Muir v. Chrysler LLC, Case No. 3:07 CV 261.

• Decision Date: 27 June 2008
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:07 CV 261.
• Citation: 563 F.Supp.2d 783
• Parties: Fred MUIR, Plaintiff, v. CHRYSLER LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

563 F.Supp.2d 783

Fred MUIR, Plaintiff, v. CHRYSLER LLC, Defendant.

Case No. 3:07 CV 261.

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Western Division.

June 27, 2008.

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Michelle L. Kranz, Zoll & Kranz, Toledo, OH, for Plaintiff.

Heidi N. Eischen, John T. Landwehr, Lynn Vuketich Luther, Eastman & Smith, Toledo, OH, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JACK ZOUHARY, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 32), Plaintiff's Opposition (Doc. No. 36) and Defendant's Reply (Doc. No. 38).

Plaintiff Fred Muir filed this lawsuit against his former employer, Defendant Chrysler LLC (Chrysler), alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e), and Ohio Revised Code § 4112.99. He also asserts claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages. This Court has jurisdiction over the Title VII claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because that claim arises under federal law. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff began working for Defendant in 1975 and at the relevant times worked at the Toledo North Assembly Plant (Plant). Plaintiff belonged to the United Auto Workers union (UAW) and was elected steward around 1996-97 and then chief steward in July 2001, a position he held during the times relevant to this lawsuit. As chief, steward, Plaintiff handled complaints from UAW members.

Hector Garcia, an hourly employee at the Plant, approached Plaintiff in October 2004 regarding an alleged incident of sexual harassment in the UAW office. Garcia alleged Mark Epley, a union official, made inappropriate comments to a female hourly employee. Garcia, who had previously reported the incident to UAW officials, asked Plaintiff to provide the mailing addresses of Chrysler management and UAW leadership so he could send a letter describing the incident. Garcia apparently had contacted an investigator with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) who recommended putting the complaint in writing. Plaintiff provided various office addresses for Chrysler and UAW officials as well as home addresses for UAW leadership.¹

Thomas Maxon, Senior Manager of Human Resources at the Plant, initiated an investigation into the incident when he learned of Garcia's letter. Maxon, along with Labor Relations Supervisor Jean Hathaway, UAW Local 12 Chairman Daniel Henneman, and UAW Committeeman Daryl Peterson, all met with the female employee in November 2004. The employee denied any inappropriate conduct by Epley. This group also met with Garcia and Plaintiff in the afternoon of Friday, November 5 and determined in the course of its questioning that the gender discrimination complaint was unsupported. They also questioned Garcia about how he obtained the home addresses of UAW leadership, and Garcia eventually informed Maxon that Plaintiff provided the list of addresses. Maxon then questioned Plaintiff about his source for the addresses, but Plaintiff did not divulge it during the interview. Plaintiff now states he obtained the addresses through public information and a Christmas card list.

The parties dispute whether Maxon raised concerns about previous incidents of identity theft at the Plant. There is no dispute, however, that Maxon was concerned about the sharing of unlisted home addresses, and he placed Plaintiff on notice of possible discipline for refusing to disclose where he obtained addresses. That same day, Friday, Plaintiff was told by UAW officials Henneman and Peterson to leave work for the day and check back with Henneman about returning to work after the weekend. The parties dispute whether Henneman told Plaintiff he was being placed on suspension by Defendant, as Defendant claims it authorized no disciplinary action against Plaintiff.

The parties also disagree on when Plaintiff returned to work. Plaintiff asserts he returned to work after five days of unpaid suspension; Defendant produces time-keeping records and affidavits to support its assertion that Plaintiff received no disciplinary action and missed just over one day of scheduled work for non-disciplinary reasons. Plaintiff testifies he did not return to work until he cleared it through the UAW.

Plaintiff filed an administrative complaint with the EEOC and an internal grievance relating to this unpaid period, with results pending. In 2005, Plaintiff also filed a complaint with the EEOC relating to the incident, alleging unlawful retaliation for exercise of protected rights. The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter in 2006 with a determination of "reasonable cause" to support a violation of Title VII. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in 2007.

