Mullery v. Great Northern Ry. Co.
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
| Writing for the Court | SANNER, J. |
| Citation | Mullery v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 50 Mont. 408, 148 P. 323 (Mont. 1915) |
| Decision Date | 16 March 1915 |
| Docket Number | 3477. |
| Parties | MULLERY v. GREAT NORTHERN RY. CO. ET AL. |
Appeal from District Court, Cascade County; J. B. Leslie, Judge.
Action by Vincent W. Mullery against the Great Northern Railway Company and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Affirmed.
Veazey & Veazey, of Great Falls, for appellants.
E. L Bishop, of Los Angeles, Cal., for respondent.
The respondent, plaintiff below, brought this action to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the Great Northern Railway Company and its switching crew, two of whom were joined with the company as defendants. The answer denies negligence on the part of defendants or any of them, and pleads contributory negligence as well as assumption of risk. Trial was to a jury, who determined the issues against the defendants, and from the judgment entered on the verdict, as well as from an order denying their motion for new trial, they have appealed. Several questions are presented which will be considered seriatim.
1. Upon the selection of the jury, and after 12 men had been passed for cause, the appellants each demanded and sought to exercise four peremptory challenges. This was not permitted the court ruling that they were only entitled to challenge collectively. As the result, there were left upon the jury after all the peremptory challenges thus allowed had been exhausted, three persons who had been severally challenged by the appellants, but upon whose rejection they did not agree. Their contention is that under section 6740, Revised Codes, each of them was entitled to exercise four peremptory challenges, and this is claimed to be based upon the language of the statute as well as upon its history. The section reads as follows:
It certainly cannot be said that this provision is unequivocal.
If "party" means each individual upon either side of the cause, then a contradiction resides in the expressions "each party may challenge the array," but "there can be only one challenge on a side to the array." It is manifest, of course, that the use of the words "party" and "side" may have been studied and purposeful; but it is not manifest that the particular purpose was to allow four peremptory challenges to each individual defendant in every case. A case in which there is one plaintiff and two or more defendants, each exercising the same number of peremptory challenges, presents difficulties in the way of obeying the mandate to challenge "alternately commencing with the plaintiff," and these difficulties are not to be needlessly multiplied. It is said that, if the Legislature intended to require defendants to join in their challenges, it could have said so in apt terms, such as appear in the provisions relating to criminal trials. Section 9244, Rev. Codes. This is true. It is also true that, if the statute had meant to authorize four peremptory challenges by each individual plaintiff or defendant, such intent could have found unmistakable expression. So, too, the fact that section 6740 first appeared in this state as section 1059, Code Civ. Pro. 1895, supplanting a section of the Compiled Statutes (section 257, Code Civ. Pro.), which did expressly require parties on the same side to join in their challenges, is apparently of much significance. But this significance is more apparent than real. Words and phrases which have acquired a particular and appropriate meaning in law are to be construed according to such meaning. Rev. Codes, § 15. When section 6740 appeared for the first time in our Code, it was, and from an early date had been, universally held that the words "each party," used in the connection there presented, mean each side or each party litigant, and not each person of whom the respective sides or parties litigant are made up. Schmidt v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. et al., 83 Ill. 405; Sodousky et al. v. McGee, 4 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 267; Hargrave v. Vaughn et al., 82 Tex. 347, 18 S.W. 695; Bibb v. Reid et al., 3 Ala. 88; Snodgrass et al. v. Hunt, 15 Ind. 274; Stone v. Segur et al., 11 Allen (Mass.) 568; Bryan v. Harrison et al., 76 N.C. 360; Blackburn et al. v. Hays, 4 Cold. (Tenn.) 227; Wolf et al. v. Perryman, 82 Tex. 112, 17 S.W. 772. So far as civil cases were concerned, special expression was required, not to state this meaning, but its opposite; and, in the absence of unequivocal language to the contrary, the persons composing each side or party litigant were required to join in the exercise of peremptory challenges. In criminal cases, and for very obvious reasons, the rule was exactly the reverse. Defendants jointly tried for a public offense were each presumed entitled to the number of peremptory challenges fixed by law, and an explicit provision was necessary before they could be required to join; and this is the explanation of section 9244. Nor is the construction thus given to section 6740 without excellent reason. It is not to be supposed that a statute was intended to create an absurdity, and yet we have only to imagine the existence of several individual plaintiffs or defendants, each exercising four peremptory challenges, to see the possible result, instead of a speedy trial of the issues by an impartial jury, a longdrawn and expensive preliminary proceeding, resulting in the elimination of every talesman whose intelligence or freedom from bias might fairly commend him for the particular duty. As said by the Supreme Court of Illinois:
"Had there been 20 tenants seeking damages, each holding by a separate lease, appellants' argument would lead to those tenants being permitted to exercise 60 challenges, while the petitioner could use but 3, and that, manifestly, would not accord with the intent of the statute." Freiberg et al. v. Railway Co., 221 Ill. 508, 77 N.E. 920.
