Muller v. Nebraska Methodist Hospital

• Decision Date: 29 April 1955
• Docket Number: No. 33694,33694
• Citation: 160 Neb. 279,70 N.W.2d 86
• Parties: Gertrude MULLER, Appellant, v. The NEBRASKA METHODIST HOSPITAL, a corporation, Appellee.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Page 86

70 N.W.2d 86

160 Neb. 279

Gertrude MULLER, Appellant, v. The NEBRASKA METHODIST HOSPITAL, a corporation, Appellee.

No. 33694.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

April 29, 1955.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The doctrine of stare decisis is grounded on public policy and, as such, is entitled to great weight. It should be adhered to unless the reasons therefor have ceased to exist, are clearly erroneous or are manifestly wrong and mischievous, or unless more harm than good will result from doing so.

2. Article I, section 13, of the Constitution of the State of Nebraska does not create any new rights but is merely a declaration of a general fundamental principle. It is a primary duty of the courts to safeguard this declaration of right and remedy but, where no right of action is given or remedy exists under either the common law or some statute, this constitutional provision creates none.

3. In this jurisdiction it has long been settled that nonprofit charitable corporations are exempt from tort liability insofar as inmates, participants, or recipients of the charity are concerned. This immunity was adopted for the protection of these institutions as a matter of public policy. This immunity has so inherently become a part of the law affecting them that if any change is to be made therein we think it should come from the Legislature.

4. The fact that patients who are able to pay are required to do so does not deprive a corporation of its eleemosynary character, nor does it permit a recovery for damages on account of the existence of contract relations.

5. The fact that a charitable institution carries indemnity insurance indemnifying it from liability to a recipient of its bounty does not create liability.

Abrahams & Kaslow, Omaha, for appellant.

Swarr, May, Royce, Smith & Story, Omaha, for appellee.

Joseph O. Burger, Edwin Cassem, George N. Mecham, Omaha, John J. Gross, West Point, Sam C. Zimmerman, Lincoln, amici curiae.

Heard before SIMMONS, C. J., and CARTER, MESSMORE, YEAGER, CHAPPELL, WENKE and BOSLAUGH, JJ.

WENKE, Justice.

Gertrude Muller brought this action in the district court for Douglas County against The Nebraska Methodist Hospital, a corporation. The purpose of the action is to recover damages for injuries she claims to have suffered while a patient in a hospital owned and operated by the defendant. The basis for the action is her claim that defendant was negligent in furnishing an unsafe operating table for her use. The trial court sustained defendant's motion for a summary judgment and, from the overruling of her motion for a new trial, plaintiff appealed.

Appellee is a nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of Nebraska for the purpose of engaging in charitable work. Its principal place of business is in Omaha, Douglas County, Nebraska, where it is engaged in operating and maintaining a hospital to carry out its charitable purposes. On April 25, 1951, appellant entered this hospital for surgery. She entered as a paying patient, agreeing to pay the regular and established charges for hospital services and care preparatory to and during the course of such surgery. In consideration thereof appellee agreed and undertook to provide appellant with suitable, safe, and proper care and facilities. On April 26, 1951, appellant, while a patient in the hospital, was taken to a room therein used for surgery and there placed on a table furnished by appellee and used for that purpose. This table consisted of two sections. The lower section thereof, on which the lower limbs of appellant rested, was so constructed that it could be raised or lowered by means of hydraulic pressure regulated and controlled by a foot pedal. It was intended that such raising and lowering would be done very gradually. While appellant was on the table completely anesthetized an attendant used the foot pedal. This caused the lower section of the table to drop instantly and resulted in appellant's back being severely strained and wrenched, which caused her to have great bodily pain and permanent injuries. The sudden dropping of the lower section of the table, when the attendant stepped on the foot pedal, was due to a defective condition of the mechanism regulating and controlling the hydraulic pressure.

The foregoing facts are either stipulated to, admitted by the pleadings, or admitted by the motion for a summary judgment for the purpose of ruling thereon.

The principal question raised by this appeal is, shall we adhere to the doctrine of immunity for nonprofit charitable corporations from tort liability, a doctrine which has long been established in this state by holdings of this court? See, Duncan v. Nebraska Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n, 92 Neb. 162, 137 N.W. 1120, 41 L.R.A.,N.S., 973, Ann.Cas.1913E, 1127; Sibilia v. Paxton Memorial Hospital, 121 Neb. 860, 238 N.W. 751. However, such nonliability is restricted to inmates, participants, or recipients of the charity and not to strangers or business invitees. See, Marble v. Nicholas Senn Hospital Ass'n, 102 Neb. 343, 167 N.W. 208; Wright v. Salvation Army, 125 Neb. 216, 249 N.W. 549. Nor is it applicable to hospitals incorporated and conducted for private gain. Malcolm v. Evangelical Lutheran Hospital Ass'n, 107 Neb. 101, 185 N.W. 330; Wetzel v. Omaha Maternity & General Hospital Ass'n, 96 Neb. 636, 148 N.W. 582, Ann.Cas.1915B, 1224.

