Muldoon v. Astrue
| Decision Date | 11 December 2008 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 07-11988-RCL. |
| Citation | 590 F.Supp.2d 188 |
| Parties | Emmett S. MULDOON, Plaintiff v. Michael J. ASTRUE, as he is Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Rayford A. Farquhar, United States Attorney's Office, Boston, MA, for Defendant.
This is a civil action arising out of the denial by the Social Security Administration of pro se plaintiff Emmett Muldoon's ("Muldoon") request to reopen his application for disability benefits, which had previously had been decided in Muldoon's favor in 1998. Muldoon seeks to establish an earlier onset date of disability based on a diagnosis of multiple sclerosis he received in 2005, which he alleges relates back to the disability findings in 1998. The Appeals Council denied Muldoon's request to reopen his prior determination on the basis that it was time-barred by the four-year statute of limitations. The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") here moves to dismiss Muldoon's amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
The Commissioner argues that the Appeals Council's decision not to reopen Muldoon's claim is not a final decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006). Muldoon argues that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over his two constitutional claims because, he alleges, his due process rights were violated by lack of counsel during the administrative hearing. Muldoon does not, however, raise any constitutional claim arising from the Appeals Council's denial of his request to reopen his prior determination.
Muldoon received an initial determination denying him disability status on April 4, 1997. (Ex. 2B.) Muldoon appealed the denial of benefits. Following an administrative hearing, he received a fully favorable decision on October 30, 1998. (Ex. 1 at 19-27.) The hearing officer found Muldoon statutorily disabled due to the following severe impairments: "chronic atrial fibrillation, atypical chest pain, thrombocytopenia, hypercholesterolemia, hypertension, status post failed D/C cardiversion [sic], and a history of episodic alcohol dependance and depression." (Ex. 1 at 23.) The hearing officer established September 20, 1995 as the date of onset of disability. (Ex. 1 at 23.) Muldoon was not represented by counsel at his hearing, partly due to 45 C.F.R. § 1637.3 (1997), which restricts legal services organizations from engaging in litigation on behalf of incarcerated people. (Ex. 5, "Letter from South Middlesex Legal Services.")
Muldoon received a second favorable determination from the Appeals Council, which found that he was entitled to one additional month of retroactive benefits on the basis of an earlier application. The Appeals Council affirmed the findings of the hearing officer as to the period of disability. (Ex. 3 at 5.)
Muldoon sought judicial review of the Appeals Council's decision in the District Court of Massachusetts on March 9, 1999. (Ex. 4.) See Muldoon v. Social Sec. Admin., No. 99-10419 (D.Mass. Aug. 18, 1999) (O'Toole, J.) (granting the Commissioner's motion to dismiss Muldoon's complaint).1 Following the dismissal of his complaint, Muldoon appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the District Court's decision. Muldoon v. Social Sec. Admin., 229 F.3d 1133 (1st Cir.2000) (unpublished table decision), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1175, 121 S.Ct. 1147, 148 L.Ed.2d 1010 (2001). Subsequently, Muldoon filed a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, which was denied. (Ex. 4.)
At issue in this case is the Appeals Council's August 15, 2007 denial of Muldoon's request to reopen his claim. (Ex. 6.) In a letter to Muldoon, the Appeals Council advised him that it did not have the right to reopen his claim. Id. The Appeals Council justified its decision on the basis that the time limit for reopening a prior final decision regarding disability is four years from the date of the notice of initial determination, which the Appeals Council noted was May 29, 1997. Id. Muldoon filed the first complaint associated with the present action in this Court on October 18, 2007. (Pl.'s Original Compl.)
This Court granted the Commissioner's first motion to dismiss Muldoon's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on May 12, 2008. (Doc. No. 13.) Muldoon filed a Motion to Vacate the Judgment of Dismissal, a Motion for Relief from Judgment,2 a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint, and a Motion for Extension of Time to file an opposition to the Commissioner's motion to dismiss, all of which were granted. (Doc. Nos. 14-18.) Muldoon's amended complaint was filed on July 14, 2008. (Doc. No. 20.) Before this court is the Commissioner's motion to dismiss the amended complaint, filed on August 14, 2008. (Doc. No. 22.)
