Muhammad v. State

• Citation: 132 So.3d 176
• Decision Date: 19 December 2013
• Docket Number: No. SC13–2105.,SC13–2105.
• Parties: Askari Abdullah MUHAMMAD f/k/a Thomas Knight, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

132 So.3d 176

Askari Abdullah MUHAMMAD f/k/a Thomas Knight, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. SC13–2105.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Dec. 19, 2013.

Linda McDermott and Martin J. McClain of McClain & McDermott, P. A., Estero, FL, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Sandra S. Jaggard, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, FL, for Appellee.

Gregg D. Thomas and Rachel E. Fugate of Thomas & LoCicero PL, Tampa, FL, for Media Appellees, Brendan Farrington of the Associated Press and Morgan Watkins of The Gainesville Sun.

PER CURIAM.

Askari Abdullah Muhammad f/k/a Thomas Knight,¹ a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals from the denial of his successive motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. We have jurisdiction. Seeart. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Muhammad filed the instant successive postconviction proceeding after Governor Rick Scott signed a death warrant on October 21, 2013. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the circuit court's order denying postconviction relief on the claims raised in his successive postconviction motion, but we reverse the court's order denying Muhammad's public records request to the Florida Department of Corrections (DOC) for copies of his own inmate and medical records, and we order immediate transmission of copies of those records to Muhammad's counsel.

BACKGROUND

Muhammad was convicted of the October 12, 1980, first-degree murder of correctional officer James Burke. Burke was fatally stabbed by Muhammad while he was incarcerated on death row for the murder of a Miami couple. ² Burke was routinely taking death row inmates to be showered and, when he unlocked Muhammad's cell, Muhammad attacked him with a knife made from a sharpened spoon. Burke died after suffering more than a dozen wounds. It was reported that Muhammad became upset when he was not allowed to see a visitor because he had refused to shave without a special exemption. Muhammad was heard to say he would have to start “sticking people.” See Muhammad v. State, 494 So.2d 969, 970 (Fla.1986), cert. denied,479 U.S. 1101, 107 S.Ct. 1332, 94 L.Ed.2d 183 (1987).

In 1981, prior to trial, Muhammad's counsel obtained appointment of two mental health experts to examine him as to competence, but he consistently refused to cooperate with them. The court later added a third competency expert, psychiatrist Jamil Amin, M.D., who was originally appointed as a defense advisor but was later appointed to act as a competency expert. Muhammad did meet with Dr. Amin and, based on an opinion from him that Muhammad was suffering from a schizophreniform illness but was competent to stand trial, the trial court adjudged Muhammad competent to proceed.

Muhammad sought to represent himself at trial but his request to proceed pro se was denied by the first judge assigned to the case. After a second judge was assigned to the case, Muhammad again asked to represent himself, but was denied. The case proceeded to trial but ended in a mistrial. That trial judge subsequently recused himself and Muhammad then proceeded to a second trial. He again sought to represent himself and the successor judge allowed him to appear pro se with standby counsel. Muhammad was convicted and waived a jury recommendation in the penalty phase. The trial court found nothing in mitigation, and found three aggravating factors: (1) the defendant was under a sentence of imprisonment, § 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979); (2) the defendant had been convicted of a prior capital felony, § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat.; and (3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. Muhammad was sentenced to death and this Court affirmed both the conviction and the sentence in Muhammad v. State, 494 So.2d at 976.³

Muhammad filed an initial postconviction motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, raising eighteen claims. Relief was denied and Muhammad appealed the denial of fifteen claims.⁴ On appeal, this Court affirmed summary denial of most of the claims as procedurally barred. Muhammad v. State, 603 So.2d 488, 489 (Fla.1992). However, we reversed summary denial of the claim that the State failed to disclose exculpatory statements concerning Muhammad's mental state at the time of the crime in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Muhammad, 603 So.2d at 489–90.

