Muldrow v. City of St. Louis

Citation30 F.4th 680
Decision Date04 April 2022
Docket Number20-2975
Parties Jatonya Clayborn MULDROW, Plaintiff - Appellant v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, State of MISSOURI; Michael A. Deeba, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants - Appellees United States, Amicus Curiae
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Richard Andrew Barry, III, Megen Ilene Hoffman, Rick Barry Law Offices, PC, Saint Louis, MO, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Sheena Hamilton, City of St. Louis, Commission of Corrections, Korey Lewis, Alexis Lee Silsbe, City Counselor's Office, Saint Louis, MO, for Defendants-Appellees.

Anna Marks Baldwin, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Tovah Calderon, Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Senior Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Appellate Section, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae.

Before LOKEN, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Sergeant Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow of the St. Louis Police Department (Department) brought Title VII claims against the City of St. Louis and state law claims against both the City of St. Louis and Captain Michael Deeba of the Department. The district court1 granted the City of St. Louis and Captain Deeba's motion for summary judgment, finding in favor of the City of St. Louis on Sergeant Muldrow's Title VII claims and simultaneously dismissing her state law claims against the City of St. Louis and Captain Deeba. Sergeant Muldrow now appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment. Having jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

I.

In 2008, Sergeant Muldrow was transferred from her position as a patrol detective to the Department's Intelligence Division. At various points during her time in the Intelligence Division, Sergeant Muldrow worked on public corruption and human trafficking cases, served as head of the Gun Crimes Intelligence Unit, and oversaw the Gang Unit. Sergeant Muldrow maintained a traditional schedule in which she worked Monday through Friday from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. or 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. In 2016, while she was still assigned to the Intelligence Division, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) deputized Sergeant Muldrow as a Task Force Officer (TFO) for its Human Trafficking Unit. As a TFO, Sergeant Muldrow had the same privileges as an FBI agent: access to FBI field offices and databases, the opportunity to work in plain clothes, access to an unmarked FBI vehicle, authority to conduct human-trafficking related investigations outside of the St. Louis city limits, and the opportunity to earn up to $17,500 in annual overtime pay.

In 2017, Interim Police Commissioner Lawrence O'Toole replaced the Commander of Intelligence, Captain Angela Coonce, with Captain Deeba. Shortly after assuming his new role, Captain Deeba began making personnel changes.2 He announced the transfer or detachment of 17 male officers and 5 female officers across the Department from various positions and of various ranks. Captain Deeba transferred four officers, two male and two female, out of the Intelligence Division, including Sergeant Muldrow, who he transferred to the Fifth District, effective June 12, 2017. Once assigned to the Fifth District, Sergeant Muldrow was responsible for the administrative upkeep and supervision of officers on patrol, reviewing and approving arrests, and responding to "Code 1" calls for service for crimes such as homicides, robberies, assaults, and home invasions. As a result of her transfer, Sergeant Muldrow was required to work a rotating schedule including weekends, wear a police uniform, drive a marked police vehicle, and work within a controlled patrol area. Sergeant Muldrow's salary remained the same, and although she was no longer eligible for the FBI's $17,500 annual overtime pay, other overtime opportunities were available to her.

Following this transfer, Sergeant Muldrow did not immediately return the FBI-issued vehicle and credentials. Captain Deeba asked Sergeant Muldrow's FBI supervisor, Agent Jennifer Lynch, to notify him once Sergeant Muldrow returned her vehicle, explaining that it was standard policy for officers to return any equipment and for any specialized clearances to be made inactive following a transfer out of a specialized unit. Included in the record is an email memorializing this conversation in which Captain Deeba summarized his request, stating, "Please ensure the FBI vehicle we spoke about that has not yet been turn [sic] in is returned to your office and please advise me once this is completed." In that email, he also explained that this was the Department's standard practice, stating,

Each time a [sic] officer is transferred from one unit to another, any/all equipment, vehicles, and access and clearance are turned in and such things as clearances are made inactive. They are not allowed to work further, start new cases or what not, to include to work [sic] any overtime compensation, with any State/Federal agencies; there are no exceptions.3

Captain Deeba also contacted Sergeant Muldrow, reminding her to return the FBI-issued vehicle, and Sergeant Muldrow's Fifth District supervisor, letting the supervisor know that Sergeant Muldrow had not yet returned the vehicle. Sergeant Muldrow then returned the vehicle and her FBI badge, and the FBI revoked her TFO status.

On June 22, 2017, Sergeant Muldrow filed a discrimination charge with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (Commission), alleging that the City of St. Louis and Captain Deeba had discriminated against her, and was issued a right to sue letter. Around this time, Sergeant Muldrow began requesting a transfer from the Fifth District. Captain Coonce made informal requests for Sergeant Muldrow to be transferred to the Second District to act as her administrative aide. However, Captain Coonce never made any formal request in writing. On July 5, Sergeant Muldrow requested a transfer to the Second District via PeopleSoft, the Department's software management system; in her deposition, she testified that upon her transfer to the Second District, she would have been assigned as Captain Coonce's administrative aide. Then, on July 26, Sergeant Muldrow applied for a position as a detective sergeant in the Second District. Finally, on August 3, Sergeant Muldrow applied for a sergeant investigator position in the Internal Affairs Division. Applicants for the sergeant investigator position were instructed to reapply when the position reposted because, due to an officer shortage, the sergeant investigator positions would not be filled until later in the year. On October 27, Sergeant Muldrow reapplied. Then, on February 5, 2018, while her application for the sergeant investigator position was still pending, she was transferred back into the Intelligence Division and her TFO privileges were reinstated. Following this transfer, Sergeant Muldrow withdrew her application for a sergeant investigator position.4

Sergeant Muldrow filed this action in Missouri state court, alleging: gender discrimination in violation of Title VII against the City of St. Louis; retaliation for reporting acts of discrimination in violation of Title VII against the City of St. Louis; gender discrimination in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act against the City of St. Louis and Captain Deeba; and retaliation for reporting acts of discrimination in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act against the City of St. Louis and Captain Deeba. The City of St. Louis and Captain Deeba removed the case to federal court and filed a motion for summary judgment on all four claims. The district court granted the motion as to Sergeant Muldrow's Title VII gender discrimination and retaliation claims against the City of St. Louis and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims against the City of St. Louis and Captain Deeba, dismissing those claims without prejudice. Sergeant Muldrow now appeals only the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of St. Louis on her Title VII claims and makes no mention of the district court's dismissal of her state law claims.

II.

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo and view the facts in the light most favorable to Sergeant Muldrow, the non-moving party. See McGowen, Hurst, Clark & Smith, P.C., 11 F.4th at 710. "Summary judgment is warranted ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ " De Rossitte v. Correct Care Sols., LLC, 22 F.4th 796, 802 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 174 L.Ed.2d 490 (2009) ).

A.

Title VII dictates that "it is ‘unlawful ... for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’ " Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S.Ct. 1731, 1738, 207 L.Ed.2d 218 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) ). Where the employee relies on indirect evidence of discrimination to establish her prima facie case, we apply the McDonnell Douglas 5 framework. See Bunch v. Univ. of Ark. Bd. of Trs., 863 F.3d 1062, 1068 (8th Cir. 2017) ; see also Turner v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 688, 694 (8th Cir. 2005) (explaining that a "claim may survive a motion for summary judgment by creating an inference of unlawful discrimination through the familiar McDonnell Douglas three-step burden-shifting analysis"). To establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination, the plaintiff-employee must show that...

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