Mullenix v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin
| Decision Date | 14 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL 1-19-CV-1203-LY |
| Parties | LINDA SUSAN MULLENIX, Plaintiff v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
TO THE HONORABLE LEE YEAKEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court are Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 129); Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on her Equal Pay Act Claim Regarding Professor Bone (Dkt. 130) Plaintiff's Opposed Motion to Strike Defendant's New Summary Judgment Evidence and Argument (Dkt. 147); and the associated response and reply briefs.[1]
I. Background
Plaintiff Linda Susan Mullenix has 47 years of teaching experience and has been a tenured law professor at The University of Texas School of Law (“UT Law”) since 1991. Plaintiff is the fourteenth-highest-paid of 52 tenured faculty members at UT Law and the fourth-highest-paid female tenured faculty member. Dkt. 129-1 at 5-6. Plaintiff's current annual salary is $349, 418; the highest male faculty member's annual salary is $390, 276. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that she discovered in 2010 that “she was being severely underpaid for her work compared to her male coworkers.” Dkt. 25 ¶ 24. Plaintiff filed a discrimination claim against the UT Law, alleging that it was violating the Equal Pay Act. Plaintiff settled her claim in 2011. Id. ¶ 33. On December 19, 2016, Plaintiff signed a “general release of all claims to date.” Id. ¶ 42.
On December 12, 2019, Plaintiff filed this suit against The University of Texas at Austin (the “University”) alleging sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3. Dkt. 1. In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that “the gender pay gap between Professor Mullenix and her male comparators has grown by thousands of dollars every year.” Dkt. 25 ¶ 12. Plaintiff alleges that she is paid less than her male counterparts because of her sex and in retaliation for her complaints of unequal pay. Id. ¶ 101.
The District Court dismissed Plaintiff's Title VII and EPA retaliation claims with prejudice. Dkts. 18, 61, 90. On November 19, 2021, the undersigned Magistrate Judge denied Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint to reassert her previously dismissed retaliation claims. Dkt 146.
Both parties now move for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). The University seeks summary judgment on both Plaintiff's EPA and Title VII discrimination claims, while Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on her EPA claim as to Professor Robert Bone. The Court addresses each claim in turn.
II. Legal Standards
Summary judgment shall be rendered when the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials, and any affidavits on file show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986); Washburn v. Harvey, 504 F.3d 505, 508 (5th Cir. 2007). A dispute regarding a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view all inferences drawn from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Washburn, 504 F.3d at 508. A court “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence” in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254-55.
Once the moving party has made an initial showing that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Mere conclusory allegations are not competent summary judgment evidence and thus are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007). Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not competent summary judgment evidence. Id. The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports its claim. See Adams v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn., 465 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir. 2006). If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
When a movant moves for summary judgment on an affirmative defense, the movant's burden of proof is even higher; the movant must “establish beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or defense.” Guzman v. Allstate Assurance Co., 185 F.4th 157, 160 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986)).
III. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike
In her Opposed Motion to Strike Defendant's New Summary Judgment Evidence and Argument (Dkt. 147), Plaintiff asks the Court to strike Exhibits L and M (Dkt. 141-1 at 89-104) to the University's Reply brief and the University's related arguments that “the Budget Committee process was approved by the larger Budget Council and fully compliant with internal policy.” Plaintiff argues that the University attempts to raise new arguments in a Reply brief.
The Court finds that the University is merely elaborating on its previously raised arguments and responding to Plaintiff's arguments. See Dkt. 129 at 9 (). Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (Dkt. 147) is DENIED.[2]
IV. Plaintiff's Equal Pay Act Claim
The Equal Pay Act prohibits discrimination in employment “between employees on the basis of sex . . . for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). In short, the EPA implemented “the principle of equal pay for equal work regardless of sex.” Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 190 (1974).
Plaintiff alleges that the University violated the EPA by paying her “less than her male counterparts that were working under substantially equal jobs requiring similar skills, effort, and responsibility as her position.” Dkt. 25 ¶ 147. Plaintiff has identified eleven male tenured UT Law professors paid more: Professors Robert Bone, Thomas McGarity, Jay Westbrook, David Rabban, Henry Hu, William Forbath, Steven Goode, Sanford Levinson, Robert Peroni, Lucas Powe, and William Sage (collectively, Plaintiff's “Comparators”). Dkt. 129-1 at 750. The University does not dispute that it pays Plaintiff less than her Comparators, but argues that those differences are based on how the UT Law Budget Committee evaluates each faculty member based on factors other than sex, including legitimate merit-based factors.
The burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), governs claims under the EPA. Lindsley v. TRT Holdings, Inc., 984 F.3d 460, 466 (5th Cir. 2021). Under this framework, the plaintiff has the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of pay discrimination. Id. To establish a prima facie case under the EPA, a plaintiff must show that “(1) her employer is subject to the Act; (2) she performed work in a position requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions; and (3) she was paid less than the employee of the opposite sex providing the basis of comparison.” Badgerow v. REJ Props., Inc., 974 F.3d 610, 617 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Chance v. Rice Univ., 984 F.2d 151, 153 (5th Cir. 1993)).
Once a plaintiff has made her prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the wage differential is justified under one of the four affirmative defenses set out in the EPA: “(1) a seniority system; (2) a merit system; (3) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (4) any other factor than sex.” Siler-Khodr v. Univ. of Texas Health Sci. Ctr. San Antonio, 261 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)). “The exceptions are affirmative defenses on which the employer has the burden both of production and of persuasion.” Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 722 (5th Cir. 1986).
Plaintiff argues that because the University has admitted that it pays her less than Professor Bone “and that both perform equal work under the same working conditions, ” she is entitled to summary judgment on her EPA claim. This argument ignores the burden-shifting framework applicable to her claim. Even if Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, her claim nevertheless may fail if the University demonstrates that one of the affirmative defenses applies. In addition, the University disputes that Plaintiff has established a prima facie case, which the Court addresses next.
Plaintiff meets the first element of her prima facie case because it is undisputed that the University is subject to the Equal Pay Act. Plaintiff argues that she has “conclusively established” the rest of her prima facie case because the University has admitted that Plaintiff was paid less...
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