Muhammad v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections

• Decision Date: 09 January 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08-13495 Non-Argument Calendar.,08-13495 Non-Argument Calendar.
• Citation: 554 F.3d 949
• Parties: Askari Abdullah MUHAMMAD, formerly known as Thomas Knight, Petitioner-Appellant, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Florida Attorney General, Respondents-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

554 F.3d 949

Askari Abdullah MUHAMMAD, formerly known as Thomas Knight, Petitioner-Appellant, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Florida Attorney General, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 08-13495 Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

January 9, 2009.

Linda McDermott (Court-Appointed), McClain & McDermott, P.A., Wilton Manors, FL, D. Todd Doss (Court-Appointed), D. Todd Doss, P.A., Lake City, FL, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Sandra Sue Jaggard, Miami, FL, for Respondents-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PRYOR, Circuit Judge:

Askari Abdullah Muhammad, formerly known as Thomas Knight, is a Florida inmate sentenced to death who seeks a certificate of appealability to appeal the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Muhammad has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. We deny his application for a certificate of appealability.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1982, Muhammad was convicted of first-degree murder after fatally stabbing a prison guard while incarcerated and awaiting the death penalty for two previous murders. Muhammad represented himself at trial, and a jury found him guilty. He waived his right to a jury for the penalty phase of trial. The trial judge found three aggravating factors: Muhammad was imprisoned when he committed the murder; he was previously convicted of a capital offense; and the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The judge found no mitigating factors and sentenced Muhammad to death.

Muhammad raised numerous arguments in his direct appeal, three of which are before us in his application for a certificate of appealability: competency, waiver of counsel, and evidentiary rulings related to Muhammad's insanity defense. The Supreme Court of Florida discussed each of these issues when it affirmed Muhammad's conviction and sentence. Muhammad v. State (Muhammad I), 494 So.2d 969 (Fla. 1986).

The Supreme Court of Florida upheld the finding that Muhammad was competent to stand trial based on the observations by the trial court of Muhammad's behavior and an examination of Muhammad by one expert:

Muhammad refused to cooperate on three separate occasions with [state experts,] Drs. Barnard and Carrera. Dr. Amin's examination found Muhammad competent .... If the court has followed the procedures of the rules and the defendant's own intransigence deprives the court of expert testimony, the court must still proceed to determine competency in the absence of such evidence. The record demonstrates that Judge Carlisle had an opportunity to observe Muhammad's behavior at the competency hearing, to review a letter and various pleadings handwritten by the defendant and a part of the file, and to review the proffer of expert evidence. The proffer indicates Muhammad suffered mental problems, but one need not be mentally healthy to be competent to stand trial. Nothing in the record available to Judge Carlisle dispositively demonstrates Muhammad was incompetent.

Id. at 972-73.

The Supreme Court of Florida upheld the finding that Muhammad was competent to make the decision to waive counsel and found that Muhammad's decision not to pursue an insanity defense was not evidence of incompetency:

Judge Chance conducted a lengthy and detailed inquiry pursuant to the requirements of Faretta before accepting Muhammad's waiver with this finding: "I personally think you're making a mistake, I really do, but that is your decision. And I'm convinced from talking with you and from the time we spent here today that you're competent and capable to make a mistake." ... Judge Chance's ruling sums up the dilemma of permitting a defendant to proceed pro se. It also embodies a determination of competency and compliance with the Faretta standard .... Muhammad's refusal to cooperate in raising an insanity defense is not itself an indicator of incompetence. The record shows that Muhammad adamantly refused to seek any excuse for the murder based on his mental condition, apparently based on his interpretation of Moslem teachings that he should take responsibility for his actions. Society permits a defendant to seek refuge in an insanity defense; it does not require it.

Id. at 974-75.

