Muirhead v. Sands

• Decision Date: 05 January 1897
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: MUIRHEAD v. SANDS.

69 N.W. 826

111 Mich. 487

MUIRHEAD v. SANDS.

Supreme Court of Michigan

January 5, 1897

Appeal from circuit court, Kalkaska, county, in chancery; Fred H Aldrich, Judge.

Bill by Peter Muirhead against Louis Sands to quiet title under a tax deed. From a judgment in favor of complainant, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Pub.Acts 1893, Act No. 206, � 60, altering the time of sale and the period for redemption of lands previously assessed for taxes does not conflict with Const. art. 6, � 32, providing that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

Smurthwaite & Fowler, for appellant.

Totten & Phelps, for appellee.

MONTGOMERY, J.

Complainant in January, 1895, became the purchaser from the state of the 78.89 acres of land in controversy, under a tax deed; the state having become the purchaser at the annual tax sale in December, 1893; the lands having been sold for the delinquent taxes of the year 1891. This bill is filed to quiet complainant's title under his tax deed.

1. It is claimed that under the laws of 1889, as amended by the laws of 1891, lands assessed for taxes of that year, upon which the taxes were unpaid, must be returned delinquent to the county treasurer in March, 1892, and that section 51 of the act provides that all lands returned delinquent shall become subject to sale one year from the 1st day of July next after the return, and that by section 62 these land could be sold on the first Monday in May next following the date at which they became subject to sale, so that they could not have been sold under that act before the first Monday in May 1894, and that by section 68 the owner can redeem at any time previous to one year from and after the 30th day of September next succeeding such sale; so that, if these lands had been sold under the act of 1891, they would have been subject to redemption until September 30, 1895, whereas under the amended law the sale was made in December, 1893, and complainant's deed was executed in January, 1895. It is claimed that the amended law of 1893 does not apply to these lands at all, and that the act of 1891 is yet in force as to them. It is conceded that some parts of the act of 1893 seem to contemplate that the provisions of the act shall apply to the sale of certain lands returned delinquent. Section 60 Act No. 206, Laws 1893, is as follows: "All lands which have been or may hereafter be returned to the auditor general as delinquent for taxes, and upon which any taxes are now or shall hereafter remain unpaid, after their return to the auditor general under the provisions of this act or to the several county treasurers of the state under the provisions of Act No. 200 of [111 Mich. 490] the Public Acts of 1891, for the period of one year or more, shall be subject to disposition, sale and redemption for the enforcement and collection of such tax liens in the method and manner as hereafter provided." These provisions would seem to be clear. But it is contended that the provisions of section 125, which reserve all rights which have accrued to any person under the previous tax law, and section 126, which, after repealing contravening acts, provides that such repeal shall not destroy or affect any rights which may have accrued or which may hereafter accrue under such acts or parts of acts while the same are in force, are inconsistent with the provisions of section 60, and indicate that it was not the intention that proceedings to enforce the collection of the tax assessed under the law of 1891 could be taken under the law of 1893. It is asked, "Is not the right to own and hold property one of the dearest vested rights known to the law?" The answer is, of course, obvious. But we think it clear that section 125 and section 126 were not directed to the reservation of these rights, but to the protection of such rights as accrued under the previous acts. The right of defendant or his grantors to own this property was not derived under the tax laws. It is next said that section 71 of the tax law of 1893 shows that the legislature did not intend to shorten the periods of sale and redemption of lands delinquent for the tax of 1891. This section gives the form of certificate, which contains the statement that the purchaser will be entitled to a deed of conveyance in one year from the 30th day of September next following. It is evident that, in copying this certificate into the law of 1893, a mistake occurred, as it was taken bodily from the certificate provided for by the law of 1891. But other sections of the statute of 1893 make the intention of the legislature clear as to the date of redemption. Section 71 provides that certificates shall be given to each purchaser of the lands and interests bid off by him, showing the year and the tax for which he has purchased, and also the amount thereof, and of all other taxes paid by him at the time of such purchase, stating that he will be entitled to a deed after the period of redemption provided for in section 74 has expired. Section 74 provides that "any person owning any of the lands sold as aforesaid, or any interest therein, may at any time within one year from and after such sale, redeem any parcel of such lands, or any part or interest in such lands," etc. These provisions make it clear that the period fixed by law for redemption was one year, and the original owner cannot be concerned as to the form of the certificate given to the purchaser, nor would it be material if no certificate was given at all. The law fixes the time within which redemption can take place, and his rights are not affected by the evidence of purchase which the statute has provided shall be furnished to the purchaser. It is next contended that, if the law of 1893 be construed to apply to the taxes for the year 1891, it hastens the time of sale of lands delinquent for taxes, and cuts down the period of redemption provided by the previous law, and is to that extent unconstitutional, in that it violates section 1 of article 10 of the constitution of the United States, prohibiting enactments by the state impairing the obligation of contracts, and article 6, � 32, of the constitution of Michigan, in that it deprives persons of their property without due process of law. We think neither of these positions is tenable. A labored argument is made to show that the relation between the state and the owner of the land is a contract relation, for the reason that the taxes assessed became a debt to the township from the person to whom they are assessed. But the proceeding is essentially in invitum, and the proceeding on a sale if land is a remedy for the delinquency of the taxpayer. The law affecting the remedy is in such cases subject to amendment, even though the time fixed for the sale or redemption be shortened. 25 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 410; Black, Tax Titles, � 353; Baldwin v. Ely, 66 Wis. 171, 28 N.W. 392; To view preceding link please click here Negus v. Yancey, 22 Iowa, 57. Defendant relies upon Cargill v. Power, 1 Mich. 369, which case proceeds upon the view that the period of redemption on a mortgage sale, as fixed by statute at the time the mortgage was executed, is to be deemed a part of the engagement of the parties. No such construction can be placed upon the statute here under consideration. There was no agreement between the state and the taxpayer as to the period of redemption.

2. It is contended that under the law of 1893 there was no provision for any private sale of state bids until after the period of redemption...