmet. After checking on his sister, Apollo and the plaintiff headed back to the shack on a trail that was not on the family property.
¶ 13 On the return trip the incident that produced the plaintiff's injuries occurred. According to Apollo, the ATV hit a stump; he then saw an overhanging branch and slammed on the brakes. Apollo remembered nothing else about the incident.8 Apollo and the plaintiff returned to the shack around 11 p.m. Both were bleeding and both vomited shortly after arriving. Mr. Switlick observed that the plaintiff was agitated, and he touched her teeth to determine if any were loose.
¶ 14 The plaintiff then went inside the bathroom and wanted to lie down on the bathroom floor. Ms. Switlick persuaded the plaintiff to lie down in one of the bedrooms. Ms. Switlick testified she awoke the plaintiff approximately every hour to check on her. Throughout the night, the plaintiff was able to respond coherently to Ms. Switlick's questions.
¶ 15 In the morning, after she had been in bed for approximately six to seven hours, the plaintiff was disoriented and responded to Ms. Switlick's questions by addressing Ms. Switlick as "mom." As a result of the plaintiff's confusion, Ms. Switlick called for an ambulance. The plaintiff suffered serious, continuing injuries.
¶ 16 The plaintiff sued the Switlicks, alleging they were negligent in providing alcohol to their minor son, in failing to convey her to a hospital, in preventing her from obtaining medical treatment, and in failing to seek help for her.
¶ 17 The circuit court entered a judgment dismissing the plaintiff's complaint, ruling that under Wis. Stat. § 895.48(1) the Switlicks were immune from liability for any of their acts or omissions occurring between the time when the plaintiff returned to the shack and when care of the plaintiff was transferred to emergency medical personnel.
¶ 18 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's judgment. The court of appeals concluded:
[W]hen the [S]amaritan is a layperson, the intervention protected will ordinarily be of short duration and of an interim sort. Nothing in the statute suggests any intention that an ordinary person should make care-giving decisions any longer than the emergency situation necessitates.
. . . .
That nothing was done to make medical help available to Mueller for over six hours only underscores the fact that Stephani was not responding as if to an emergency. Based on the undisputed facts in this case, the Switlicks thus did not provide any care that would entitle them to immunity from liability under Wis. Stat. § 895.48.9
¶ 19 The dispositive issue in the present case requires us to interpret and apply Wis. Stat. § 895.48(1), the Good Samaritan statute, to the undisputed facts of the case.
¶ 20 The interpretation and application of a statute is ordinarily a question of law that this court decides independent of the circuit court and the court of appeals but benefiting from their analyses.
¶ 21 Because this case was decided on summary judgment and the material facts are not in dispute, we follow the standard of review set forth in Wis. Stat. § 802.08. We determine whether the circuit court correctly decided an issue of law, namely the interpretation and application of the applicable statute, in its decision on the summary judgment motion.10
¶ 22 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.48(1) states in...
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