Muir v. U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin.
| Decision Date | 22 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:20-cv-01280 |
| Parties | MICHAEL GIBSON MUIR, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION; DAVID P. PEKOSKE, in his individual capacity; L3HARRIS TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; ALLEGIANT AIR, LLC; CHAD F. WOLF, in his official capacity as United States Department of Homeland Security; Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
This Matter is before the Court on multiple motions to dismiss. Defendant Allegiant Air, LLC, has filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Pursuant to Rule 12(c) and Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Docs. 30, 31). Defendants United States Transportation Security Administration (TSA), David P. Pekoske, and Chad. F. Wolf (collectively, "Federal Defendants") have filed a joint Motion to Dismiss (doc. 33); Defendant David P. Pekoske has also filed, in his individual capacity, a separate Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (doc. 34). And Defendant L3Harris Technologies, Inc. (L3), has filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 37). All motions have been fully briefed and are therefore ripe for review.
Plaintiff claims he was psychologically and physically injured as a result of two encounters with Defendant TSA. (Doc. 12). On August 9, 2018, Defendant presented at the Phoenix-Mesa Gateway Airport in Mesa, Arizona, for mandatory pre-flight screening. (Doc. 12 at 5). While Plaintiff was in the "hands-up" position during the body scan portion of the screening, his hernia at his right groin became symptomatic; TSA officials informed Plaintiff that the body scan revealed an anomaly at Plaintiff's right groin, necessitating a pat-down search. (Doc. 12 at 5-7). Plaintiff ordered the TSA officials not to touch his right groin because he was experiencing a serious medical emergency and "being touched at his right groin would result in extreme physical pain and could endanger his life." (Doc. 12 at 7). The TSA officials persisted, and Plaintiff—against his will—submitted to the pat-down search. (Doc. 12 at 7).
On August 12, 2018, Plaintiff presented at the Peoria International Airport in Peoria, Illinois, for mandatory pre-flight screening. (Doc. 12 at 8). Plaintiff's hernia again became symptomatic during the body scan, and TSA officials again required a physical pat-down of Plaintiff's right groin. (Doc. 12 at 8-11). Plaintiff again ordered the TSA officials not to touch his right groin because he was experiencing a serious medical emergency and physical contact "would result in immediate and extreme physical pain." (Doc. 12 at 10). He offered to instead lower his pants and underwear to show the TSA officials his hernia; the TSA officials declined and required the pat-down search. Plaintiff again reluctantly submitted to the pat down, desperate to end the interaction. (Doc. 12 at 11). As a result of these two incidents, Plaintiff suffers "severe ongoing psychological distress and disturbing physical manifestations." (Doc. 12 at 11).
The various motions for dismissal invoke multiple legal standards.
"A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is governed by the same standards as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)." BBL, Inc. v. City of Angola, 809 F.3d 317, 325 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 727-28 (7th Cir. 2014)). To survive dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the plaintiff's claim sufficient to plausibly demonstrate entitlement to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff is not required to anticipate defenses or plead extensive facts or legal theories; rather, the complaint need only contain enough facts to present a story that holds together. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010). The Seventh Circuit has consistently noted the essential function of Rule 8(a)(2) is to put the defendant on notice. Divane v. Nw. Univ., 953 F.3d 980,987 (7th Cir. 2020) .
On review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. United States ex rel. Berkowitz v. Automation Aids, Inc., 896 F.3d 834, 839 (7th Cir. 2018). This means the Courts accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. Id. Allegations that are, in reality, legal conclusions are not taken as true and cannot survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 694 F.3d 873, 885 (7th Cir. 2012). Moreover, pro se complaints must be construed liberally and held to a "less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015). (quoting Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011)).
United States v. Alkaramla, 872 F.3d 532, 534 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). Whether a case falls within the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts is both a constitutional and a statutory question. "[T]he Constitution imposes a ceiling, albeit a high one, on the potential jurisdiction of the federal courts" by "permit[ting] federal courts to hear only certain claims." Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Loc. 150, AFL-CIO v. Ward, 563 F.3d 276, 280-81 (7th Cir. 2009); see also U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Congress has the authority "to further refine the actual scope of federal jurisdiction" because federaljurisdiction must be exercised pursuant to a statutory grant. Id. Thus both the Constitution and federal statutory law "must authorize a federal court to hear a given type of case" for federal jurisdiction to lie. Id. at 280.
There are two types of jurisdictional challenges: facial and factual. "Facial challenges require only that the court look to the complaint and see if the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction." Apex Digit., Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2009) (emphasis omitted). "In reviewing a facial challenge, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Silha v. ACT, Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 173 (7th Cir. 2015). "In contrast, a factual challenge lies where the complaint is formally sufficient but the contention is that there is in fact no subject matter jurisdiction." Apex Digit., 572 F.3d at 444 (internal quotation marks omitted). In such cases, "[t]he district court may properly look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists." Id. In any event, the plaintiff "bears the burden of establishing that the jurisdictional requirements have been met." Ctr. for Dermatology & Skin Cancer, Ltd. v. Burwell, 770 F.3d 586. 588-89 (7th Cir. 2014).
The Court will address each motion to dismiss in turn.
Defendant Allegiant Air argues Plaintiff's allegations against it, set forth in Counts XV-XX of the First Amended Complaint (doc. 12 at 20-24), are time-barredand fail to state a claim. (Doc. 31 at 5). Plaintiff's Response argues (1) his claims survive scrutiny under Rule 12(b)(6) and (2) the discovery rule—or, in the alternative, Defendant's fraudulent concealment of his claims—operated to toll the statute of limitations, rendering his claims timely. (Doc. 36 at 13-30). The Court granted Defendant Allegiant Air leave to file a Reply, which argued, inter alia, much of Plaintiff's Response should be disregarded as an impermissible attempt to amend the operative Complaint. (Doc. 41 at 2-3).
While it is indeed "axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss" Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984), it is likewise settled law that "facts alleged . . . in a brief in opposition to a motion to dismiss may be considered when evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint so long as they are consistent of the allegations in the complaint," Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 311 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, "a complaint need not anticipate and overcome affirmative defenses, such as the statute of limitations." Amin Ijbara Equity Corp. v. Vill. of Oak Lawn, 860 F.3d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, "dismissal at this early stage is appropriate when the complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish that the suit is indeed tardy." Id.; see also Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Krop, 2018 IL 122556, ¶ 21, 120 N.E.3d 982, 988, reh'g denied (Nov. 26, 2018) ("When a complainant should have discovered an injury is a question of fact, but this court can determine when the limitations period began if the facts areundisputed and only one answer is reasonable.").2 With these principles in mind, the Court will consider "new" facts relating to the statute...
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