The Supreme Court of Florida concluded that Muhammad's hearing to waive counsel, under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), which occurred less than a month after his competency had been determined, was adequate:

Appellate counsel also argues that the judge should have appointed experts for a determination of competency regarding the waiver and self-representation. Counsel claims Muhammad asked for an examination on this point, but it is clear from the context of his statement that his intention was that Dr. Amin consult with him as a defense expert under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.216(a), and nothing indicates that Muhammad had changed his position regarding the other experts. Also, the Faretta hearing occurred less than a month after the prior determination of competency to stand trial and nothing in the record suggests that Muhammad's mental condition had changed in the interim necessitating another, most likely futile, attempt at expert evaluation.

Id.

The Supreme Court of Florida also concluded that Muhammad had waived any objection to the evidentiary rulings of the state court related to his insanity defense:

[Muhammad] next asserts error in the trial court's ruling that appointed trial counsel would be unable to present any evidence of insanity because of the defendant's refusal to cooperate with the court experts. Subsequent to this ruling, Muhammad filed a pro se motion a month before trial to withdraw the notice of intent to raise the insanity defense. The trial court permitted the state to withdraw its motion to strike the insanity defense and granted Muhammad's motion. Muhammad was competent to make the motion and therefore he has waived any claim of error.

Id. at 976.

In 1989, Muhammad filed for post-conviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and argued eighteen grounds for relief. Only three of the arguments raised in Muhammad's 3.850 motion are raised in his application for a certificate of appealability: interference with his right to counsel, his waiver of counsel was equivocal, and suppression of evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). After the trial court determined that all of the claims were procedurally barred because they either had been raised or should have been raised on direct appeal and no cause had been established to excuse the default, the trial court denied the motion. Muhammad appealed, and the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the dismissal of all but the Brady claim as procedurally barred. Muhammad v. State (Muhammad II), 603 So.2d 488, 489 (Fla. 1992).

As to Muhammad's allegation that the state had suppressed exculpatory evidence, the Supreme Court of Florida remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 490. On remand, the trial court vacated Muhammad's death sentence and denied all other requested relief. Both Muhammad and the government appealed. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the denial of relief as to Muhammad's conviction and reversed the decision to vacate Muhammad's sentence of death. State v. Knight, 866 So.2d 1195 (Fla.2003) (per curiam).

The Supreme Court of Florida ruled that Muhammad had failed to prove that he was prejudiced by the alleged suppression of several unsigned statements because they were, at best, cumulative:

At best, the seven unattributed, unsigned, and undated statements contain limited and conflicting information regarding Muhammad's state of mind around the time of the murder .... [T]he information contained in the allegedly suppressed employee statements was cumulative to information from employee depositions. The record reflects that those depositions were turned over to Muhammad, yet he did not use them to present any mental mitigation. Under these circumstances, no likelihood that Muhammad would have used the similar and cumulative information ... to argue mental mitigation has been established .... [T]he nature of the documents that were presented on remand would not require either a new sentencing phase or a new trial.

Id. at 1202-03.

Muhammad also petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for a writ of habeas corpus and asserted five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. One of those arguments is relevant to his application for a certificate of appealability: that ineffective assistance of counsel was "cause" for his failure to raise the argument that the state court had interfered with his standby counsel on direct appeal. The Supreme Court of Florida denied Muhammad's habeas petition. Id. at 1205-06.

The Supreme Court of Florida held that Muhammad's argument that the court had interfered with his right to standby counsel would not have been meritorious and any failure to raise the argument on direct appeal was not prejudicial:

[I]t is clear from the record that Muhammad did not want to appear to have acquiesced to the limited role that his standby counsel was performing. Moreover, the court took seriously Muhammad's desire not to insinuate that [standby counsel] was providing him any assistance. Muhammad's decision to not avail himself of his designated standby counsel, even though he was aware [such counsel] was available, was his own, and not the trial judge's decision.

Id. at 1205.

In 2005, Muhammad filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Muhammad alleged ten grounds for relief. The district court denied the petition. Muhammad v. McDonough, No. 3:05-cv-62-J-32, 2008 WL 818812 (M.D.Fla. Mar. 26, 2008). The district court also...