Mullin v. Raytheon Co.
Decision Date | 05 November 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 98-1656,98-1656 |
Parties | 78 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1174, 74 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,696 William MULLIN, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. RAYTHEON COMPANY, Defendant, Appellee. . Heard |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
J. Allen Holland, with whom John R. Cavanaugh and Lynch, Brewer, Hoffman & Sands, LLP were on brief, for appellant.
James F. Kavanaugh, Jr., with whom Deborah W. Kirchwey and Conn, Kavanaugh, Rosenthal, Peisch & Ford, L.L.P. were on brief, for appellee.
Before SELYA, Circuit Judge, COFFIN and CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-appellant William Mullin sued his employer, defendant-appellee Raytheon Company, contending that his demotion (and a concomitant reduction in remuneration) constituted age discrimination in contravention of both the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, and the Massachusetts Anti-Discrimination Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(1B), (Chapter 151B). The district court granted Raytheon's motion for summary judgment on all counts. See Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 2 F.Supp.2d 165 (D.Mass.1998). Mullin's appeal raises, inter alia, a question of first impression in this circuit as to the viability of "disparate impact" claims in age discrimination cases. We conclude that such claims are not cognizable under either federal or state law.
Consistent with the summary judgment standard, we recount the material facts in the manner most congenial to the appellant's theory of the case, accepting his (properly documented) version of genuinely disputed facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor. See Coyne v. Taber Partners I, 53 F.3d 454, 457 (1st Cir.1995); Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir.1990).
Raytheon assigns salaried employees a labor grade on a numeric scale that ranges from 4 to 18. Each grade corresponds to a different (successively higher) earnings bracket. Prior to filing this action, the appellant worked for Raytheon for some twenty-nine years. He steadily climbed the corporate lattice. In 1979, he achieved a grade of 15 and became manager of manufacturing operations for Raytheon's Andover (Massachusetts) plant--a position in which he supervised more than 2,000 employees. At that point, his upward progression ceased. Although he retained a grade 15 classification until 1995, his duties changed and his authority gradually contracted. In 1984, Raytheon transferred Mullin to its Lowell (Massachusetts) plant, where he became a second-shift manager, supervising some 400 employees. Beginning in 1989, the company informally assigned him to the role of trouble-shooter and transferred him from area to area, according to need. In 1994, Raytheon designated him as the manager of the Gyro and Motorwind Work Centers at the Lowell plant--a position in which he oversaw fewer than 100 subordinates.
Over the years, Raytheon's principal business has been the manufacture of military ordnance. When the Cold War ended and Congress slashed the Defense Department's procurement budget, the volume of work potentially available to Raytheon decreased proportionately. In an effort to adjust to these economic realities, Raytheon inaugurated major structural changes. Among other steps, it closed the Lowell plant and one in Manchester, New Hampshire, and folded the operations previously performed at those locations into its Andover plant. In the process, Raytheon relocated the appellant and his department to Andover.
In addition to plant closings and consolidations, the retrenchment produced a significant number of layoffs and reassignments. It also included a wage freeze, during which Raytheon assayed the commensurability of upper-level salaried employees' assigned labor grades and actual responsibilities. The company evaluated each position in light of criteria such as the complexity of the work undertaken, the number of employees supervised, and the financial responsibility inherent in the job. In the appellant's case, it deemed his grade (15) inconsistent with his duties and downgraded him to level 12--an action that, under established corporate policy, required a downward compensation adjustment to bring him within the salary range that corresponded to his new classification. 1
Claiming that age discrimination prompted this demotion, the appellant sued. His complaint, grounded in both federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332--Mullin is a citizen of New Hampshire and Raytheon is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Massachusetts--set out four statements of claim: two for disparate treatment (one under the ADEA and one under Chapter 151B) and two for disparate impact (one under the ADEA and one under Chapter 151B). After a period of discovery, Raytheon moved for brevis disposition and the district court obliged. See Mullin, 2 F.Supp.2d at 175. This appeal ensued.
Summary judgment is a device that "has proven its usefulness as a means of avoiding full-dress trials in unwinnable cases, thereby freeing courts to utilize scarce judicial resources in more beneficial ways." Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir.1991). Its essential role is "to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties' proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required." Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir.1992). The mechanics of the device are familiar, see, e.g., Garside, 895 F.2d at 48, and do not warrant exegetic description here. For present purposes, it suffices to note that summary judgment should be granted when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In determining whether these criteria have been satisfied, we, like the trial court, "must view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir.1990).
With this brief preface, we turn to the appellant's asseverational array. In the process, we review the lower court's decision de novo. See Garside, 895 F.2d at 48.
Claims.
The tripartite burden-shifting regime conceived by the Supreme Court for use in Title VII cases, see St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-11, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), applies to disparate treatment claims under the ADEA and Chapter 151B. See, e.g., Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 823 (ADEA); Whalen v. Nynex Info. Resources Co., 419 Mass. 792, 795, 647 N.E.2d 716, 718 (1995) (Chapter 151B). The parties concede that the appellant proffered a prima facie case and that Raytheon, by citing the cuts in defense spending, the attendant need to downsize, and the outcome of the personnel reevaluation, articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation both for restructuring and for demoting the appellant. Thus, the contest here revolves around the third step of the McDonnell Douglas pavane.
For purposes of Mullin's ADEA-based disparate treatment claim, we must therefore concentrate on whether he adduced enough evidence to create a trialworthy question both as to the employer's alleged motivation (animus based on age) and as to the pretextuality of its explanation for the adverse employment action. See Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 823; Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8-9 (1st Cir.1990).
The appellant's burden under Chapter 151B is somewhat less onerous. While federal law requires a showing of pretext plus age animus, the Massachusetts courts appear, at the third step of the pavane, to require a claimant to show only pretext. See Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Boston, Inc., 419 Mass. 437, 444-46, 646 N.E.2d 111, 116-17 (1995). 2 The difference between the federal "pretext-plus" standard and the Massachusetts "pretext-only" standard, though sometimes significant, is irrelevant in this case. The district court determined that the appellant failed to raise a genuine issue as to either pretext or age animus, see Mullin, 2 F.Supp.2d at 172, and, since we agree with the former determination, the appellant's disparate treatment claims fail under either standard.
We need not tarry. Raytheon advanced a strong, objectively verifiable set of reasons for consolidating operations, restructuring its work force, and downgrading Mullin: significant revenue loss stemming from massive Defense Department cutbacks, culminating in a reevaluation of all upper-echelon salaried employees. The appellant points to nothing that casts doubt upon the legitimacy of this reason, nor does he proffer any substantial evidence that would permit a rational jury to find that Raytheon rigged the restructuring in a fashion designed to ensure that the appellant's labor grade and/or compensation level would be reduced unfairly. The district court painstakingly analyzed all the appellant's submissions in this regard, see id. at 169-71, and it would be pleonastic to rehearse that discussion here. We content ourselves with saying that, after having carefully sifted the record, we uphold the lower court's disposition of the disparate treatment claims for essentially the reasons elucidated in its rescript. See Lawton v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of Am., 101 F.3d 218, 220 (1st Cir.1996) ( ); In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 989 F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir.1993) (similar).
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