Mulligan v. Rioux
| Decision Date | 28 June 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 14648,14648 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Arthur J. MULLIGAN v. Robert RIOUX et al. |
John T. Scully, with whom was Joseph A. La Bella, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).
John B. Farley, with whom were John W. Lemega and, on the brief, Michael J. Gustafson, Hartford, for appellees (defendants).
Before PETERS, C.J. and BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT and KATZ, JJ.
The principal issue in this appeal is whether the defendants, detectives Robert Rioux and Gerald Myers of the East Hartford police department, 1 are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law and, therefore, are immune from the common law malicious prosecution claims and federal civil rights claim brought by the plaintiff, Arthur Mulligan, the director of the East Hartford department of public works. After the jury found in favor of the plaintiff on each claim and the trial court accepted the verdict, the defendants filed a motion to set aside the verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court granted the defendants' motion, the plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). We reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts are undisputed. The plaintiff was employed as the director of the department of public works for the town of East Hartford (department) from 1968 until November 1, 1985. On two occasions in 1985, the plaintiff was arrested pursuant to warrants prepared by the defendants on charges stemming from the department's lubrication services contract with Automatic Lubrication Service, Inc. (Automatic Lubrication). The plaintiff was first arrested on October 28, 1985, and charged with one count of "Town Ordinance Violation: Bidding Procedure" in violation of chapter 10, article 2, § 10-5 of the code of ordinances of the town of East Hartford 2 (town competitive bidding ordinance) in connection with department purchases of lubrication services from Automatic Lubrication. The affidavit in support of the arrest alleged that the plaintiff, as director of the department, had violated the town competitive bidding ordinance by continuing the department's lubrication services contract with Automatic Lubrication without putting the contract out to bid after it had terminated. The plaintiff was again arrested on November 19, 1985, and charged with twelve counts of bribe receiving in violation of General Statutes § 53a-148, 3 based on twelve rounds of golf he had played at Blackledge Country Club, allegedly paid for by Automatic Lubrication. The affidavit in support of the arrest alleged that the plaintiff, as the director of the department, had charged twelve rounds of golf to Automatic Lubrication's account at the Blackledge Country Club in return for providing "benefits, merchandise, and special considerations to Automatic Lubrication...." Specifically, the affidavit alleged that "[o]ne of the benefits and special considerations that [the department had] afforded to Automatic Lubrication was awarding it the lubrication contract for Town vehicles without going through the bidding procedure as mandated by [the town competitive bidding ordinance]."
During the criminal proceedings that followed his arrests, the plaintiff filed separate motions to dismiss each information under which he stood charged, 4 claiming, inter alia, 5 that "[t]he affidavit relied upon for the issuance of the arrest warrant [in each arrest] contained material inaccuracies and omissions which were the result either of deliberate falsehood or a reckless disregard for the truth." The plaintiff further claimed that, if the court were to set aside such material inaccuracies and consider such material omissions, it would find that there was insufficient evidence to establish probable cause that the plaintiff had committed the offenses charged. Accordingly, the plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), for the purpose of challenging the truthfulness of the arrest warrant affidavits.
In support of his motions, the plaintiff filed affidavits containing offers of proof, which satisfied the trial court in the criminal proceedings, Tamborra, J., that the plaintiff had made the substantial preliminary showing required for a Franks hearing. At the close of the Franks hearing, Judge Tamborra concluded that, even though the affidavits may have contained some inaccuracies, the plaintiff had not "met his burden of showing that a false statement necessary to the finding of probable cause was knowingly and intentionally included or made with reckless disregard for the truth." Accordingly, Judge Tamborra denied each of the plaintiff's motions to dismiss as to all counts, on the ground that sufficient probable cause existed for allowing the charges against the plaintiff to proceed to trial. 6
Subsequently, the plaintiff was brought to trial on the criminal charges before Judge Robert Hale. At the close of the state's evidence, the plaintiff moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Practice Book §§ 882 through 884, 7 which Judge Hale granted on February 20, 1987.
Thereafter, in September, 1987, the plaintiff commenced the present action against the defendants. The plaintiff raised three claims in his amended six count complaint: 8 (1) a common law malicious prosecution claim based on his October 28, 1985 arrest; (2) a common law malicious prosecution claim based on his November 19, 1985 arrest; and (3) a federal civil rights claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) 9 based on both arrests. 10 In support of his three claims, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had failed properly to investigate the charges relating to both arrests and had submitted an affidavit in support of each arrest that contained numerous false and inaccurate statements. 11 The plaintiff also alleged that the arrests had been made without probable cause and with malice. The plaintiff further alleged that as a result of the arrests he had received massive amounts of unfavorable publicity, had experienced great humiliation and mental anguish, and had suffered tremendous damage to his reputation.
In their answer to the plaintiff's amended complaint, the defendants asserted four special defenses. They claimed that: (1) qualified immunity shielded them from liability because their alleged acts had been performed in the course of a governmental duty and were discretionary; (2) each arrest had been made pursuant to a valid warrant; (3) they had consulted with prosecuting attorneys in the course of their alleged conduct and were therefore protected by their reliance on the advice of counsel; and (4) their alleged conduct had been objectively reasonable. On November 9, 1989, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) the doctrine of qualified immunity protected them from liability; and (2) the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the plaintiff from relitigating the validity of the arrest warrants because that issue already had been fully and fairly litigated at the Franks hearing during the underlying criminal proceeding. On October 27, 1990, the trial court, Koletsky, J., denied the defendants' motion without memorandum.
Thereafter, the case was tried to a jury, which, on January 2, 1992, returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on all six counts of his complaint, awarding a total of approximately $1 million in damages. 12 On January 3, 1992 the defendants moved to set aside the verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 13 The trial court allowed the defendants to amend their motion on two occasions. In support of their motion, the defendants reasserted the special defenses of qualified immunity and reliance on the advice of counsel, as well as their collateral estoppel claim. Additionally, the defendants asserted that: (1) there was insufficient evidence at trial to support a finding of lack of probable cause and malice under each count of the complaint; and (2) the verdict was excessive as a matter of law because the trial court improperly had admitted impermissibly speculative testimony concerning the plaintiff's alleged lost employment opportunity. 14 In its memorandum of decision dated September 17, 1992, the trial court, M. Hennessey, J., concluded that "the defendants [were] entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law." Accordingly, the trial court granted the defendants' motion to set aside the verdict and rendered judgment for the defendants on all six counts. This appeal followed.
The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly set aside the jury's verdict because: (1) the defendants, having acted with malice, were not immune from the plaintiff's claims for malicious prosecution under our common law doctrine of qualified immunity; and (2) the defendants' qualified immunity from the plaintiff's civil rights claim depended on disputed questions of fact and, therefore, should not have been set aside as a matter of law. The defendants raise the following alternative grounds for affirming the trial court's judgment: (1) their arrests of the plaintiff were supported by probable cause as a matter of law; (2) they were entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct was objectively reasonable; (3) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of malice for purposes of the plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims; (4) the defendants' reliance on the advice of the state's attorneys shielded them from liability; and (5) the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the plaintiff from relitigating the existence of probable cause because that issue already had been fully and fairly litigated at the Franks hearing during the...
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