Muldoon, filing pro se, has been incarcerated since October 1996. (Pl.'s Am. Compl. ¶ 21; Exs. 2, 5.) He is divorced with four children. Id.
Eight years after the initial determination of disability, a magnetic resonance imaging test ("MRI") conducted on January 31, 2005 revealed that Muldoon suffers from multiple sclerosis. (Pl.'s Am. Compl. at 2; Ex. 5.) Based on his diagnosis of multiple sclerosis, Muldoon seeks to move the onset date of his disability back from September 20, 1995 to June 1, 1993. (Pl.'s Am. Compl. ¶ 30.) Muldoon alleges that his monthly benefit amount would increase if he can establish an earlier onset date, because the earlier date would impact the formula used to calculate his insured status. (Pl.'s Opp. to Def.'s Mot. at 4.)
Due to his incarceration, Muldoon is unable to receive social security benefits under 20 C.F.R. § 404.468(a) (1997); however, his children are entitled to benefits under 20 C.F.R. § 404.350 (1996).
Although this Court has a duty to draw all inferences in his favor and construe his complaint liberally, Muldoon has failed to allege any facts that would provide this court with subject matter jurisdiction. Here's why:
A. Standard of Review
The Commissioner filed the present motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). At the pleading stage, a plaintiff must submit "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. (8)(2). A court reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction must accept all factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor. Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Div. of Dept. of Homeland Sec., 510 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2007). If a petitioner fails to state a ground for subject matter jurisdiction, the claim must be dismissed. Johansen v. United States, 506 F.3d 65, 68 (1st Cir. 2007); see also Murphy v. United States, 45 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir.1995) ().
A reviewing court is "required to construe liberally a pro se complaint and may affirm its dismissal only if a plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts entitling him or her to relief." Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir.1997) (citing Rockwell v. Cape Cod Hosp., 26 F.3d 254, 255 (1st Cir.1994)); see, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam). Despite liberal construction requirements, a pro se party must still comply with procedural and substantive law. Ahmed, 118 F.3d at 890.
B. Muldoon's Claim.
Judicial review of the decisions of the Social Security Administration may only be sought "after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which [the claimant] was a party." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006). The Appeals Council has discretion to deny a request to reopen a prior final decision without a hearing; such discretion is provided by regulation, not by statute. 20 C.F.R. § 404.987(b) (1994). The regulations state that a denial of a request to reopen a claim is not subject either to administrative or judicial review. 20 C.F.R. § 404.903(l) (2007). Califano v. Sanders established the rule that, absent a constitutional claim, an Appeals Council's discretionary denial of a request to reopen a prior determination is not a final decision that would provide this court with subject matter jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 430 U.S. 99, 108, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). See also Dudley v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 816 F.2d 792, 795 (1st Cir.1987); Dvareckas v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 804 F.2d 770, 771-72 (1st Cir.1986); Rios v. Secretary of Health, Educ., and Welfare, 614 F.2d 25, 26-27 (1st Cir.1980); Matos v. Secretary of Health, Educ., and Welfare, 581 F.2d 282, 285 (1st Cir.1978). Accordingly, this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Appeals Council's denial of Muldoon's request under 42 U.S.C. § 405(h).
By regulation, the Appeals Council lacks authority to reopen a claim for benefits beyond four years from the date of the initial determination. 20 C.F.R. § 404.988(b); see Sanders, 430 U.S. at 108, 97 S.Ct. 980. Muldoon filed his request to reopen the prior determination with the Appeals Council on October 28, 2005, more than eight years past date of initial determination (Ex. 5), which was May 29, 1997 (Ex. 6.) To satisfy the four-year statute of limitations, Muldoon would have had to have filed his request to reopen his claim by May 29, 2001. Accordingly, the Appeals Council properly...
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