Mullinnex v. Menard
| Decision Date | 08 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-180,19-180 |
| Citation | 236 A.3d 171 |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | Patrick MULLINNEX et al. v. Lisa MENARD et al. |
Matthew Valerio, Defender General, and Kelly Green and Emily Trudeau, Prisoners' Rights Office, Montpelier, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Stephen J. Soule and Pamela L.P. Eaton of Paul Frank + Collins P.C., Burlington, and Michael Bentley and Molly Walker of Bradly Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Jackson, Mississippi, for Defendants-Appellants.
PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Robinson and Eaton, JJ., and Skoglund, J. (Ret.) and Howard, Supr. J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned
¶ 1. Defendants Michael Touchette and Centurion Healthcare1 bring this interlocutory appeal from the trial court's certification of a class of plaintiffs in a Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75 action. The class certified below is comprised of persons in the custody of the Vermont Department of Corrections (DOC), each of whom suffers from opioid-use disorder and alleges that defendants' medication-assisted treatment (MAT) program does not meet prevailing medical standards of care as required by Vermont law. Defendants, the former Commissioner of the DOC and its contract healthcare provider, argue that the trial court erred both in finding that plaintiff Patrick Mullinnex exhausted his administrative remedies before filing suit and in adopting the vicarious-exhaustion doctrine favored by several federal circuits in order to conclude that Mullinnex's grievances satisfied the exhaustion requirement on behalf of the entire class. Defendants also contend that the trial court's decision to certify the class was in error because plaintiffs did not meet Rule 23's numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy-of-representation requirements. See V.R.C.P. 23(a). We reverse, concluding that—assuming arguendo that the vicarious-exhaustion doctrine is appropriately applied in Vermont—it could not apply in this case because, on the record before the trial court, no member of the putative class succeeded in exhausting his administrative remedies. Because plaintiffs' failure to exhaust leaves the courts without subject-matter jurisdiction, we do not reach defendants' challenges to the merits of the class-certification decision.
¶ 2. Pursuant to 28 V.S.A. § 801(a), the DOC must "provide health care for inmates in accordance with the prevailing medical standards." In 2018, the Legislature added a provision requiring that: (1) inmates receiving MAT prior to entering a correctional facility be continued in that treatment so long as medically necessary; (2) inmates who screen positive for opioid-use disorder while incarcerated may elect to receive MAT if it is deemed medically necessary; and (3) inmates who so elect "shall be authorized to receive the medication as soon as possible and for as long as medically necessary." 2017, No. 176 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 3-4; 28 V.S.A. §§ 801(e), 801(b)(l). Plaintiffs allege that the MAT program established by defendants following the amendments to §§ 801 and 801b does not meet prevailing medical standards of care.
¶ 3. An inmate who believes he or she is not receiving medical care comporting with the requirements of §§ 801 or 801b may seek redress through the DOC's grievance process. The DOC has fulfilled its legislative directive to "establish procedures to review the grievances of inmates." 28 V.S.A. § 854 ; see Offender Grievance System—APA Rule #06-006, Code of Vt. Rules 13 130 005 [hereinafter DOC Grievance Rules], https://doc.vermont.gov/sites/correct/ files/documents/policy/correctional/320-Grievance-System-Rule.pdf [https://perma.cc/EAA4-SAQ7]. The DOC Grievance Rules set forth the following procedural steps to govern the resolution of nonemergent grievances which do not allege "serious employee misconduct."2 DOC Grievance Rules §§ 3, 5. An inmate who wishes to file a grievance must first file an informal complaint. Id. § 5(a). If the inmate is dissatisfied with the outcome of the informal-complaint-resolution process, he or she may file a formal grievance. Id. § 5(b). The "local chain of command" must respond to the grievance within twenty business days. Id. § 5(d), (e). The inmate may choose to appeal that local response. Id. § 5(e). "Appeal[s] to the Commissioner will be responded to within 20 business days." Id. Finally, the Rules require that inmates "exhaust administrative remedies provided by the Department of Corrections' grievance system before commencing litigation." Id. § 5(g).
