Muhs v. River Rats, Inc.

• Decision Date: 18 November 2008
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. CV207-77.
• Citation: 586 F.Supp.2d 1364
• Parties: Gary MUHS, Plaintiff, v. RIVER RATS, INC., d/b/a Two-Way Marina, Two-Way Marina, Two-Way Boatyard, Rick Smith, and Lamar Welch, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

586 F.Supp.2d 1364

Gary MUHS, Plaintiff, v. RIVER RATS, INC., d/b/a Two-Way Marina, Two-Way Marina, Two-Way Boatyard, Rick Smith, and Lamar Welch, Defendants.

Civil Action No. CV207-77.

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Brunswick Division.

November 18, 2008.

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John J. Czura, John J. Czura, PC, Augusta, GA, R. Jonathan Hart, Chatham County Attorney's Office, Savannah, GA, William P. Walker, Jr., Walker & Morgan, LLC, Lexington, SC, for Plaintiff.

Paul Michael Scott, Richard K. Strickland, Whelchel, Brown, Readdick & Bumgartner, Brunswick, GA, Robert B. Smith, Smith and Phelps, Jesup, GA, R. Stephen Sims, R. Stephen Sims, PC, Springfield, GA, for Defendants.

ORDER

ANTHONY A. ALAIMO, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Gary Muhs, filed the above-captioned case against Defendants, River Rats, Inc., doing business as Two-Way Marina ("River Rats"), Two-Way Boatyard, Rick Smith, and Lamar Welch, asserting negligence and unseaworthiness claims.¹

Presently before the Court are Defendants' motions for summary judgment and Plaintiffs motion to amend his complaint. Because there is some evidence that River Rats, Two-Way Boatyard, and Welch may be liable, their motions will be DENIED in part. Because there is no evidence that River Rats, Two-Way Boatyard, and Welch committed other acts of negligence averred by Muhs, their motions will be GRANTED in part. Because there is no evidence to support piercing the corporate veil, Smith's motion will be GRANTED. Because Muhs' motion is indefinite and vague, it will be DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Muhs, as the Court must on a summary judgment motion, the facts are as follows. On June 22, 2005, Muhs, his fiancee Nancy Ball, and Ball's two children, David and Jackie, traveled to Two-Way Marina, which is located near Darien, Georgia. Muhs traveled to the marina to inspect and fuel the Nellie Belle, a boat that Muhs was in the process of purchasing from Lamar Welch. Muhs tried to start the boat, but one of the engines would not fire. Muhs concluded that there was no gas in the boat. After some time, Muhs was able to start the boat and pulled it around to the fueling dock at the marina.

River Rats operates the Two-Way Marina, which is open to the public, and provides facilities to fuel watercraft. The fueling operation is self-service. Dkt. No. 62, Frances Jones Dep. 4. On June 22, 2005, River Rats' employee Frances Jones was responsible for turning the gas pump on and off. Ms. Jones never went to the fuel dock to pump fuel herself. It was Ms. Jones' normal practice to stand by the pump while the boat was fueling until it was time to turn the pump off. Id.

Once the boat was moored at the fueling dock, David had to go to the bathroom. Muhs did not want David to use the restroom in the marina's restaurant, Mudcat Charlie's, because Jackie had broken the toilet there about ten days earlier. Dkt. No. 54, Muhs Dep. 53. Instead, Muhs wanted David to go to the bathroom in the Altamaha River, and told David he would hold onto the boy the whole time. Once Muhs put David in the water, the boy got scared and wiggled out of Muhs' hands. When Ball saw that Muhs had dropped her son in the water, she became upset and started yelling at Muhs.

Around this time, Muhs talked to the fuel attendant, Jones, and Muhs started fueling the boat. Fuel is dispensed from a pump through a hose to a fuel nozzle which is inserted into the vessel's fuel port attached to the gas tank. Muhs set the automatic lever to "pump," and took David to the bathroom in the restaurant. When Muhs returned, he saw and smelled gasoline in the river and in the boat's bilge, which is located below the deck with the vessel's engines. Ms. Jones did not go near the Nellie Belle at the time of fueling and did not see the boat's gas tank overflowing while the gas was being dispensed. Dkt. No. 62, Frances Jones Dep. 17.

Muhs noticed that 252 gallons of gasoline had been dispensed, and thought "it just topped out." Dkt. No. 54, Muhs Dep. 106. Ball testified that it was obvious to her and Muhs that there was gas in the bilge, and they both smelled gas. Both expressed their concern about starting the boat under these circumstances. Muhs told Ball that they needed to dilute the gasoline spilled in the boat, so they poured twenty-four bottles of water, containing twenty-four ounces of water each, into the bilge.

