Muhammad v. Warden, Baltimore City Jail
| Decision Date | 08 June 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-7005,85-7005 |
| Citation | 849 F.2d 107 |
| Parties | Karriem Wali MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WARDEN, BALTIMORE CITY JAIL and United States of America and Lt. Young, Baltimore City Jail; Baltimore Police Department of Baltimore, Maryland; The District Court of Baltimore, Maryland, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Edmund J. O'Meally (Blum, Yumkas, Mailman, Gutman & Denick, P.A., Baltimore, Md., on brief), for plaintiff-appellant.
Millard S. Rubenstein, Asst. City Sol. (Benjamin L. Brown, City Sol., Frank C. Derr, Asst. City Sol., J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., Richard M. Kastendieck, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, Md., on brief), for defendants-appellees.
Before WIDENER and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges, and HAYNSWORTH, Senior Circuit Judge.
This appeal concerns the standards which should control in deciding whether to stay a prisoner's civil rights action pending the prisoner's release from prison. Because we find the district court's explanation of its sua sponte stay of a prisoner's action here inadequate to permit fair review under the relevant standards, we vacate the stay order and remand for reconsideration in accordance with this opinion.
In 1979, while appellant Karriem Wali Muhammad was detained in the Baltimore City Jail pending trial on federal bank robbery charges, he was assaulted by a fellow inmate. Muhammad asked the Warden and a Lt. Young to investigate the assault and prosecute his assailant. Later, when Muhammad was interviewed by members of the Baltimore City Police Department he was allegedly told that he would be contacted by the courts. No court ever contacted him.
In September 1981, Muhammad filed a pro se complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland against the United States, the Warden of the Baltimore City Jail, Lt. Young, the Baltimore City Police Department, and the District Court of Baltimore, Maryland. Along with various other complaints, Muhammad sought damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, and Sec. 1985, on the theory that the District Court of Maryland failed to institute charges against his assailant and that the Warden, Lt. Young, and the Baltimore City Police Department engaged in a conspiracy to cover up the incident.
The district court summarily dismissed Muhammad's claim with prejudice, finding that he had not stated a claim under Sec. 1983 against the Warden and Lt. Young because the complaint alleged only a single, isolated incident of violence that did not constitute a pervasive risk of harm or pattern of unchecked violence. The district court also dismissed the other claims. Before the entry of the order dismissing his complaint, Muhammad filed a motion to amend. The district court, construing Muhammad's motion as a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), denied the motion. Muhammad then appealed the order dismissing his complaint and the order denying his motion to amend. This court, while affirming most of the district court's disposition of the charges, nevertheless vacated the judgment in part and remanded so that the district court could address Muhammad's claim that the Warden, Lt. Young, the Baltimore City Police Department, and the District Court of Baltimore interfered with Muhammad's efforts to gain access to appropriate judicial procedures. See Muhammad v. Warden, Baltimore City Jail, slip op. No. 81-6917 (Sept. 22, 1982) [691 F.2d 495 (table) ]. We said:
We recognize that Muhammad may not be entitled to relief on a claim that defendants provided information which resulted in a judicial officer's decision not to issue a warrant.... Nevertheless, if Muhammad can show that the absence of response to his inquiries resulted from the defendants' interference with his attempts to gain access to the appropriate judicial procedure, he may be entitled to relief.
On remand, the district court issued a scheduling order setting a trial date for Oct. 3, 1983. The defendants all moved to dismiss, and Muhammad filed a response and a motion for summary judgment. Muhammad also requested a jury trial. On May 9, 1983, Muhammad informed the court of his transfer to a federal penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana.
On September 9, 1983, the district court entered an order denying the motions to dismiss filed by the Warden, Lt. Young, and the Baltimore City Police Dept. The district court, however, granted the District Court of Baltimore's motion to dismiss, reasoning that the court was a creation and instrument of the State of Maryland and not subject to suit for damages without its consent. On October 7, 1983, the district court denied Muhammad's motions for summary judgment and ordered the clerk to reclassify the case as one in which a jury trial had been demanded. The district court also postponed the trial, originally set for October 3, 1983, on the ground that another case with greater priority was set for trial on that same day.