¶ 4. The record reveals that the instant proceeding finds its inception in a DOC grievance form submitted by plaintiff Mullinnex on September 20, 2018, following an informal complaint to "medical" the day before. Therein, Mullinnex alleged that, although he had "been approved for MAT," he would not be induced until thirty days prior to his release from the facility despite having "a medical need now for MAT" and a desire "to get help with [his] addiction and be induced." At some point during the following month,3 Mullinnex appealed the local response to his grievance to the corrections executive. Finally, Mullinnex filed an appeal to the Commissioner indicating his dissatisfaction with a grievance response from the corrections executive, which Mullinnex indicated was dated October 30, 2018. Although the form providing for an appeal to the Commissioner contained a line designated for the date the appeal was submitted, this line was left blank. However, the form was filed with the civil division of the superior court on November 2, 2018, together with Mullinnex's request for emergency injunctive relief naming "Lisa Menard et al."4 as the defendants. Although the court received Mullinnex's filing several days later, he signed and dated it on October 30. Given this timing, it is clear that Mullinnex filed his administrative appeal to the Commissioner and his civil action contemporaneously.
¶ 5. Several days later, an attorney from the Prisoners' Rights Office entered an appearance on Mullinnex's behalf in the civil case. Defendants then moved to dismiss the case as moot, indicating that Mullinnex had been prescribed MAT and began receiving it on November 7, 2018. The trial court declined to dismiss, instead directing Mullinnex to file an amended petition. Mullinnex accordingly filed an amended petition, this time through counsel, and joined as named plaintiffs John Jarvis, Shawn Gagnon, and Gregory Paradis, "on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated." In the amended petition, Michael Touchette and "Centurion Healthcare" were named as defendants. The amended petition was accompanied by a motion to maintain a class action on behalf of all others similarly situated, alleging the existence of three questions of law and fact common to the putative class:
(1) whether [d]efendants' MAT induction process meets prevailing medical standards of care as required by 28 V.S.A. §§ 801(a) [and] 801b, (2) whether [d]efendants' practice and policy of withdrawing treatment for and punishing prisoner-patients who relapse or continue to use meets prevailing medical standards of care, [and] (3) whether [d]efendants' practice and policy of denying MAT to prisoner-patients based on their legal status and without regard to their diagnosis meets prevailing medical standards of care.
¶ 6. Defendants responded in opposition to both the amended petition and the motion to maintain a class action. In addition to arguing that venue was improper and the class-action requirements were unmet, defendants contended that none of the named plaintiffs had exhausted administrative remedies relative to their MAT complaints, divesting the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. In support of the alleged failure to exhaust, defendants offered an affidavit from David Turner, the Director of Policy Development and Offender Due Process at the DOC. Turner laid out the DOC's grievance procedure, describing multiple "levels of appeal ... that ultimately reach the Commissioner," who "is the final arbiter of inmate grievances." Although he did not mention Mullinnex's grievances, Turner averred that none of the named plaintiffs had exhausted their grievance appeals with respect to the three questions identified in the amended petition.
¶ 7. The court issued a decision in which it held that both venue and subject-matter jurisdiction were proper. With respect to the latter issue, the court did not hold an evidentiary hearing. Instead, it looked to the grievances filed by Mullinnex and concluded that he had exhausted his administrative remedies, noting that it found the "basis for his failure to exhaust as asserted by [d]efendant ... unclear," but explaining that, "[t]o the extent the purported failure lies with the absence of a response or decision from the DOC administrators, the court would deem the DOC grievance procedure ‘unavailable’ to Plaintiff Mullinnex." Although it noted that Mullinnex appeared to have appealed to the Commissioner prior to the expiration of the twenty-day window provided under DOC rules for the Corrections Executive's response, the court found "this premature filing to be of little consequence in the absence of any response from DOC administrators." It then adopted the "vicarious exhaustion" doctrine favored in some federal jurisdictions, pursuant to which one prisoner-plaintiff's exhaustion satisfies the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA's) exhaustion requirement on behalf of an entire class. See, e.g., Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 2004). On this basis, it held that the putative class had satisfied the exhaustion requirements through Mullinnex's efforts. It then noted that it could not yet determine whether plaintiffs met the prerequisites for class certification and set the matter for oral argument. Following this hearing, the court issued another ruling on April 26, 2019, certifying the class as to issues with the MAT induction process and disciplinary actions taken against...
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