Appellant asks us to re-examine our holdings and seeks to have us reverse them on the basis that they are illogical and fundamentally unsound because they are based on concepts and conditions which no longer exist. On the other hand appellee asks us to apply the doctrine of stare decisis thereto.

'The doctrine of stare decisis is grounded on public policy and, as such, is entitled to great weight and must be adhered to, unless the reasons therefor have ceased to exist, are clearly erroneous, or are manifestly wrong and mischievous or unless more harm than good will result from doing so.' 14 Am.Jur., Courts, § 61, p. 284.

We said in Scott v. Scotts Bluff County, 106 Neb. 355, 183 N.W. 573, 574: 'So, where the court has decided a question of law in another case and a like state of facts is subsequently presented, the rule of stare decisis applies and will not be easily changed.' To the same effect, see Bulgrin v. Schlechte, 88 Neb. 278, 129 N.W. 272; Patterson v. Kerr, 127 Neb. 73, 254 N.W. 704.

However, we have also said: 'I fully appreciate the importance of the doctrine stare decisis, and with what reluctance courts consent to the reversal of rules established by repeated decisions, although confessedly erroneous, particularly such as have become rules of property. In such cases, according to the dictates of common justice, they should be adhered to until changed by statute. There are, it is true, to be found cases holding that the same principle is applicable to all statutory constructions, whether involving rules of property or mere questions of practice. But such a consecration of the doctrine of stare decisis is opposed to reason and the overwhelming weight of authority. That rule, like all others, is not without its exceptions, and, in the absence of complications resulting from property rights, it is the undoubted privilege, if not, indeed, the duty, of courts to re-examine their decisions whenever satisfied that they are fundamentally wrong.' State v. Hill, 47 Neb. 456, 66 N.W. 541, 559.

In considering the latter the following principle applies: "Before overruling a former decision deliberately made, the court should be convinced, not merely that the case was wrongly decided, but that less injury will result from overruling than from following it.' * * * McEvoy v. City of Sault Ste. Marie, 136 Mich. 172, 98 N.W. 1006.' Torbitt v. Village of Bennett, 98 Neb. 129, 152 N.W. 301, 302.

Appellant calls our attention to the general principle that for negligent or tortious conduct liability is the rule and that the law's emphasis, under such circumstances, is ordinarily on liability, not immunity. We are fully aware that immunity from liability for negligent or tortious conduct is an exception but this court has, since 1912, established such an exception for nonprofit charitable corporations insofar as inmates, participants, or the recipients of the charity are concerned. Other states have adopted a similar exception ranging from complete immunity to varying degrees thereof. See, Crossett Health Center v. Croswell, 221 Ark. 874, 256 S.W.2d 548; Jurjevich v. Hotel Dieu, La.App., 11 So.2d 632; Howard v. South Baltimore General Hospital, 191 Md. 617, 62 A.2d 574; Mastrangelo v. Maverick Dispensary, 330 Mass. 708, 115 N.E.2d 455; Erwin v. St. Joseph's Mercy Hospital, 323 Mich. 114, 34 N.W.2d 480; Kreuger v. Schmiechen, Mo., 264 S.W.2d 311; Rafferzeder v. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital, 33 N.J.Super. 19, 109 A.2d 296; Williams v. Randolph Hospital, 237 N.C. 387, 75 S.E.2d 303; Gregory v. Salem General Hospital, 175 Or. 464, 153 P.2d 837; Bond v. City of Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A.2d 328; Caughman v. Columbia Y. M. C. A., 212 S.C. 337, 47 S.E.2d 788; Felan v. Lucey, Tex.Civ.App., 259 S.W.2d 302; Meade v. St. Francis Hospital of Charleston, W.Va., 74 S.E.2d 405; Baldwin v. St. Peter's Congregation, 264 Wis. 626, 60 N.W.2d 349; Forrest v. Red Cross Hospital, Ky., 265 S.W.2d 80; Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 A. 898, 33 L.R.A.,N.S., 141; Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 A. 595, 31 L.R.A. 224; St. Vincent's Hospital v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N.E. 537, 33 A.L.R. 1361; Cullen v. Schmit, 139 Ohio St. 194, 39 N.E.2d 146; Weston's Adm'x v. Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785, 23 A.L.R. 907; Bruce v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 51 Nev. 372, 277 P. 798; Bishop Randall Hospital v. Hartley, 24 Wyo. 408, 160 P. 385, Ann.Cas.1918E, 1172.

While the basis upon which the various courts rest there decisions vary, fundamentally there seem to be five principles on which...