Mullins v. Crowell
| Decision Date | 21 September 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 97-BU-2509-S.,No. CV 97-BU-2314-S.,No. CV 97-BU-2016-S.,No. CV 97-BU-2143-S.,No. CV 97-BU-1897-S.,No. CV 97-BU-2011-S.,No. CV 97-BU-2315-S.,No. CV 97-BU-2482-S.,No. CV 97-BU-2464-S.,No. CV 97-BU-2287-S.,No. CV 97-BU-2322-S.,No. CV 99-BU-0061-S.,No. CV 97-BU-2013-S.,No. CV 97-BU-2480-S.,No. CV 97-BU-2809-S.,No. CV 97-BU-2012-S.,No. CV 97-BU-2758-S.,No. CV 97-BU-2015-S.,No. CV 97-BU-2325-S.,No. CV 98-BU-2932-S.,CV 97-BU-1897-S.,CV 97-BU-2011-S.,CV 97-BU-2012-S.,CV 97-BU-2013-S.,CV 97-BU-2015-S.,CV 97-BU-2016-S.,CV 97-BU-2143-S.,CV 97-BU-2287-S.,CV 97-BU-2314-S.,CV 97-BU-2315-S.,CV 97-BU-2322-S.,CV 97-BU-2325-S.,CV 97-BU-2464-S.,CV 97-BU-2480-S.,CV 97-BU-2482-S.,CV 97-BU-2509-S.,CV 97-BU-2758-S.,CV 97-BU-2809-S.,CV 98-BU-2932-S.,CV 99-BU-0061-S. |
| Citation | 74 F.Supp.2d 1067 |
| Parties | Robert MULLINS, Michael D. Desruisseaux, and Thomas Miles, Plaintiffs, v. Craven CROWELL, Johnny H. Hayes, and William H. Kennoy, Defendants. Michael G. Murks, Plaintiff, v. Craven Crowell, Johnny H. Hayes, and William H. Kennoy, Defendants. Millard Shelton, Plaintiff, v. Craven Crowell, Johnny H. Hayes, and William H. Kennoy, Defendants. James R. Williams, Plaintiff, v. Craven Crowell, Johnny H. Hayes, and William H. Kennoy, Defendants. Jerry Chandler, Plaintiff, v. Craven Crowell, Johnny H. Hayes, and William H. Kennoy, Defendants. Noonan W. Greene, Plaintiff, v. Craven Crowell, Johnny H. Hayes, and William H. Kennoy, Defendants. Thomas Larry Bailey, Plaintiff, v. Craven Crowell, Johnny H. Hayes, and William H. Kennoy, Defendants. Jerry Gothard, Plaintiff, v. Craven Crowell, Johnny H. Hayes, and William H. Kennoy, Defendants. Edward J. Smart, Plaintiff, v. Craven Crowell, Johnny H. Hayes, and William H. Kennoy, Defendants. Frank N. Speer, Plaintiff, v. Craven Crowell, Johnny H. Hayes, and William H. Kennoy, Defendants. Marc W. Shores, Plaintiff, v. Craven Crowell, Johnny H. Hayes, and William H. Kennoy, Defendants. Timothy L. Mansell, Plaintiff, v. Craven Crowell, Johnny H. Hayes, and William H. Kennoy, Defendants. Ricky S. Coats, Plaintiff, v. Craven Crowell, Johnny H. Hayes, and William H. Kennoy, Defendants. Bobby Massey, Plaintiff, v. Craven Crowell, Johnny H. Hayes, and William H. Kennoy, Defendants. Halbert Putnam, Plaintiff, v. Craven Crowell, Johnny H. Hayes, and William H. Kennoy, Defendants. Troy Tucker, Plaintiff, v. Craven Crowell, Johnny H. Hayes, and William H. Kennoy, Defendants. Lanny W. Smith, Plaintiff, v. Craven Crowell, Johnny H. Hayes, and William H. Kennoy, Defendants. Barbara G. Hovater, Plaintiff, v. Craven Crowell, Johnny H. Hayes, and William H. Kennoy, Defendants. Thomas A. Crow and Marion G. Rainer, Plaintiffs, v. Craven Crowell, Johnny H. Hayes, and William H. Kennoy, Defendants. Lonner T. Chandler and Richard B. Dutton, Plaintiffs, v. Craven Crowell, Johnny H. Hayes, and William H. Kennoy, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
Terry R. Smyly, Jay Lewis, Law Offices of Jay Lewis, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiffs.
Edward S. Christenbury, Thomas F. Fine, John E. Slater, Angela P. Tyson-Floyd, Barbara S. Maxwell, Jane Park Farris, Tennessee Valley Authority, Knoxville, TN, for Defendants.