We need not doubt, however, that since nominal defendants, who are in fact hostile to each other, are "parties litigant," they are entitled to challenge as such within the meaning of section 6740. Hargrave v. Vaughn et al., supra; Rogers v. Armstrong Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 30 S.W. 848; McLaughlin v. Carter, 13 Tex.Civ.App. 694, 37 S.W. 666; Hogsett v. Traction Co., 55 Tex.Civ.App. 72, 118 S.W. 807; Levyn v. Koppin (Mich.) 149 N.W. 993. Whether such hostility must appear on the face of the pleadings, or whether it may be shown in some other way at the time the jury is selected, we need not determine, because no such hostility was ever made to appear in any way in the case at bar. The answer was joint, was signed by attorneys representing all the appellants, and asserted defenses common to all of them. As between them there was not, by pleading, representation, or evidence, any conflict of interest disclosed or any issue of any sort. They constituted but one party defendant, and the ruling by which they were limited to four peremptory challenges was correct.
2. At the close of respondent's evidence, appellants "jointly and severally" moved for a nonsuit, which was denied; later, and at the close of all the evidence, they similarly moved for a directed verdict, which met the same fate. Claiming error in these rulings, the appellants now insist that neither the respondent's case, in the first instance, nor the whole case, was sufficient in point of fact to warrant a recovery against them or any of them. This involves a discussion of the circumstances of the accident which were as follows: The respondent was an employé of the Anaconda Copper Mining Company, at the B. & M. Smelter in Great Falls. One of the units composing that smelter was a structure called the "smoke shed," a building several hundred feet long east and west by 27 feet wide north and south. This smoke shed was open at both ends and was traversed lengthwise by two tracks, running on 16X16 timbers. Beneath these tracks, separated by similar timbers, were 35 bins, which ran from side to side of the structure; each taking up about 12 feet of its length, and being about 18 feet deep. Midway of the smoke shed, or nearly so, was bin 17, which was flanked on the east by bin 18, and on the west by bin 16. West of bin 16 was bin 15, and east of bin 18 was bin 19. Bin 19 was covered by a plank floor; the others being open so as to receive ore or rock from the cars. At the east end of bin 15 and next to bin 16 was a doorway to which a flight of stairs led. These stairs and doorway were installed for the purpose of enabling employés of the smelter, who might have occasion, to enter the smoke shed at that point. The south rail of the south track as it crosses bins 15, 16, 17, and 18 was about 50 inches from the south wall of the building. Between the two tracks and along the south wall were plank walks, also designed for the use of employés on occasion. The walk between the tracks was 26 inches wide; that along the south wall varies in width, being 32 inches wide over bins 15 and 16, and 18 inches wide over bins 17 and 18. In the south wall, opposite bin 19, was an elevator way, and from this a door led to the floor covering that bin and giving access, when free from cars, to the plank...
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