Muhammad v. Judge Martin E. Smith

Decision Date23 July 2014
Docket Number3:13-cv-760 (MAD/DEP)
PartiesJAMIL ABDUL MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff, v. JUDGE MARTIN E. SMITH; JASON WHITE, Assistant District Attorney; BROOME COUNTY COURTS, 6TH DISTRICT; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; and STATE OF NEW YORK, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

APPEARANCES:

JAMIL ABDUL MUHAMMAD

Orleans Correctional Facility

Plaintiff pro se

OF COUNSEL:

Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, who is currently a New York State prisoner but was not at the time this action was filed, commenced this civil rights action asserting claims against a sitting judge, an assistant district attorney, a county court, and the American Bar Association. See Dkt. No. 1. In an October 16, 2013 Report, Recommendation, and Order, Magistrate Judge Peebles conducted an initial review of the complaint and recommended that the complaint be dismissed, with leave toreplead only as to any claims asserted against Defendant American Bar Association. See Dkt. No. 19.

Currently before the Court is Magistrate Judge Peebles' Report, Recommendation, and Order and Plaintiff's objections thereto.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's complaint and his many subsequent filings are largely unintelligible. In his complaint, Plaintiff identifies himself as a "Moor/Sovereign/a Freeman On The Land/ a Man, Real Live Flesh and Blood[.]" Dkt. No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff claims that, through his "unalienated rights under UCC1-207(308)," he is "entitled to any Interpleted Funds relative to JAMIL ABDUL MUHAMMAD, and the defendant is determined to be Barred from any collection of my alleged debt from JAMIL ABDUL MUHAMMAD relating to Jamil Abdul Muhammad and defendant had in no 'CLAIM IN FACT.'" Id. at 5.

From other submissions submitted by Plaintiff, it appears that Plaintiff was sentenced by Broome County Court Judge Martin E. Smith, a named Defendant, based upon a plea of guilty entered in that court. See Dkt. No. 7 at 2. Plaintiff appears to allege that, as a result of those proceedings, Judge Smith is guilty of kidnapping, and is liable for conspiracy to violate his civil rights in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241. See id. Further, Plaintiff makes vague references to a clerk in Binghamton named "Karen," and claims that she and other Defendants have placed him in imminent harm. See Dkt. No. 21 at 4-5. Plaintiff asks the Court to award him "the dismissal of said charges" and to release him "by implying said 'habeas corpus' granting [him] immediate release of confinement[.]" Id. at 5.

In a Report, Recommendation, and Order, Magistrate Judge Peebles granted Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and then conducted an initial review of the complaint. See Dkt. No. 19. Magistrate Judge Peebles noted that Plaintiff's complaint failed to meet the minimal pleading standards set forth in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as Twombly and its progeny. See id. at 7. In light of his pro se status, however, Magistrate Judge Peebles considered Plaintiff's subsequent filings to determine if he has set forth a plausible claim against any named Defendant. See id. at 8.

Magistrate Judge Peebles first found that Defendants Smith and White are entitled to absolute immunity because Plaintiff's claims against them are associated with his prosecution in Broome County. See id. at 8-9. Further, the report found that Plaintiff's claims brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 241 should be dismissed because it is a criminal statute that does not give rise to a private cause of action. See id. at 9 n.6 (citations omitted). Next, Magistrate Judge Peebles concluded that Plaintiff's claims against the Broome County Courts must be dismissed because they are an extension of the state, immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See id. at 10. Thereafter, Magistrate Judge Peebles found that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's claims against Defendant American Bar Association ("ABA") because Plaintiff failed to allege any facts to plausibly suggest that Defendant ABA is a state actor, or that it acted under color of state law when allegedly violating Plaintiff's rights. See id. at 10-11. Finally, Magistrate Judge Peebles recommended that the Court dismiss all claims with prejudice, except those asserted against Defendant ABA. See id. at 12-13.

Currently before the Court are Magistrate Judge Peebles Report, Recommendation, and Order, and Plaintiff's objections thereto. Additionally pending before the Court are several lettermotions, along with an amended complaint Plaintiff filed after the issuance of the Report, Recommendation, and Order.

