Mukluk Freight Lines, Inc. v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc.
| Decision Date | 03 December 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 1870,1870 |
| Citation | 516 P.2d 408 |
| Parties | MUKLUK FREIGHT LINES, INC., Appellant. v. NABORS ALASKA DRILLING, INC., et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Alaska Supreme Court |
Joseph W. Sheehan, of Rice, Hoppner, Blair & Associates, Fairbanks, for appellant.
Bruce A. Bookman, of McGrath, Wohlforth & Flint, Anchorage, for appellee Nabors Drilling.
John E. Havelock, Atty. Gen., Juneau, Anthony D. M. Doyle, Asst. Atty. Gen., Anchorage, for appellee, State of Alaska.
Before RABINOWITZ, C. J., and CONNOR, ERWIN, BOOCHEVER, and FITZGERALD, JJ.
Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 1 acquired through purchase all of the stock of Kodiak Oilfield Haulers, Inc. 2 Following the purchase, Nabors filed an application pursuant to AS 42.10.220 3 with the Alaska Transportation Commission 4 for transfer of Kodiak's operating authority to Nabors. Mukluk Freight Lines, Inc., 5 objected to the application 6 contending that Kodiak's operating authority was dormant, and that the Commission was required to consider public necessity before approving a transfer of the operating authority. Mukluk also challenged Nabors' ability to provide adequate service under Kodiak's operating authority.
The Commission conducted two prehearing conferences. Initially, the Commission intended to hold an evidentiary hearing in the matter. The contestants were ordered to file written submissions 7 on the evidence which each intended to present. Nabors complied fully with the Commission's prehearing order, but Mukluk's submission consisted of a verified statement by James G. Dye, its president, with an outline of Mukluk's objections. Dye, in urging the Commission to deny the application, alleged Nabors had failed to prove nondormancy. According to the statement, the proposed transfer was incompatible with the public interest since there was insufficient freight to warrant additional transportation service. Mukluk also demanded a right to cross-examine all of Nabors' witnesses at the hearing.
In light of Mukluk's failure to file a submission complying with the Commission's prehearing order, Nabors requested that all issues before the Commission be resolved by consideration of the written submissions avoiding the necessity of an evidentiary hearing. Since Mukluk had failed to submit evidence on the issue of dormancy after having the opportunity to review Nabors' written submissions, Nabors now claimed that essential fairness required final adjudication of the issues on the basis of the submissions without further hearings.
The Commission responded to Nabors' suggestion by promulgating Order 71-807, dated November 12, 1971. The order cancelled the evidentiary hearing and limited the inquiry of the Commission to an evaluation of written submissions. According to the order, the Commission, in the exercise of its discretion, had determined that in this instance public interest did not require an evidentiary hearing. In effect the order prevented Mukluk from cross-examining Nabors' witnesses in the search for flaws or weaknesses in Nabors' evidence. The Commission recited the factors which it considered in reaching its decision that the evidentiary hearing was unnecessary. They included the nature of Nabors' acquisition of control of Kodiak, the strength and credibility of Nabors' evidence, Nabors' cooperation in disclosing information to the Commission, and Mukluk's failure to submit contradictory evidence within a reasonable time, even after having access to all of Nabors's evidence.
In the place of an evidentiary hearing, the Commission announced that it would employ a 'modified procedure.' In the new process Mukluk would be allowed additional time to submit evidence in written form and to take the depositions of Nabors' witnesses if Mukluk so desired. Although the Commission announced a willingness to evaluate any additional requests for reconsideration of its order, Mukluk offered no further submissions or applications. Instead, Mukluk promptly filed an appeal to the superior court. 8 While the appeal was pending in superior court, the Commission approved 9 Nabors' application for transfer of Kodiak's operating authority.
The superior court made its order on the appeal on November 6, 1972. The court approved the Commission's use of a modified procedure, but concluded that Mukluk had been deprived of due process of law in that the Commission had failed in the new procedure to allow Mukluk sufficient time to prepare written submission. The contestants then entered into a stipulation, approved by the superior court, staying the order of the superior court until an appeal could be taken to this court.