Muhs waited about an hour, and could no longer smell gas. Muhs believed he had eliminated the danger that the spilled gasoline might ignite. Muhs wanted to start the boat to see what was wrong with it so he could talk to Welch about the problem. The children were on the dock at this time. As Muhs tried to start the engine, Jackie yelled "Daddy, Daddy, boat on fire!" Dkt. No. 54, Nancy Ball Muhs Dep. 84; Dkt. No. 93 ¶ 34. Muhs turned around and saw smoke, but not flames, coming from the engine compartment. Muhs first thought there was an electrical fire because the boat had electrical problems previously.

Muhs then saw that Ball's legs were on fire, so he pushed her into the water. Muhs went back around to the engine compartment to try to figure out what was wrong. Ball testified that Muhs stayed on the boat for several minutes after she caught fire. Dkt. No. 54, Nancy Ball Muhs Dep. 86. After Muhs looked down and saw that his arm was on fire, he dove off the boat because he thought it was going to explode. Muhs pulled himself onto the dock and collapsed at Ball's feet. Muhs was burned severely in the fire.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides for summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Facts are "material" if they could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), and must draw "all justifiable inferences in his favor[,]" United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff's Claims Against River Rats, Two-Way Boatyard, and Welch Sound in Admiralty Law

Muhs' complaint invokes the Court's diversity jurisdiction, and alternatively, the Court's admiralty jurisdiction. Muhs submits that this case arises out of a fire on a vessel upon navigable waters and is a negligence case in admiralty. River Rats responds that state law applies, not the law of the sea.

Under the "Reverse-Erie" doctrine, federal maritime law governs the rights and liabilities of the parties where a tort occurs on navigable waters, irrespective of whether the case is litigated in state or federal court, even if a federal court's diversity jurisdiction is invoked by the plaintiff. Diesel "Repower," Inc. v. Islander Invs. Ltd., 271 F.3d 1318, 1322 & n. 1 (11th Cir.2001).

Federal maritime law applies where the situs and nexus tests are established. Id. at 1322 n. 2 (citing Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 93 S.Ct. 493, 34 L.Ed.2d 454 (1972)). Where the "substance and consummation of the occurrence which gave rise to the cause of action" takes place in navigable waters, the situs or locality test is established. Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 255, 93 S.Ct. 493 (quoting T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179, 182, 48 S.Ct. 228, 72 L.Ed. 520 (1928)). "[T]he tort `occurs' where the alleged negligence took effect." Id. at 266, 93 S.Ct. 493. Additionally, where the underlying tort bears a substantial relationship with maritime activity, it has a sufficient connection with maritime law and the nexus test is met. Id. at 268, 93 S.Ct. 493.

In the instant case, the boat became engulfed in flames after fueling, while floating in the Altamaha River. The application of federal maritime law is supported by the facts. This is not a case like Executive Jet, where an airplane crashed fortuitously into navigable waters. Id. at 266, 93 S.Ct. 493; see also Dir. v. Perini N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 320, 103 S.Ct. 634, 74 L.Ed.2d 465 (1983). The Court concludes that the nexus test is met because the averred tort has a substantial relationship with maritime activity.

Although the law of the sea governs, a federal court sitting in admiralty may apply common-law rules where such application does not impair principles of uniformity mandated by federal maritime law. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 873, 106 S.Ct. 2295, 90 L.Ed.2d 865 (1986); Coastal Fuels Mktg., Inc. v. Fla. Express Shipping Co., 207 F.3d 1247, 1251-52 (11th Cir.2000).

Because maritime law applies, River Rats' argument that Muhs assumed the risk of the peril, and is thus precluded from recovery, is not well founded. "Any rule of assumption of risk in admiralty, whatever its scope, must be applied in conjunction with the established admiralty doctrine of comparative negligence and in harmony with it. Under that doctrine contributory negligence, however gross, is not a bar to recovery but only mitigates damages." Edward Leasing Corp. v. Uhlig & Assocs., Inc., 785 F.2d 877, 886 (11th Cir.1986)(quoting Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 431, 59 S.Ct. 262, 83 L.Ed. 265 (1939)).

Therefore, Muhs' alleged failure to act as a reasonable person constitutes contributory negligence that could reduce his recovery, but not bar it outright. The Court applies comparative fault rules to apportion...