Mullaney v. Anderson

Citation96 L.Ed. 458,342 U.S. 415,72 S.Ct. 428
Decision Date03 March 1952
Docket NumberNo. 329,329
PartiesMULLANEY, Commissioner of Taxation for Territory of Alaska, v. ANDERSON et al
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Mr. J. Gerald Williams, Juneau, Alaska, for petitioner.

Mr. Carl B. Luckerath, Seattle, Wash., for respondents.

Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Territorial Legislature of Alaska provided for the licensing of commercial fishermen in territorial waters, imposing a $5 license fee on resident fishermen and a $50 fee on nonresidents. Alaska Laws, 1949, c. 66. The Alaska Fishermen's Union and its Secretary-Treasurer, on behalf of some 3,200 nonresident union members, brought this action in the District Court of the Territory to enjoin the Tax Commissioner from collecting the license fee from nonresidents. Plaintiffs contended that the Territorial Legislature was without power under the Organic Act to pass the statute, that the exaction complained of unconstitutionally burdens interstate commerce, and that it is an abridgment of the privileges and immunities of citizens of other States forbidden by Art. IV, § 2 of the Constitution and by the Fourteenth Amendment. After trial, the District Court concluded that the differential between resident and nonresident fees rests on substantial differences bearing a fair and reasonable relation to the objects of the legislation, and upheld the statute. 91 F.Supp. 907. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, one judge dissenting. 191 F.2d 123. We brought the case here for clarification of the limits on the power of the Territorial Legislature. 342 U.S. 865, 72 S.Ct. 111.

Here, for the first time, petitioner questioned the standing of respondent union and its Secretary-Treasurer to maintain this suit. To remove the matter from controversy, respondent moved for leave to add as parties plain- tiff two of its members, nonresidents of Alaska and subject to the statutory exaction. Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., authorizes the addition of parties 'by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just.' The original plaintiffs alleged without contradiction that they were authorized by the nonresident union members to bring this action in their behalf. This claim of authority is now confirmed in the petition supporting the motion to add the member-fishermen as plaintiffs. To grant the motion merely puts the principal, the real party in interest, in the position of his avowed agent. The addition of these two parties plaintiff can in no wise embarrass the defendant. Nor would their earlier joinder have in any way affected the course of the litigation. To dismiss the present petition and require the new plaintiffs to start over in the District Court would entail needless waste and runs counter to effective judicial administration—the more so since, with the silent concurrence of the defendant, the original plaintiffs were deemed proper parties below. Rule 21 will rarely come into play at this stage of a litigation. We grant the motion in view of the special circumstances before us.

In Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 68 S.Ct. 1156, 92 L.Ed. 1460, the Court held that Art. IV, § 2 of the Constitution would bar any State from imposing the license fee here attacked. In that case it was said: 'The State is not without power, for example, to restrict the type of equipment used in its fisheries, to graduate license fees according to the size of the boats, or even to charge non-residents a differential which would merely compensate the State for any added enforcement burden they may impose or for any conservation expenditures from taxes which only residents pay.' 334 U.S. at pages 398—399, 68 S.Ct. at page 1163. The challenged discrimination does not come within any of these exceptions. The Tax Commissioner relied on the higher cost of enforcing the license law against non- resident fishermen to justify the difference in fees, and the District Court found that 90% of the cost of enforcement was incurred in collecting the fees from nonresidents. But there is no warrant for the assumption that the differential in fees bears any relation to this difference in cost, nothing to indicate that it 'would merely compensate' for the added enforcement burden. Indeed the Tax Commissioner and his Special Deputy Enforcement Officer specifically disclaimed any knowledge of the dollar cost of enforcement. What evidence we have negatives the idea of any such relation, for the total amount payable by nonresident fishermen in 19491950, in excess of what they would have been charged if they had been residents, may easily have exceeded the entire amount abailable for administration of the Tax Commissioner's office in that year.1 Constitutional issues affecting taxation do not turn on even approximate mathematical determinations. But something more is required than bald assertion to establish a reasonable relation between the higher fees and the higher cost to the Territory. We do not remotely imply that the burden is on the taxing authorities to sustain the constitutionality of a tax. But where the power to tax is not unlimited, validity is not established by the mere imposition of a tax. In this case, respondents negatived other possible bases raised by the pleadings for the discrimination, and the one relied on by the Commissioner, higher enforcement costs, was one as to which all the facts were in his possession. Respondents sought to elicit these facts by interrogatories and cross-examination without avail. Under the circumstances we think they discharged their burden in attacking the statute.

But, it is urged, Alaska is not a State but a Territory to which the controlling constitutional limitations laid down in Toomer v. Witsell, supra, are not applicable. Haavik v. Alaska Packers' Ass'n, 263 U.S. 510, 44 S.Ct. 177, 68 L.Ed. 414, is invoked for that contention. We have no occasion here to reconsider the constitutional holding of that case, namely, that it is within the power of Congress to relieve the Territory of some of the restrictions applicable to a State. But that in fact was the real issue to which the Court's attention was directed in the Haavik case. It was assumed that if Congress had the power...

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