On remand to the circuit court, and after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court vacated Muhammad's death sentence and ordered a new sentencing hearing. The State appealed the grant of a new sentencing hearing and Muhammad cross-appealed the claim that the trial court failed to consider the impact of the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing on the guilt phase of his trial. See State v. Knight, 866 So.2d 1195 (Fla.2003). We affirmed the portion of the trial court's order denying the motion to vacate Muhammad's conviction, but reversed that portion of the order vacating his death sentence. Id. at 1210. In reversing the order granting a new penalty phase, we concluded that even if Muhammad had clearly proven that certain employee and inmate statements from the DOC investigatory file were willfully or inadvertently withheld, Muhammad failed to prove that he was prejudiced by the alleged suppression. The seven unattributed, unsigned, and undated statements contained limited and conflicting information concerning Muhammad's state of mind around the time of the murder, and they were cumulative to information in employee depositions that were turned over to Muhammad, but which he did not attempt to use to present any mitigation.⁵Id. at 1200–02. We also denied Muhammad's petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging five claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.⁶Id. at 1203 & n. 9. The Supreme Court denied certiorari review in Muhammad v. Florida, 541 U.S. 1066, 124 S.Ct. 2396, 158 L.Ed.2d 969 (2004).

In 2005, Muhammad filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court alleging ten claims.⁷Muhammad v. McDonough, No. 3:05–CV–62–J–32, 2008 WL 818812, *1–2 (M.D.Fla. Mar. 26, 2008). The federal court denied an evidentiary hearing on the claims, id. at *8, *22, and denied habeas corpus relief. Id. at *48. Muhammad sought a certificate of appealability from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals on five of the grounds previously pursued in the state courts and federal district court.⁸ The Eleventh Circuit denied a certificate of appealability in Muhammad v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, et al., 554 F.3d 949, 955 (11th Cir.2009), cert. denied,559 U.S. 906, 130 S.Ct. 1281, 175 L.Ed.2d 1077 (2010), holding that Muhammad failed to show the denial of a constitutional right in connection with any of the claims for which he sought the certificate of appealability.

On July 28, 2008, Muhammad filed a successive motion for postconviction relief in the state circuit court under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, raising only one claim, a challenge to the constitutionality of Florida's lethal injection procedureswhich were in effect on that date. Muhammad contended that the lethal injection procedures created a risk of unnecessary pain and did not call for a medical determination of unconsciousness, which violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17, of the Florida Constitution. Muhammad sought an evidentiary hearing to present testimony of certain DOC personnel and an anesthesiologist who served on the Governor's Commission on Administration of Lethal Injection, which was created after the execution of Angel Diaz in 2006. The circuit court summarily denied the claim without an evidentiary hearing.

On appeal, we affirmed, noting that Muhammad was raising the same claims and proposing essentially the same evidence that was presented in earlier proceedings in which we held the same lethal injection procedures to be constitutional. See Muhammad v. State, 22 So.3d 538, 2009 WL 3807205, at *1 (Fla.2009) (table) (citing Tompkins v. State, 994 So.2d 1072, 1080 (Fla.2008), cert. denied,555 U.S. 1161, 129 S.Ct. 1305, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2009); Marek v. State, 8 So.3d 1123, 1130 (Fla.), cert. denied,557 U.S. 960, 130 S.Ct. 40, 174 L.Ed.2d 625 (2009)). We further stated, “The Court has also repeatedly rejected Eighth Amendment challenges to Florida's August 2007 revised lethal injection protocol.” Muhammad, 22 So.3d 538, 2009 WL 3807205, at *2 (citing Ventura v. State, 2 So.3d 194, 198 (Fla.), cert. denied,557 U.S. 925, 129 S.Ct. 2839, 174 L.Ed.2d 562 (2009); Henyard v. State, 992 So.2d 120, 130 (Fla.), cert. denied,554 U.S. 943, 129 S.Ct. 28, 171 L.Ed.2d 930 (2008); Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So.2d 326, 334, 353 (Fla.2007), cert. denied,553 U.S. 1059, 128 S.Ct. 2485, 171 L.Ed.2d 777 (2008)).

With this background in mind, we turn to Muhammad's successive motion for postconviction relief filed in the circuit court after Governor Scott signed the death warrant in this case on October 21, 2013. Pursuant to the circuit court's scheduling order, on October 29, 2013, Muhammad filed a successive motion to vacate his judgments of conviction and sentence of death in which he raised seven claims.⁹ Muhammad also filed motions for disclosure of public records, discovery, and for a stay. The State filed responses to the motions and to the postconviction claims and, on October 31, 2013, the circuit court held a combined motion hearing and case management conference. The court denied the motions and issued a written order summarily denying the postconviction claims on November 4, 2013. Notice of appeal was timely filed.

A majority of the Court determined that Muhammad's claim as to the substitution of a new drug, midazolam hydrochloride, as the first drug in the three-drug lethal injection protocol warranted an evidentiary hearing. We therefore granted a stay...