Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank Trust Co

• Decision Date: 24 April 1950
• Docket Number: No. 378,378
• Citation: 339 U.S. 306,70 S.Ct. 652,94 L.Ed. 865
• Parties: MULLANE v. CENTRAL HANOVER BANK & TRUST CO. et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

339 U.S. 306

70 S.Ct. 652

94 L.Ed. 865

MULLANE

v CENTRAL HANOVER BANK & TRUST CO. et al.

No. 378.

Argued and Submitted Feb. 8, 1950.

Decided April 24, 1950.

Mr. Kenneth J. Mullane, New York City, for appellants.

Mr. Albert B. Maginnes, New York City, for appellee, Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.

Mr. James N. Vaughan, New York City, for appellee, James N. Vaughan, Guardian et al.

Mr. Justice JACKSONdelivered the opinion of the Court.

This controversy questions the constitutional sufficiency of notice to beneficiaries on judicial settlement of accounts by the trustee of a common trust fund established under the New York Banking Law,Consol.Laws, c. 2.The New York Court of Appeals considered and overruled objections that the statutory notice contravenes requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and that by allowance of the account beneficiaries were deprived of property without due process of law.299 N.Y. 697, 87 N.E.2d 73.The case is here on appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1257,28 U.S.C.A. § 1257.

Common trust fund legislation is addressed to a problem appropriate for state action.Mounting overheads have made administration of small trusts undesirable to corporate trustees.In order that donors and testators of moderately sized trusts may not be denied the service of corporate fiduciaries, the District of Columbia and some thirty states other than New York have permitted pooling small trust estates into one fund for investment administration.^*The income, capital gains, losses and expenses of the collective trust are shared by the constituent trusts in proportion to their contribution.By this plan, diversification of risk and economy of management can be extended to those whose capital standing alone would not obtain such advantage.

Statutory authorization for the establishment of such common trust funds is provided in the New York Banking Law, § 100-c, c. 687, L.1937, as amended by c. 602, L.1943andc. 158, L.1944.Under this Act a trust company may, with approval of the State Banking Board, establish a common fund and, within prescribed limits invest therein the assets of an unlimited number of estates, trusts or other funds of which it is trustee.Each participating trust shares ratably in the common fund, but exclusive management and control is in the trust company as trustee, and neither a fiduciary nor any beneficiary of a participating trust is deemed to have ownership in any particular asset or investment of this common fund.The trust company must keep fund assets separate from its own, and in its fiduciary capacity may not deal with itself or any affiliate.Provisions are made for accountings twelve to fifteen months after the establishment of a fund and triennially thereafter.The decree in each such judicial settlement of accounts is made binding and conclusive as to any matter set forth in the account upon everyone having any interest in the common fund or in any participating estate, trust or fund.

In January, 1946, Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company established a common trust fund in accordance with these provisions, and in March, 1947, it petitioned the Surrogate's Court for settlement of its first account as common trustee.During the accounting period a total of 113 trusts, approximately half inter vivos and half testamentary, participated in the common trust fund, the gross capital of which was nearly three million dollars.The record does not show the number or residence of the beneficiaries, but they were many and it is clear that some of them were not residents of the State of New York.

The only notice given beneficiaries of this specific application was by publication in a local newspaper in strict compliance with the minimum requirements of N.Y. Banking Law § 100-c(12): 'After filing such petition (for judicial settlement of its account)the petitioner shall cause to be issued by the court in which the petition is filed and shall publish not less than once in each week for four successive weeks in a newspaper to be designated by the court a notice or citation addressed generally without naming them to all parties interested in such common trust fund and in such estates, trusts or funds mentioned in the petition, all of which may be described in the notice or citation only in the manner set forth in said petition and without setting forth the residence of any such decedent or donor of any such estate, trust or fund.'Thus the only notice required, and the only one given, was by newspaper publication setting forth merely the name and address of the trust company, the name and the date of establishment of the common trust fund, and a list of all participating estates, trusts or funds.

