Mullins v. Department of Labor

• Decision Date: 09 March 2009
• Docket Number: Civil No. 08-1422 (ADC).
• Citation: 608 F.Supp.2d 245
• Parties: Betty Ann MULLINS, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

608 F.Supp.2d 245

Betty Ann MULLINS, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 08-1422 (ADC).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

March 9, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Erick Morales-Perez, Erick Morales Law Office, Carolina, PR, for Plaintiff.

Marie L. Cortes-Cortes, Carlos E. Lopez-Lopez, Lopez, Lopez & Associates, Daniel Angel Vazquez-Diaz, Oficina de Litigios Generales, Departamento de Justicia, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

AIDA M. DELGADO-COLON, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff, Betty Ann Mullins ("Mullins" or "plaintiff"), filed this action against her employer, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's Department of Labor ("DOL"), and its employees, Ramón Velasco ("Velasco"), the former Secretary of Labor, Sandra Arroyo-Dávila ("Arroyo"), Angél Ferrer-Cruz ("Ferrer"), and Andrés Espinosa ("Espinosa"), in their official and individual capacities, and Madeline Meliá ("Meliá") and José R. Colón ("Colón"), in their individual capacities, ("collectively defendants"). Docket No. 1. She alleges disability, age, and gender discrimination and retaliation in her employment. The claims are brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"); the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 et seq. Plaintiff also invokes pendent jurisdiction of this court for claims under Law 100 of June 30, 1959, P.R. Laws Ann., tit 29, § 146 et seq. ("Law 100"); Law 69 of July 6, 1985, P.R. Laws Ann., tit. 29, § 1321 et seq. ("Law 69"); Law 44 of July 6, 1985, P.R. Laws Ann., tit. 1, § 501 et seq. ("Law 44"); and Article 1802 of the Commonwealth of P.R. Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann., tit. 31, § 5141 ("Article 1802").

Before the court is the DOH, Velasco, Arroyo, Ferrer and Espinosa's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)¹ and 12(b)(6). Docket No. 25. Meliá and Colón requested to join co-defendant's motion to dismiss. Docket No. 37. The court granted said request. Docket No. 39. Plaintiff opposes dismissal of the complaint, but concedes on one of defendants' arguments.² After due consideration, defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

II. Factual Background

Unless otherwise indicated, the following relevant allegations are drawn from the complaint filed on April 11, 2008. Docket No. 1.

Mullins is of legal age, single, a resident of Carolina, Puerto Rico and works as a mediator of labor conflicts at the DOL. Id. at ¶ 6. The DOL is an instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Velasco was the Secretary of the DOH; Ferrer was the Director of the Arbitration and Conciliation Board; Colon performed as the Sub-director of the Arbitration and Conciliation Board and plaintiff's immediate supervisor; Espinosa held the position of Assistant Director of Legal Affairs; Arroyo was the Director of Human Resources; and Melia was the Assistant Director of the DOL. Id. at ¶¶ 8-13, 16.

Mullins began working at the DOL on September 2, 1988. She has always worked in the same position: Arbitration-Mediation of Labor Conflicts. Id. at ¶ 14. Her duties and responsibilities consist of mediation and arbitration of various kinds of labor conflicts between union employees and employers. Her duties also include adjudicating complaints, issues and conflicts. Other duties include training personnel regarding arbitration and mediation, provide seminars and represent the Director of Mediation and Arbitration in counseling and advising the community at large, and any other duties deemed necessary by said Director or the Secretary of the DOL. Id. at ¶ 15. Mullins' overall performance met and exceeded defendants' expectations. Id. at ¶ 17.