Before the Court are a number of pending motions in the consolidated case of Mullins v. Crowell, et al., lead case number CV 97-BU-1897-S. Pending in this consolidated case are (1) a motion for summary judgment filed by the Defendants, Craven Crowell ("Crowell"), Johnny H. Hayes ("Hayes") and William H. Kennoy ("Kennoy"), on August 14, 1998,1 against the claims of Plaintiffs (collectively, "original Plaintiffs") Thomas L. Bailey ("Bailey"), Jerry W. Chandler ("J.Chandler"), Ricky S. Coats ("Coats"), Michael D. Desruisseaux ("Desruisseaux"), Jerry Gothard ("Gothard") Noonan Greene ("Greene"), Barbara Hovater ("Hovater"), Timothy L. Mansell ("Mansell"), Bobby Massey ("Massey"), Thomas Miles ("Miles"), Robert Mullins ("Mullins"), Michael Murks ("Murks"), Halbert Putnam ("Putnam") Millard I. Shelton ("Shelton"), Marc Shores ("Shores"), Frank Speer ("Speer"), Edward Smart ("Smart"), Lanny Smith ("Smith"), and Troy Tucker ("T.Tucker") (Document 55); (2) a motion for leave to file a reply brief filed by the Defendants on October 5, 1998 (Document 74);2 (3) a second motion for summary judgment filed by the Defendants on June 9, 1999, against the claims of Plaintiffs (collectively, "new Plaintiffs") Lonner T. Chandler ("L.Chandler"), Thomas A. Crow ("Crow"), Richard B. Dutton ("Dutton"), and Marion G. Rainer ("Rainer") (Document 116); (4) a motion for leave to submit the decision of the EEOC in Hines v. Runyon filed by the Plaintiffs on July 9, 1999 (Document 128);3 (5) a motion for leave to file an affidavit out of time filed by the Plaintiffs on July 13, 1999 (Document 129);4 (6) a motion to dismiss Richard B. Dutton with leave to refile filed by the Plaintiffs on July 20, 1999 (Document 131); (7) a motion for leave to submit additional evidence filed by the Plaintiffs on July 28, 1999 (Document 133); (8) a motion to include the parties' briefs on the motions for summary judgment as part of the record filed by the Plaintiffs on July 28, 1999 (Document 134); (9) a motion to change, modify, expand, and/or clarify the Plaintiffs' theory of the case to focus on how the Plaintiffs' impairments substantially limit major life activities other than working filed by the Plaintiffs on August 5, 1999 (Documents 136 & 138); and (10) a motion to permit change of theory and/or submission of additional evidence as a matter of equity filed by the Plaintiffs on August 9, 1999 (Document 137).
In their motions for summary judgment, the Defendants contend that each of the Plaintiffs is incapable of presenting a genuine issue of triable fact as to his or her claims of disability discrimination under sections 501(b) and 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(b) & 794(a). The original and new Plaintiffs respond that there exist genuine issues of triable fact on their claims that the Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA") discriminated against them on the basis of their disabilities by classifying them in segregated competitive areas and levels — thereby impairing their ability to compete for retention in the face of an impending reduction in the workforce — and by terminating them through the reductions in force.5
Summary judgment offers the parties an invaluable opportunity to test the mettle of a case before it ever reaches trial. In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court assesses all of the proof the parties can bring to bear to ascertain the presence of a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the court's determination of the propriety of summary judgment is to be tempered by a strong inclination in favor of the non-movant. Therefore, only if the court concludes that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law is a grant of summary judgment appropriate. FED. R.CIV.P. 56(c). See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
It is the initial responsibility of the movant to inform this court of the grounds for its motion and to specifically identify those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and any affidavits that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The movant carries no meager burden, for it must illuminate for the district court, with reference to materials on file, the reasons why the non-movant cannot or does not raise a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to support a trial. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991). But see Gonzalez v. Lee County Housing Authority, 161 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir.1998) .
Only after the moving party has satisfied this initial burden must the nonmoving party "make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of each essential element to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Howard v. BP Oil Company, 32 F.3d 520, 523 (11th Cir.1994). At that point, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) dictates that the nonmoving party "go beyond the pleadings" and by "affidavits, or by the `depositions', answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file' designate `specific facts'" showing there exist genuine issues for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 575 (11th Cir.1988). "If the non-moving party fails to `make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,' then the court must enter summary judgment for the moving party." Gonzalez v. Lee County Housing Authority, 161 F.3d at 1294 (11th Cir.1998). Bare speculation based on loose construal of the evidence will not satisfy the non-movant's burden. See id.
While the district court is permitted to consider the offered "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any" in deciding whether to grant or deny a summary judgment motion, FED. R.CIV.P. 56(c),the non-movant bears the absolute responsibility of designating the specific facts in the record that support its claims. See United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property in Greene and Tuscaloosa Counties in the State of Alabama, 941 F.2d 1428, 1438 (11th Cir....
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