At the time the first investment in the common fund was made on behalf of each participating estate, however, the trust company, pursuant to the requirements of § 100-c(9), had notified by mail each person of full age and sound mind whose name and address was then known to it and who was 'entitled to share in the income therefrom * * * (or) * * * who would be entitled to share in the principal if the event upon which such estate, trust or fund will become distributable should have occurred at the time of sending such notice.'Included in the notice was a copy of those provisions of the Act relating to the sending of the notice itself and to the judicial settlement of common trust fund accounts.

Upon the filing of the petition for the settlement of accounts, appellant was, by order of the court pursuant to § 100-c(12), appointed special guardian and attorney for all persons known or unknown not otherwise appearing who had or might thereafter have any interest in the income of the common trust fund; and appellee Vaughan was appointed to represent those similarly interested in the principal.There were no other appearances on behalf of any one interested in either interest or principal.

Appellant appeared specially, objecting that notice and the statutory provisions for notice to beneficiaries were inadequate to afford due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore that the court was without jurisdiction to render a final and binding decree.Appellant's objections were entertained and overruled, the Surrogate holding that the notice required and given was sufficient.75 N.Y.S.2d 397.A final decree accepting the accounts has been entered, affirmed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, In re Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 275 App.Div. 769, 88 N.Y.S.2d 907, and by the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, 299 N.Y. 697, 87 N.E.2d 73.

The effect of this decree, as held below, is to settle 'all questions respecting the management of the common fund.'We understand that every right which beneficiaries would otherwise have against the trust company, either as trustee of the common fund or as trustee of any individual trust, for improper management of the common trust fund during the period covered by the accounting is sealed and wholly terminated by the decree.SeeMatter of Hoaglund's Estate, 194 Misc. 803, 811—812, 74 N.Y.S.2d 156, 164, affirmed272 App.Div. 1040, 74 N.Y.S.2d 911, affirmed297 N.Y. 920, 79 N.E.2d 746;Matter of Bank of New York, 189 Misc. 459, 470, 67 N.Y.S.2d 444, 453;Matter of Security Trust Co. of Rochester, 189 Misc. 748, 760, 70 N.Y.S.2d 260, 271;Matter of Continental Bank & Trust Co., 189 Misc. 795, 797, 67 N.Y.S.2d 806, 807—808.

We are met at the outset with a challenge to the power of the State—the right of its courts to adjudicate at all as against those beneficiaries who reside without the State of New York.It is contended that the proceeding is one in personam in that the decree affects neither title to nor possession of any res, but adjudges only personal rights of the beneficiaries to surcharge their trustee for negligence or breach of trust.Accordingly, it is said, under the strict doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565, the Surrogate is without jurisdiction as to nonresidents upon whom personal service of process was not made.

Distinctions between actions in rem and those in personam are ancient and originally expressed in procedural terms what seems really to have been a distinction in the substantive law of property under a system quite unlike our own.Buckland and McNair, Roman Law and Common Law, 66; Burdick, Principles of Roman Law and Their Relation to Modern Law, 298.The legal recognition and rise in economic importance of incorporeal or intangible forms of property have upset the ancient simplicity of property law and the clarity of its distinctions, while new forms of proceedings have confused the old procedural classification.American courts have sometimes classed certain actions as in rem because personal service of process was not required, and at other times have held personal service of process not required because the action was in rem.See cases collected inFreeman on Judgments, §§ 1517 et seq. (5th ed.).

Judicial proceedings to settle fiduciary accounts have been sometimes termed in rem, or more indefinitely quasi in rem, or more vaguely still, 'in the nature of a proceeding in rem.'It is not readily apparent how the courts of New York did or would classify the present proceeding, which has some characteristics and is wanting in some features of proceedings both in rem and in personam.But in any event we think that the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution do not depend upon a classification for which the standards are so elusive and confused generally and which, being primarily for state courts to define, may and do vary from state to state.Without disparaging the usefulness of distinctions between actions in rem and those in personam in many branches of law, or on other issues, or the reasoning which underlies them, we do not rest the power of the State to resort to constructive service in this proceeding upon how its courts or this Court may regard...