I. Prima Facie Case for Retaliation

To establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a),² Plaintiff must show: "(1) [he] engaged in activity protected under Title VII; (2) the defendant knew that [he] engaged in protected activity; (3) the defendant subsequently took an adverse, retaliatory action against the plaintiff, or the plaintiff was subjected to severe or pervasive retaliatory harassment by a supervisor; and (4) the protected activity and the adverse action were causally connected." Randolph v. Ohio Dep't of Youth Servs., 453 F.3d 724, 736 (6th Cir.2006).³

The EEOC right-to-sue letter (Opp. Memo. Ex. B) contains a finding of "reasonable cause to believe that violations of the statute(s) occurred with respect to some or all of the matters alleged in the charge." The letter does not provide detail on what Plaintiff reported in the charge or what warranted "reasonable cause." Plaintiff argues this letter is sufficient to establish his prima facie case of unlawful retaliation.

Kesselring v. United Techs. Corps., 753 F.Supp. 1359, 1368-69 (S.D.Ohio 1991) held that a court may admit in evidence an administrative finding:

The Supreme Court in Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 96 S.Ct. 1949, 48 L.Ed.2d 416 (1976) noted, that prior administrative findings may be admitted as evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)(c) in Title VII cases. See also, Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation Center, 520 F.Supp. 769 (S.D.Ohio 1981). The admissibility of agency reports or findings is a matter within the discretion of the court. Johnson v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 734 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1984). The existence or non-existence of discrimination still depends upon the facts of a particular case, not upon an agency's conclusions regarding those facts. Harden, 520 F.Supp. at 773.

The factual record before the Court controls its adjudication of the merits, not the conclusory finding contained in the EEOC letter. Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit has found such letters to hold limited probative value. See Williams v. Nashville Network, 132 F.3d 1123, 1129 (6th Cir.1997) (holding trial court did not abuse discretion in excluding EEOC determination letter from evidence in trial because of limited probative value and risk of jury confusion or undue prejudice). Without any record of the EEOC's analysis or the information upon which it relied, its finding alone does not bind or persuade the Court and falls short of creating a genuine issue of material fact.

1. Protected Activity

This case is different from the usual Title VII case because Plaintiff did not submit a complaint or personally oppose any employment practice. Rather, he provided a complaining employee the home addresses of officials, which Defendant claims is a violation of company policy and a possible basis to discipline Plaintiff. The Court next considers whether Plaintiff's conduct, independent of Garcia's underlying claim, is protected under Title VII.

First, Plaintiff must establish he engaged in a "protected activity" within the meaning of Title VII. This element may be met by evidence of opposing an unlawful practice or making a charge, testifying, assisting or participating in an investigation, proceeding or hearing. These two provisions have been labeled the "opposition" and "participation" clauses:

We have enumerated the types of activities that constitute opposition under Title VII: complaining to anyone (management, unions, other employees, or newspapers) about allegedly unlawful practices; refusing to obey an order because the worker thinks it is unlawful under Title VII; and opposing unlawful acts by persons other than the employer-e.g., former employers, union, and coworkers.

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We have held that Title VII [also] protects an employee's participation in an employer's internal investigation into allegations of unlawful discrimination where that investigation occurs pursuant to a pending EEOC charge.

Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, 211 Fed.Appx. 373, 376 (6th Cir.2006), cert, granted, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1118, 169 L.Ed.2d 846 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff argues his conduct is protected under either the opposition or participation clause. Plaintiff claims he is so closely associated with Garcia in this matter that he need not show he was directly involved in the protected activity. Plaintiff points out that Garcia approached him for assistance in submitting a complaint to Chrysler after Garcia had met with an EEOC investigator for guidance. Plaintiff argues his "actions in providing mailing addresses to Garcia for [the] specific purpose of submitting a written complaint regarding an incident of sexual harassment, with full knowledge of Garcia's intent, constitutes participation in objecting to discriminatory or harassing employment practices" (Opp. at p. 12).

Plaintiff cites no conduct he personally undertook in opposition to unlawful employment practices. Sharing a list of union and company official addresses does not meet the standard of "active, consistent `opposing' activities." Bell v. Safety Grooving & Grinding, LP, ...