Plaintiff understands she has been continually discriminated against since 2004 due to gender for the following: a) assigning male colleagues, with less experience and less qualifications than plaintiff, to arbitration and mediation proceedings; b) providing male colleagues with superior monetary compensation than plaintiff; and c) providing male colleagues with better professional advancement than those afforded to plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 18. Thus, in spite of Mullins' superior professional performance, defendants gave less qualified male employees higher pay levels for the same responsibilities Mullins had, affecting the terms and conditions of her employment. Id. at ¶¶ 30-31. Further, plaintiff understands that since 2004 and despite her qualifications she was discriminated against due to her age³. Plaintiff bases her age discrimination claim on the fact that defendants have: a) hired younger persons than the plaintiff as mediator/arbitrators; b) provided younger persons, with less experience and educational qualifications, higher compensation than plaintiff; c) provided younger employees with better job assignments, as mediator and arbitrator, than those provided to plaintiff, including arbitration cases, conciliation of labor cases, mediation, negotiation, complex arbitration cases, assignment of administrative duties; and d) published more arbitration awards of younger co-workers than plaintiff, in detriment to her professional standing as a mediator Id. at ¶¶ 19, 37-38. Plaintiff understands that defendants discriminated against plaintiff on account of her disability for having developed an "emotional condition" due to labor stress and "burn out". Defendants made comments to plaintiff, characterizing her as emotionally affected, unfit, violent, and mentally unsound. They have stated that she should go to "INSPIRA," a mental therapeutic center, to receive psychological treatment. Defendants have mocked plaintiff's character by attributing her a mental illness. According to plaintiff, defendants have made these comments wantonly, maliciously and viciously, causing plaintiff pain, suffering and mental anguish. Id. at ¶ 20.

Plaintiff also claims defendants retaliated against her for filing complaints of detrimental working conditions and salary violations with different state and federal agencies, including the complaint before this court. Plaintiff states that defendants have: (a) diminished her professional responsibilities; (b) made disparaging remarks about her professional capabilities and performance in front of her co-workers; and (c) taken unjustifiable disciplinary measures against her. Id. at ¶ 21. Notwithstanding, plaintiff alleges that defendants have not taken any affirmative action to remedy the discrimination plaintiff has complained of. Id. at ¶ 25. Instead, plaintiff attests that defendants created a hostile work environment, which included threats, negative comments and other improper coercive comments for which Mullins continues to suffer pain, mental anguish, and monetary damages. Id. at ¶ 33.

III. Motion to Dismiss

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court "take[s] as true all wellpleaded allegations and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Ezra Charitable Trust v. Tyco Int'l, Ltd., 466 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir.2006). The claimant, however, "must allege `a plausible entitlement to relief.'" Rodríguez-Ortíz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92, 95 (1st Cir.2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1967, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).⁴ "The court need not accept a plaintiff's assertion that a factual allegation satisfies an element of a claim, however, nor must a court infer from the assertion of a legal conclusion that factual allegations could be made that would justify drawing such a conclusion." Cordero-Hernández v. HernándezBallesteros, 449 F.3d 240, 244 n. 3 (1st Cir.2006).

IV. Discussion

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint for the following reasons: (i) the DOL, and its employees in their official capacities, are entitled the Eleventh Amendment immunity for the ADA and ADEA claims as well as the Commonwealth law claims; (ii) plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies against defendants for Title VII gender discrimination and failed to state a claim for Title VII retaliation; and (iii) plaintiff's Commonwealth law claims are time-barred. Docket No. 25.

A. Sovereign Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. The principles embodied in the Eleventh Amendment apply to suits against a state by its own citizens. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890); Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. P.R. Aqueduct and Sewer Auth., 991 F.2d 935, 938 (1st Cir.1993) (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974)).⁵

The Eleventh Amendment bars monetary damages claims against the state itself, its agencies and instrumentalities that are an arm or "alter ego" of the state, as well as their employees, in their official capacity. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct: 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 280-281, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977); Wang v. New Hampshire Bd. of Registration in Med., 55 F.3d 698, 700 (1st Cir.1995). Claims filed against state officials in their official capacity are deemed actions against the state since the real party in interest is the State and not the official. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989).

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and its dependencies have not waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity to be sued for damages in federal court under the ADA and the A...