Mull v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S.
| Decision Date | 01 October 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 10,Docket No. 95200,10 |
| Citation | 444 Mich. 508,510 N.W.2d 184 |
| Parties | William MULL and Dorothy Mull, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF the UNITED STATES, a New York corporation, and Rouse Company, a foreign corporation, Defendants, and Midwest Malls Limited Partnership, Defendant-Appellant. Calendar, |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
In this negligence action, we granted leave to determine whether a front-end loader is a motor vehicle for purposes of the owner's liability statute, M.C.L. § 257.401; M.S.A. § 9.2101. The trial court and the Court of Appeals concluded, as a matter of law, that a front-end loader is a motor vehicle. We affirm.
On Sunday, November 15, 1987, the plaintiff, William Mull, suffered serious personal injuries as a result of an accident that occurred while standing in the bucket of a front-end loader at the Southland Mall. 1
A front-end loader is a motor driven, four-wheeled machine, whose rear tires are approximately four feet in diameter, and are much larger than the front tires. A front-end loader has a cab with windshield, a steering wheel to which the accelerator lever is attached and brake and clutch pedals located on the floor. In short, a front-end loader is a self-propelled machine.
At the time of the accident, Mull was an employee of The Center Companies (TCC), which has operated and maintained malls since June, 1970. TCC was not affiliated with Midwest Malls. Other TCC employees present at the time of the accident were Todd Wilkerson, Jeanette Ramik, and Michael Koss.
On this day, Mr. Koss was in charge and instructed the Wilkerson, Ramik, and Mull work crew to install the mall's Christmas wreaths on the side of the shopping center. The mall owned a piece of equipment called a "televator" available for the Christmas wreath project. The televator is a four-wheeled device designed to raise a worker up to fifty feet in the air. It is controlled by the worker, who pushes buttons to raise or lower the platform. However, if used outside, a truck is required to tow the televator into position.
The televator often proved cumbersome and was never used for maintenance on the outside walls of the building. Instead, the workers were routinely instructed by the "lead man" to use the front-end loader as an elevator by raising the workers in the bucket. 2 This occasion was no different.
To accomplish the task, Mr. Koss drove the front-end loader from the garage through the Midwest Mall's public parking lot to the work site. He instructed the work crew to stand in the bucket of the front-end loader and install the Christmas wreaths.
The loader was positioned on the lawn and sidewalk area, immediately adjacent to the wall where Mull and Ramik were to install the Christmas wreaths. As Wilkerson extended the wreaths over the roof and down the wall, Mull and Ramik were elevated up the side of the wall to the wreath. At that point, Ramik pushed the wreath into position, and Mull attached the wreath to the wall.
Seconds later, Mull gave Koss a "thumbs up" sign, which indicated that he wanted the bucket raised so that he could fasten the top of the wreath to another stud attached to the wall. However, rather than going straight up, the loader lurched forward causing the bucket to suddenly move forward and up. 3 As a result, Mull's right foot was crushed between the edge of the bucket and the wall.
The Mulls filed this negligence action pursuant to the civil liability act, M.C.L. § 257.401; M.S.A. § 9.2101. They sought damages incurred as a result of William Mull's injuries, including Dorothy Mull's loss of her husband's love, society, companionship, and consortium.
Midwest Malls moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), on the grounds that the front-end loader was not a motor vehicle for purposes of M.C.L. § 257.401; M.S.A. § 9.2101, and, alternatively, that the machine was not being used as a motor vehicle at the time of the accident. 4 The trial court found that the front-end loader was a motor vehicle for purposes of the owner's liability statute, 5 and denied defendants' motions for summary disposition and for a rehearing or reconsideration.
Subsequently, the jury found that Koss was negligent in the operation of the front-end loader and that his negligence was a proximate cause of William Mull's injuries. The trial court entered judgment in the Mulls' favor consistent with the jury verdict. Consequently, Midwest Malls moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a mistrial, and a new trial. The trial court denied these motions. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 196 Mich.App. 411, 493 N.W.2d 447 (1992).