On April 18, 1985, the district court referred Muhammad's case to a U.S. Magistrate for processing and disposition as an action challenging the conditions of confinement pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. No action was ever taken by the magistrate, and on August 16, 1985, the district court sua sponte ordered the case "administratively closed" pending Muhammad's release from federal prison and subject to Muhammad's right to reopen the case when he returned to Maryland. The district court's "Memorandum and Order" did not indicate the basis for the district court's decision to "administratively close" the case beyond noting that "there is no provision under federal law appropriating funds for the transportation of plaintiffs from out-of-state prisons for the purpose of prosecuting civil rights complaints." Muhammad here appeals the district court's order.
The threshold issue is whether the district court's order is appealable. The district court's order, as Muhammad concedes, did not fully resolve his action or dispose of all of the issues in dispute between the parties since the order contemplates a later trial on the merits. In general, federal appellate jurisdiction depends "on the existence of a decision by the District Court that 'ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.' " Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2457, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945)). Muhammad argues, however, that the district court's order, though it does not technically end his action, does so in practical effect. As Muhammad observes, the order administratively closing his case stays the action indefinitely, and Muhammad is not scheduled for release from federal penitentiary until 1991 at the earliest. Since he will find it difficult if not impossible to locate witnesses and conduct fresh discovery after his release, Muhammad insists that the district court's order effectively ends his lawsuit.
A number of courts have considered the appealability of district court orders staying prisoners' Sec. 1983 lawsuits. These courts have uniformly found the district courts' actions appealable, typically relying on the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), see, e.g., Wimberly v. Rogers, 557 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir.1977), or on the "practical finality" or "death-knell" quality of such orders, see, e.g., McKnight v. Blanchard, 667 F.2d 477 (5th Cir.1982) ( ) quoting Hine v. D'Artois, 531 F.2d 726, 730 (5th Cir.1976); see also Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 756 (8th Cir.1971) (per curiam) ().
We agree with these courts that, on one or the other of these bases, such orders may in certain cases be appealable. And we hold that the order here in issue is one which qualifies. While more dire instances of practical finality may be imagined, this one is sufficiently dire. Muhammad's earliest release date is apparently 1991, and his claim, initiated in 1981, depends on witnesses to conduct that occurred in 1979. We conclude that the open-ended delay created by the district court's order so prejudices Muhammad's ability to prosecute his claim as to render the order an appealable "final judgment."
The propriety of entering this, or any, stay order in an incarcerated prisoner's civil action must be assessed in light of the broader problem presented when any such case becomes ripe for trial. * For a stay of proceedings pending release from prison is but one of several obvious options that lie within the discretion of district courts. In addition to a stay pending release, these include making provisions for the prisoner to attend in person, either at his own expense, or at government expense, and in any case in government custody; trying the case without the prisoner's presence in the courtroom, either on depositions or affidavits or with aid of video; and even trying the case without a jury in the place of incarceration. All of these trial options of course presuppose that not only is the case ripe for trial, but that trial of disputed fact issues is required. If the case may be disposed of on motion to dismiss, or for summary judgment, or for default, or the like, that of course not only obviates the problem of the plaintiff's incarceration but is the required course.
The question of what to do in these circumstances may be, and has been, presented to district courts in a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
U.S. v. Moussaoui, 03-4792.
...Although the Carbo Court explicitly left the question open, its reasoning applies equally to the testimonial writ. See Muhammad v. Warden, 849 F.2d 107, 114 (4th Cir.1988). It is thus clear that a district court can reach beyond the boundaries of its own district in order to issue a testimo......
-
U.S. v. Moussaoui, 03-4792.
...Although the Carbo Court explicitly left the question open, its reasoning applies equally to the testimonial writ. See Muhammad v. Warden, 849 F.2d 107, 114 (4th Cir.1988). It is thus clear that a district court can reach beyond the boundaries of its own district in order to issue a testimo......
-
Clehm v. Bae Sys. Ordnance Sys., Inc., Civil Action No. 7:16-cv-00012
...the court acknowledges at the outset that ideally, of course, Linkous would have appeared in person. Muhammad v. Warden, Baltimore City Jail, 849 F.2d 107, 111-12 (4th Cir. 1988) (explaining that "[n]ot only the appearance but the reality of justice is obviously threatened" by an inmate's a......
- U.S. v. Barnette