III. DISCUSSION
A. Redemptionist and sovereign citizen theories

Plaintiff's assertions appear to be based, at least in part, on the "redemptionist" theory or the related "sovereign citizen" theory, which are frivolous legal theories that have been consistently rejected by federal courts. See Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 203 n.4 (3d Cir. 2008). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained:

"Redemptionist" theory . . . propounds that a person has a split personality: a real person and a fictional person called the "strawman." The "strawman" purportedly came into being when the United States went off the gold standard in 19[3]3, and, instead, pledged the strawman of its citizens as collateral for the country's national debt. Redemptionists claim that government has power only over the strawman and not over the live person, who remains free. Individuals can free themselves by filing UCC financing statements, thereby acquiring an interest in their strawman. Thereafter, the real person can demand that government officials pay enormous sums of money to use the strawman's name or, in the case of prisoners, to keep him in custody. If government officials refuse, inmates are encouraged to file liens against correctional officers and other prison officials in order to extort their release from prison. Adherents of this scheme also advocate that inmates copyright their names to justify filing liens against officials using their names in public records such as indictments or court papers.

Id. (citation omitted).1

Plaintiff also apparently adheres to the Redemptionist theory regarding the use of capital letters:

Redemptionists claim that by a birth certificate, the government created strawmen out of its citizens. A person's name spelled in English, that is with initial capital letters and small letters, represents the real person, that is, the flesh and blood person. Whenever a person's name is written in total capitals, however, as it is on a birth certificate, the Redemptionists believe that only the strawman is referenced, and the flesh and blood person is not involved.

McLaughlin v. CitiMortqage, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 201, 210 (D. Conn. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bryant v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 524 F. Supp. 2d 753, 758-61 (W.D. Va. 2007).

Theories presented by redemptionist and sovereign citizen adherents have not only been rejected by the courts, but also recognized as frivolous and a waste of court resources. See McLaughlin v, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 210 (providing detailed explanation of the redemptionist theory and rejecting it); Charlotte v. Hanson, 433 Fed. Appx. 660, 661 (10th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the sovereign citizen theory as having no conceivable validity in American law) (citation omitted). A prisoner's attempt "to avoid the consequences of his criminal conviction" based on the redemptionist theory, has been recognized as "legally frivolous," Ferguson-El v. Virginia, No. 3:10CV577, 2011 WL 3652327, *3 (E.D. Va. Aug. 18, 2011), and civil cases based on redemptionist and sovereign citizen theories have been found to be "utterly frivolous" and "patently ludicrous," using "tactics" that are "a waste of their time as well as the court's time, which is paid for by hard-earned tax dollars." Barber v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 2:09cv40, 2010 WL 398915, *4 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 7, 2009).

In short, Plaintiff seeks to avoid the consequences of his conviction by suggesting he exists as two separate legal entities and that the State of New York and Broome County do not have jurisdiction over both entities and thus must release him and pay him damages. Such a theory is legally frivolous. See Tirado v. New Jersey, No. 10-3408(JAP), 2011 WL 1256624,*4-5 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2011) (observing a similar argument "has absolutely no legal basis"); Marshall v. Fla. Dep't Corr., No. 10-CV-20101, 2010 WL 6394565, *1 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2010). Although the Court finds that these theories are frivolous, in light of his pro se status, the Court will consider each possible claim in greater detail.

B. The Report, Recommendation, and Order

Section 1915(e)(2)(B) directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, "(2) . . . the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that - . . . (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).2 Thus, although the Court has the duty to show liberality toward pro se litigants, see Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam), and should exercise "extreme caution . . . in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and both parties (but particularly the plaintiff) have had an opportunity to respond, . . ." Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983) (internal citations omitted), the court also has a responsibility to determine that a claim is not frivolous before permitting a plaintiff to proceed with an action in forma pauperis.3

When reviewing a complaint, the court may also look to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a pleading that sets forth a claim for relief...

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