Mukluk now appears as appellant and Nabors and the Commission are the appellees. The appellant makes the following contentions in this appeal:
'1. The (Commission) has acted beyond the scope of its rules and regulations.
2. The (Commission) has failed to comply with AS 42.07.141 ().
3. The (Commission) has failed to comply with AS 44.62.180-290 (procedures for adopting regulations).
4. The (Commission) by its decision and order . . . effectively denied mukluk freight Lines, Inc. due process of law.'
We must first determine if the order of the superior court possesses the finality essential for appellate review. 10 The term 'finality' is subject to several definitions. 11 An order by the trial court as a general rule is said to be final if it completely and finally disposes of the contested claims on their merits. 12 Here the order of the superior court disposed of Mukluk's claim for an evidentiary hearing and approved the Commission's proposed use of the procedure. Since the order provided Mukluk with additional time to take depositions of Nabors' witnesses, and to offer evidence in written form, no decision could be made on the merits of the transfer application. Necessarily another decision must follow resolving those issues initially raised by the Nabors' application. Since this is so, we must conclude that the order of the superior court was not a final order.
We have decided, however, that in this case review is proper, since postponement of appellate review until a final judgment is entered by the superior court may 'result in injustice because of impairment of a legal right' 13 and since the order 'sought to be reviewed is of such substance and importance as to justify deviation from the normal appellate procedure by way of appeal and to require the immediate attention of this court.' 14 Accordingly, we choose to regard this appeal as a petition for review. 15
We now turn to appellant's contentions. The trial court concluded in its order that in a transfer proceedings the Commission had discretionary authority to either grant or deny evidentiary hearings. In reaching its decision the court did not discuss the applicable standard for review of agency determination on this issue. Appellant argues that judicial review of agency decisions on constitutional and statutory issues should be without deference to agency expertise, experience or knowledge.
The degree of deference which the courts will accord to administrative decisions on constitutional and statutory issues requires consideration of a variety of factors. In Kelly v. Zamarello, 486 P.2d 906, 916 (Alaska 1971), this court observed,
'One type involves questions in which the particularized experience and knowledge of the administrative personnel goes into the determination. When this type of question is presented to the court for review, deference should be given to the administrative interpretation, since the expertise of the agency would be of material assistance to the court. . . .
The other kind of case presents questions of law in which knowledge and experience in the industry affords little guidance toward a proper consideration of the legal issues. These cases usually concern statutory interpretation or other analysis of legal relationships about which courts have specialized knowledge and experience. Consequently, courts are at least as capable of deciding this kind of question as an administrative agency. . . .
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Application of the reasonable basis test is extremely useful where the administrative action under review resembles executive as opposed to legislative or judicial activity. . . .
The reasonable basis approach, in the review of agency action which is essentially executive in character, recognizes that the application of law to facts in an administrative setting may require techniques quite different from those traditionally associated with judicial functions. . . . On the other hand, where the agency's decision was not one within its ambit of specialized knowledge, the Court has applied a much broader standard of review and has in these cases substituted its own judgment on the law. We believe that the reasonable basis approach should be used for the most part in cases concerning administrative expertise as to either complex subject matter or fundamental policy formulations.' 16
Professor Davis suggests one other important factor, in addition to a number of rather nebulous background consideration, 17 which guides judicial discretion regarding substitution of its judgment of agency determinations.
18
The controlling factors in this case weigh heavily against application of the reasonable basis test to the issues now under consideration. Those issues appear to have little to do with the Commission's expertise or particularized knowledge. Instead they concern constitutional and statutory...
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Gibson v. Alaska Alcoholic Beverage Control Board
...the issue concerns ". . . statutory interpretations requiring the special competency of the courts." Mukluk Freight Lines, Inc. v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 516 P.2d 408, at 412 (filed December 3, 1973, Alaska Supreme Thus, the court need not accord great deference to the findings of th......