Muhammad v. Wiles

Docket NumberEP-19-CV-51-KC,EP-19-CV-367-KC[1]
Decision Date26 May 2023
PartiesBILAL MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff, v. RICHARD WILES, Sheriff, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

ORDER OVERRULING THE PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS ACCEPTING THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE, AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

KATHLEEN CARDONE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

The Court, after considering Bilal Muhammad's complaint, the report and recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge, and Muhammad's objections, approves the report and recommendation and adopts it as its opinion in this matter. It accordingly dismisses Muhammad's civil rights complaint.

BACKGROUND

On December 30, 2015, police responded to reports of shots fired at a residential building where Muhammad rented a room in El Paso, Texas. Muhammad v. Wiles, No. EP-19-CV-367-KC 2020 WL 1234946, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2020) aff'd but criticized, No. 20-50279, 2022 WL 73047 (5th Cir. Jan. 7, 2022). They arrested Muhammad after they ordered him out of the building, and he laid down an assault rifle and a pistol. Id. They discovered the body of Lane William Wiscomb inside the building. Id. They determined Wiscomb died from gunshot wounds. Id.

Muhammad was charged with murder and booked into the El Paso County Detention Center. Id. He was indicted on March 9, 2016, for murder, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 19.02, under cause number 20160D01015 in the 168th Judicial District Court of El Paso County. Id. Muhammad has remained a pretrial detainee in the custody of Defendant Sheriff Richard Wiles at the El Paso County Jail Annex (EPCJA) for more than seven years awaiting his trial.[2] Id.

A. EP-19-CV-51-KC

In EP-19-CV-51-KC, Muhammad relied on multiple theories to request “a temporary restraining order ... and preliminary injunction directing ... El Paso County Sheriff [Richard Wiles] to provide him a kosher diet.” Muhammad v. Wiles, No. EP-19-CV-51-KC-LS, 2019 WL 13301479, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2019). He claimed he followed the Laws of Kashruth, and his faith required him to eat kosher foods. Muhammad v. Wiles, No. EP-19-CV-51-KC, 2019 WL 13301657, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2019), superseded, No. EP-19-CV-51-KC, 2019 WL 13301701 (W.D. Tex. July 16, 2019). Id. He alleged Wiles denied him his “right” to a kosher diet. Id. He asserted this right arose from (1) the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 et seq.; (2) the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause; and (2) the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Id. His motion was denied “because he did not exhaust his administrative remedies before he filed his case, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).” Muhammad, 2019 WL 13301701, at *5. He appealed and his case was reversed and remanded after the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded there was “a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Muhammad exhausted administrative remedies.” Muhammad v. Wiles, 841 Fed.Appx. 681, 685 (5th Cir. 2021).

B. EP-19-CV-367-KC

While Muhammad's appeal in EP-19-CV-51-KC was pending, he filed a 168-page handwritten civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in EP-19-CV-367-KC. Muhammad, 2020 WL 1234946, at *1. He sought injunctive relief and damages based on claims arising under RLUIPA; the First Amendment; the Eighth Amendment; the Fourteenth Amendment; and civil provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), § 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Muhammad v. Wiles, No. 20-50279, 2021 WL 5504760, at *1 (5th Cir. Nov. 23, 2021), opinion withdrawn and superseded on denial of reh'g, No. 20-50279, 2022 WL 73047 (5th Cir. Jan. 7, 2022). He also raised state law claims alleging violations of the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (TRFRA), TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.003; STATE LAW CLAIMS OF BREACH OF CONTRACT; AND STATE TORT CLAIMS FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, CONSPIRACY, AND GENERAL BREACH OF DUTY. Id. Specifically, he asserted Defendants did not provide “standard kosher meals that follow orthodox kashrut .. laws” which met his religious obligations. Muhammad, 2020 WL 1234946, at *1 (quoting Pl.'s Compl., ECF No. 62, p. 14).[3] He conceded Defendants did provide an “El Paso, Texas kosher menu” for EPCJA prisoners, but asserted these meals did not meet his religious requirements. Id. (citing Pl.'s Compl., ECF No. 62, pp. 54-55 (El Paso County .. implemented] .. the policy .. of ‘El Paso Texas, kosher menu' ..”); Pl.'s Compl., ECF No. 62, Ex. 1 (Kosher Menu), pp. 180-181; Pl.'s Compl., ECF No. 62, Ex. 2 (Operating Agreement-Food Services), pp. 182-203). He asserted Defendants “placed a substantial burden on the free exercise of his religious beliefs [without] a compelling government interest.” Id. (quoting Pl.'s Compl., ECF No. 62, p. 14). He further asserted Defendants “established a state-endorsed religion . . . to crush [his] religious beliefs ... to either make him .. convert or .. suffer . from eating the unhealthy diet.” Id. (quoting Pl.'s Compl., ECF No. 62, pp. 25-26). He argued Defendants had not “heeded ... the Religious Land Use + Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) which . provide[d] greater protection than the” First Amendment. Id. (quoting Pl.'s Compl., ECF No. 62, p. 28). He maintained “the gravamen” of his complaint was Defendants have “denied him the right to freely practice his religion.” Id. (quoting Pl.'s Compl., ECF No. 62, p. 54). He claimed he had exhausted his administrative remedies. Id. (citing Pl.'s Compl., ECF No. 62, p. 13). He asked the Court to intervene in his behalf and order Defendants to provide “nutritionally sufficient orthodox kosher meals that do not offend his religious beliefs.” Id. (quoting Pl.'s Compl., ECF No. 62, p. 62). He also asked for compensation in the amount of $10,000 per day from February 1, 2019, to the date the Court entered a final judgment giving him relief. Id. (citing Pl.'s Compl., ECF No. 62, p. 164).

