Muhammed v. Ponds, 3:20-cv-00602
| Decision Date | 08 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:20-cv-00602,3:20-cv-00602 |
| Parties | MUHAMMED MUHAMMED, Plaintiff, v. BYRON PONDS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM
Muhammed Muhammed, an inmate at Trousdale Turner Correctional Center in Hartsville, Tennessee, filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1), a supplement to the complaint (Doc. No. 5), and an application to proceed as a pauper (Doc. No. 2). This action is before the court for an initial review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act and the in forma pauperis statute.
The court may authorize an inmate to file a civil suit without prepaying the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Because the plaintiff's application to proceed as a pauper reflects that he cannot pay the filing fee in advance, the application (Doc. No. 2) will be granted. The $350.00 filing fee will be assessed as directed in the accompanying order. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
The court must dismiss this action if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). The court also must liberally construe pro se pleadings and hold them to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
The plaintiff's allegations primarily concern his inmate classification at Trousdale Turner. Based on the plaintiff's factual allegations and the exhibits attached to the complaint, the court has established the following summary for the purpose of conducting an initial review.
In September 2019, the plaintiff was put on "close custody" status after pleading guilty to an "assault on staff" disciplinary offense. (Doc. No. 1 at 6.) The plaintiff was to go to "medium custody" after six months if he did not have an intervening disciplinary infraction. (Id.) The plaintiff did not have an infraction before his next reclassification hearing in May 2020, so TDOC Contract Monitor Chris Brun and Warden Raymond Byrd signed papers removing the plaintiff from close custody and authorizing him to return to general population. (Id.)
On May 29, 2020, Unit Manager Thames falsely charged the plaintiff with assault on staff. (Id. at 6, 9.) The plaintiff was taken to segregation, which violated a TDOC policy that inmates should be placed on "pending investigation" status before being charged. (Id.) The plaintiff had a disciplinary hearing on June 8, the timing of which allegedly violated his due process rights. (Id. at 9, 16-17.) Thames did not appear at the hearing. (Id. at 9.) The disciplinary board found the plaintiff not guilty based on a review of the prison's video footage. (Id. at 10, 16-17.)
The plaintiff remained on segregation until June 10, when he was placed on "pending investigation" status by Assistant Warden Byron Ponds. (Id. at 10; Doc. No. 5 at 1.) On June 11, the plaintiff filed a grievance with Grievance Chairperson Elisabeta Lopez. (Doc. No. 1 at 5.)
On June 16, Disciplinary Hearing Officer Huntley told the plaintiff that he spoke with Assistant Warden Ponds, and Ponds told Huntley that the plaintiff was returning to close custodystatus because Warden Byrd did not want him "back on the compound." (Id. at 10.) On June 23, Warden Byrd, Assistant Warden Ponds, and Assistant Warden Vinnie Vantel had Classification Coordinator Holmes reclassify the plaintiff to close custody status. (Id.; Doc. No. 5 at 2.) Holmes specifically told the plaintiff that he qualified for medium custody status, but that Ponds instructed her to "use a code to override [the plaintiff] to close custody" based on "the last classification and write up." (Doc. No. 1 at 11-12.) Sergeant Dickey also told the plaintiff that inmates found not guilty of assaulting him have been allowed "back on the compound." (Doc. No. 5 at 2.)
While on close custody status, the plaintiff is housed in the same pod as "protective custody" inmates, where he is unable to use the telephone or watch television and faces the following conditions: "no electricity, cold/late food, unsanitary showers, poor security, low staff." (Doc. No. 1 at 7.) The plaintiff seems to allege that this improper classification negatively affects his mental health, as he takes medication for diagnosed PTSD, depression, anxiety, and paranoia. (Id.) Inmates on close custody also lose parole eligibility, and the plaintiff alleges that Warden Byrd wanted him on this status, rather than some "transfer" status, to harm the plaintiff's ability to make parole at his next scheduled parole hearing in October. (Id. at 10-11.)
The plaintiff sues Warden Byrd, Assistant Warden Ponds, Assistant Warden Vantel, and Grievance Chairperson Lopez. (Id. at 1-3; Doc. No. 5 at 1.) He requests reclassification to general population with high priority, all "credits from 6-29-20 to present," and all "state pay." (Doc. No. 1 at 13.) He also requests "restitution paid out" for the defendants' actions. (Id. at 13-14.)
To determine if a complaint passes initial review under the applicable statutes, the court applies the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). The court therefore accepts "all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, [and] 'consider[s] thefactual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.'" Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009)). An assumption of truth does not extend to allegations that consist of legal conclusions or "'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis, Tenn., 695 F.3d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
As an initial matter, the plaintiff fails to state a claim against Grievance Chairperson Lopez. The only factual allegation regarding Lopez is that she received a grievance from the plaintiff related to the facts of this lawsuit. The plaintiff, therefore, is presumably asserting that Lopez either mishandled or failed to take appropriate action in response to his grievance. But "there is no inherent constitutional right to an effective prison grievance procedure," Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App'x 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases), and "the denial of a grievance or the failure to act upon the filing of a grievance is insufficient to establish liability under § 1983." Johnson v. Aramark, 482 F. App'x 992, 993 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, Lopez will be dismissed as a party.
Next, the plaintiff asserts that Trousdale Turner staff violated TDOC policy before and after his disciplinary hearing on June 8, 2020. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that he should havebeen placed on "pending investigation" status before being charged on May 29, instead of being taken to segregation. And after the hearing, the plaintiff asserts that Trousdale Turner staff violated a TDOC policy against "double jeopardy" by reclassifying him to close custody status despite the disciplinary board's finding of not guilty. (Doc. No. 1 at 8, 12; Doc. No. 5 at 1.) However, inmates cannot state a Section 1983 claim based solely on the failure to follow prison policies. See Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 574 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983)) ("Failing to follow proper procedures is insufficient to establish an infringement of a liberty interest."). Thus, to the extent that the plaintiff's claims are premised on the failure to follow policy, they will be denied.
The plaintiff's primary complaint is that prison staff violated his due process rights at the disciplinary hearing, and by placing him on close custody status following the hearing despite being found not guilty. As an initial matter, the plaintiff fails to state a claim based on the process afforded him at the hearing itself because he "was found not guilty." See Hursey v. Anderson, No. 16-1146, 2017 WL 3528206, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 31, 2017) (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1995)) ("[B]ecause Hursey was found not guilty, the misconduct proceedings did not implicate a protected liberty interest."). The plaintiff's concern, therefore, is not with the disciplinary board that found him not guilty, but with the reclassification to close custody following that outcome.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that prisoners "may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (citations omitted). To state a procedural due process claim, the plaintiff must show that (1) he had a protected liberty or property interest; (2) he was deprived of that interest; and (3) the state did notafford him adequate procedural rights prior to depriving him of that interest. Janinski v. Tyler, 729 F.3d 531, 541 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 611 (6th Cir. 2006)). The first prong of this claim is a threshold requirement. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Thus, "the question of what process is due is relevant only if the inmate establishes a constitutionally protected interest." Pickelhaupt v. Jackson, 364 F. App'x 221, 224 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Wikinson, 545 U.S. at 224).
Prisoners have a narrower set of protected...
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