We granted leave to appeal on June 16, 1993. 6
The following statutory provisions are germane to the question under consideration:
"The owner of a motor vehicle shall be liable for any injury occasioned by the negligent operation of the motor vehicle whether the negligence consists of a violation of the provisions of the statutes of the state or in the failure to observe such ordinary care in the operation of the motor vehicle as the rules of the common law requires [sic]." M.C.L. § 257.401(1); M.S.A. § 9.2101(1). (Emphasis added.)
The act defines motor vehicle as follows:
" 'Motor vehicle' means every vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from over-head trolley wires, but not operated upon rails." M.C.L. § 257.33; M.S.A. § 9.1833. (Emphasis added.)
For present purposes, the key word in the above definition is vehicle, which is defined in the code as follows:
" 'Vehicle' means every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices exclusively moved by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks and except, only for the purpose of titling and registration under this act, a mobile home as defined in section 2 of the mobile home commission act, Act No. 96 of the Public Acts of 1987, being section 125.2302 of the Michigan Compiled Laws." M.C.L. § 257.79; M.S.A. § 9.1879. (Emphasis supplied.)
Defendant Midwest Malls contends that the Legislature, in enacting the owner's liability statute, intended to provide for liability exclusively for those vehicles that are either operated on a public highway or that may be lawfully operated on a public highway. In addition, defendant posits Frazier v. Rumisek, 358 Mich. 455, 100 N.W.2d 442 (1960), for the proposition that the owner's liability statute was enacted solely in response to the rising number of injuries resulting from automobile accidents, and concludes that it does not apply in this case. We disagree.
In the case before us, we must once again define the term "motor vehicle" and construe the phrase "may be." This language has received conflicting interpretations in lower court decisions. See Calladine v. Hyster Co., 155 Mich.App. 175, 399 N.W.2d 404 (1986); Jones v. Cloverdale Equipment Co., 165 Mich.App. 511, 419 N.W.2d 11 (1987); Mull v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, supra. Accordingly, well-recognized rules of statutory construction must be employed. 7
Acknowledged authorities have declared that "motor vehicle" has a broader meaning than automobile. 8 It is a generic term for all classes of self-propelled vehicles not operated on stationary rails or tracks. Jernigan v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. of New York, 235 N.C. 334, 335-336, 69 S.E.2d 847 (1952). 9 Michigan's owner liability statute provides that a motor vehicle is any vehicle that is self-propelled and any vehicle that is propelled by electric power. 10 As explained below, we think it clear that, under the owner's liability statute, every machine that is self-propelled and could be used to transport people or property on a highway, is a motor vehicle.
Both parties agree that this Court interpreted the legislative intent in enacting the owner's liability statute in Frazier, supra. The Court stated:
Id. 358 Mich. at 457, 100 N.W.2d 442. (Emphasis added.)
In Frazier, we impliedly refused to narrowly construe the owner's liability statute. Instead, we held that an owner is liable for the negligent operation of the machine owned by him when he had consented to its use. Id. Similarly, in Ladner v. Vander Band...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Travelers Ins. v. U-Haul of Michigan, Inc.
...since 1929. 1929 C.L. 4648. Section 401 of the civil liability act has been in existence since 1949. Mull v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 444 Mich. 508, 521, 510 N.W.2d 184 (1994). The statute has been amended several times since its enactment, most recently in 1995 after initiation of......
-
Pick v. Szymczak, Docket No. 98142
...its ordinary and generally accepted meaning. Turner, supra at 27, 528 N.W.2d 681; Mull v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 444 Mich. 508, 514, n. 7, 510 N.W.2d 184 (1994). However, where the meaning of the statute is unclear, judicial construction is necessary. Turner,......
-
Estes v. Titus
...marital property. Because the common meaning of the word "may" indicates a possibility, see Mull v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 444 Mich. 508, 519, 510 N.W.2d 184 (1994), defendant, as the judgment debtor, "may" own, have an interest in, title to, or right to poss......
-
Alpha Capital Mgmt. Inc. v. Rentenbach.
...law. Mull v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 196 Mich.App. 411, 423, 493 N.W.2d 447 (1992), aff'd 444 Mich. 508, 510 N.W.2d 184 (1994). "[A] verdict should not be set aside unless failure to do so would be inconsistent with substantial justice. Reversal is not warrant......