The Court thoroughly reviewed Muhammad's RLUIPA and First Amendment claims. Id. at *2-*5. It concluded the “balance of equities favors the exercise of restraint in granting [Muhammad's] request for injunctive relief requiring judicial intervention in matters involving internal prison operations” and denied his request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Id. at *6. It then screened Muhammad's RLUIPA and First Amendment claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Id. at *6-*7. It noted “the gravamen” of Muhammad's complaint was that Defendants had “denied him the right to freely practice his religion” by denying him a particularized kosher diet, when by his own admission Defendants already provided prisoners at the EPCJA with kosher meals-albeit kosher meals that did not meet Muhammad's standards. Id. at *7 (quoting Pl.'s Compl., ECF No. 62, pp. 54-55). Hence, it concluded that Muhammad was “not entitled to relief under RLUIPA because Defendants [could] demonstrate a compelling interest in refusing to provide an individualized diet to Muhammad in particular, and its policy of denying individualized meals to prisoners in general may be the least restrictive means of achieving its penological interest in the effective functioning of EPCJ.” Id. Moreover, it noted “the Fifth Circuit has consistently held that prison officials ‘need not respond to particularized religious dietary requests to comply with the First Amendment.' Id. (quoting Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 122 (5th Cir. 2007)). Thus, the Court concluded that “Muhammad's complaint lack[ed] an arguable basis in either law or fact” and was subject to summary dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Id. So, the Court dismissed Muhammad's complaint as frivolous.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Court's denial of injunctive relief. Muhammad v. Wiles, No. 20-50279, 2022 WL 73047, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 7, 2022). It also noted the Court “addressed and disposed of Muhammad's claims for ... damages under the RLUIPA and the First Amendment.” Id. at *1. But it observed the Court “did not address, much less dismiss, Muhammad's claims arising under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, the RICO statute, the TRFRA, and state tort and contract law.” Id.

C. Consolidation

For efficiency, the Court consolidated Muhammad's unadjudicated claims in both of his kosher meal cases into EP-19-CV-51-KC, and closed EP-19-CV-367-KC. Muhammad's live pleading, then, is the more comprehensive complaint originally filed in case number EP-19-CV-367-KC (now ECF No. 62 in the instant case).

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The United States Magistrate Judge to whom the Court referred this matter screened Bilal Muhammad's remaining claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. R. & R., ECF No. 101. After completing his review, he recommended that the Court dismiss Muhammad's previously unaddressed claims, merge the dismissal of these claims with the Court's earlier dismissal of Muhammad's RLUIPA and First Amendment claims, and dismiss his complaint with prejudice. Id. at 12. He reasoned:

A. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

Muhammad's due process argument is that the defendants violated his “right to be free from punishment as a pretrial detainee.” Id. at 4 (quoting Pl.'s Compl ECF No. 62, p. 159) (see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (“In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention that implicate only the protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, we think that the proper inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee.”)). But Muhammad fails to plead facts showing that Defendants' failure to tailor their kosher menu to accommodate his idiosyncratic needs is...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT