Mullins v. Parkview Hosp., Inc.

• Court: Indiana Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Baker
• Citation: Mullins v. Parkview Hosp., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 45 (Ind. 2005)
• Decision Date: 30 June 2005
• Docket Number: No. 02A04-0412-CV-671.,02A04-0412-CV-671.
• Parties: W. Ruth MULLINS and Johnce Mullins, Jr., Appellants-Defendants, v. PARKVIEW HOSPITAL, INC., Preferred Anesthesia Consultants, Kathryn B. Carboneau, M.D., University of St. Francis of Fort Wayne, Indiana, Inc., Larea VanHoey, Fort Wayne OB/GYN Consultants, and Marvin E. Eastlund, M.D., Appellees-Plaintiffs.

830 N.E.2d 45

W. Ruth MULLINS and Johnce Mullins, Jr., Appellants-Defendants, v. PARKVIEW HOSPITAL, INC., Preferred Anesthesia Consultants, Kathryn B. Carboneau, M.D., University of St. Francis of Fort Wayne, Indiana, Inc., Larea VanHoey, Fort Wayne OB/GYN Consultants, and Marvin E. Eastlund, M.D., Appellees-Plaintiffs.

No. 02A04-0412-CV-671.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

June 30, 2005.

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Sherrill Wm. Colvin, Lori W. Jansen, Haller & Colvin, P.C., Fort Wayne, IN, Attorneys for Appellants.

Edward L. Murphy, Stephen J. Harants, Miller Murphy & Miller, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorneys for Appellees Marvin E. Eastlund, M.D. and Fort Wayne OB/GYN Consultants.

Milford M. Miller, Miller Murphy & Miller, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorney for Appellees Kathryn B. Carboneau, M.D. and Preferred Anesthesia Consultants, P.C.

Mark A. Baeverstad, Peggy A. Carlisle, Rothberg Logan & Warsco LLP, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorneys for Parkview Hospital, Inc.

Cathleen M. Shrader, John M. Clifton, Jr., Barrett & McNagny LLP, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorneys for University of Saint Francis of Fort Wayne, Indiana, Inc. and Larea VanHoey.

OPINION

BAKER, J.

Appellants-plaintiffs W. Ruth Mullins (Ruth) and her husband, Johnce Mullins, Jr. (collectively, the Mullinses), appeal from the trial court's summary judgment order in favor of appellees-defendants Parkview Hospital, Inc. (Parkview), Preferred Anesthesia Consultants, P.C., Kathryn B. Carboneau, M.D., University of St. Francis of Fort Wayne, Indiana, Inc. (St. Francis), Larea VanHoey, Fort Wayne OB/GYN Consultants, LLC, and Marvin E. Eastlund, M.D. Specifically, the Mullinses contend that the trial court erred in: (1) failing to find that VanHoey committed a battery upon Ruth; (2) finding that expert testimony was necessary regarding the issue of informed consent; (3) finding that the Mullinses were required to prove that a lacerated esophagus was not a possible complication of surgery; (4) finding that the contractual agreements between Parkview and St. Francis did not establish their mutual liability to the Mullinses; and (5) deeming admitted certain of the Mullinses' responses to requests for admission. Finding, among other things, that the Mullinses have stated claims for battery against VanHoey and Drs. Eastlund and Carboneau and their respective employers, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

FACTS

Ruth entered Parkview, a teaching hospital, on December 4, 2000, for hysterectomy surgery to be performed by her physician, Dr. Eastlund.¹ On November 14, 2000, Ruth and Dr. Eastlund met to discuss the surgery. Ruth explained to Dr. Eastlund that she was a very private person and did not want any individuals in the operating room other than absolutely necessary medical personnel. She also refused to agree to any pictures or videotapes being taken of her surgery. Ruth later met with one of Dr. Eastlund's nurses to sign his informed consent form, and she crossed out and refused to consent to the following paragraphs:

I consent to the presence of healthcare learners.

I consent to the photography or videotaping of the surgical, diagnostic, and/or medical procedure to be performed providing my name and identity is not revealed.

Appellant's App. p. 352.

On the day of her surgery, Ruth met with her anesthesiologist, Dr. Carboneau, before the procedure had begun. According to Ruth, she asked Dr. Carboneau if she would personally be handling the anesthetic procedures, and the doctor answered, "Yes." Appellants' App. p. 352. Dr. Carboneau denies ever telling Ruth that she "would be personally performing each separate task leading up to and involved during the administration of anesthesia agents." Carboneau's Br. p. 3. Ruth signed Dr. Carboneau's consent form, which stated that only Dr. Carboneau "or a physician privileged to practice anesthesia" would administer anesthesia to Ruth. Appellants' App. p. 357. Dr. Carboneau's consent form does not mention the presence or participation of learners, and she admits that during their meeting, she never mentioned that possibility to Ruth.

Ruth was under sedation and unconscious when VanHoey, a student studying for certification as an emergency medical technician (EMT) at St. Francis, entered the surgical room. As a part of her certification program, VanHoey was required to successfully complete several intubations² on living patients. Although VanHoey had previously practiced the procedure on mannequins, the day of Ruth's surgery was the first time that VanHoey had ever attempted live intubations.

St. Francis and Parkview had contracted with each other for St. Francis students to be trained in various medical procedures, including intubations, while under the supervision of a Parkview employee. Per their agreement, St. Francis provided medical malpractice insurance for students and faculty, and Parkview retained ultimate responsibility and authority for each patient's care. Appellants' App. p. 412-14, 429. Generally, the Parkview employee, called a "preceptor," walked into an operating suite prior to the start of a surgical procedure and asked if the patient was a candidate on which the student could practice the intubation technique. If the anesthesiologist agreed, the preceptor and the student learner entered the operating room, where the student would attempt the intubation procedure. The patient was unaware of the student's presence in the room and participation in the procedure. While performing the procedure, the student was supervised by the anesthesiologist, not the preceptor or any other Parkview employee.

When VanHoey entered Ruth's operating room, she was accompanied by her preceptor, Colin White. White asked Dr. Carboneau if VanHoey could practice the intubation procedure on Ruth, Dr. Carboneau consented, and Dr. Eastlund, who was present in the operating room, voiced no objections. VanHoey made two attempts to intubate Ruth using a laryngoscope. After her second attempt, both Dr. Carboneau and Dr. Eastlund saw blood on the type of the laryngoscope, but apparently, the presence of blood on the laryngoscope following intubation is not unusual, and neither doctor was alarmed at the time. After VanHoey failed to intubate Ruth successfully, Dr. Carboneau performed the procedure and completed Ruth's anesthesia.

On December 6, 2000, two days after Ruth's hysterectomy, the attending nurse noticed that Ruth's face and neck were beginning to swell. After running some tests, Dr. Carboneau, Dr. Eastlund, and Dr. John Csicsko, a cardiovascular surgeon, met with Ruth to explain that VanHoey had lacerated Ruth's esophagus when she attempted to perform the intubation procedure. The doctors explained to Ruth that she needed to undergo another surgical procedure to repair the damage to her esophagus. Although Ruth was reluctant to undergo another surgical procedure because she had just undergone the hysterectomy, the doctors strongly encouraged her to have the procedure that day because waiting until the next day could have been fatal. Thus, on the same day, Ruth had surgery to repair her esophagus, and as a result of this second procedure, she had to remain in the hospital for over a month until her dismissal on January 5, 2001.

On December 3, 2002, Ruth filed a complaint against the appellees-defendants, alleging that they went beyond the scope of her informed consent, that they failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care, and that their negligence was the proximate cause of her injuries. A medical review panel (MRP) was convened pursuant to the Indiana Malpractice Act, and on June 7, 2004, it concluded that Dr. Eastlund, Dr. Carboneau, and Parkview complied with the appropriate standard of care.³

The appellees-defendants filed their motions for summary judgment during June and July 2004. Parkview's motion, which was eventually joined by Dr. Eastlund and Fort Wayne OB/GYN Consultants, alleged that the MRP had found unanimously in favor of all defendants and that the Mullinses had presented no expert testimony creating an issue of fact as to the defendants' liability. The same arguments formed the basis of Dr. Carboneau and Preferred Anesthesia Consultants' motion. St. Francis and VanHoey's motion, eventually joined by Parkview, was based upon requests for admission deemed admitted by the trial court. After conducting a hearing on the motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all appellees-defendants on November 19, 2004. The Mullinses now appeal.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

As we consider the Mullinses' arguments, we note that summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings and evidence considered by the trial court show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.⁴ Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Cobb, 754 N.E.2d 905, 909 (Ind.2001); see also Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). On a motion for summary judgment, all doubts as to the existence of material issues of fact must be resolved against the moving party. Owens Corning, 754 N.E.2d at 909. Additionally, all facts and reasonable inferences from those facts are construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. If there is any doubt as to what conclusion a jury could reach, then summary judgment is improper. Id.

An appellate court faces the same issues that were before the trial court and follows the same process. Id. at 908. The party appealing from a summary judgment decision has the burden of persuading the court that the grant or denial of summary judgment was erroneous. Id. When a trial court grants summary judgment, we carefully scrutinize that determination to ensure that a party was not improperly prevented from having his or her day in court. Id.

I. Battery Claims

The Mullinses first argue that the trial court erred in dismissing their case without finding that a battery had been committed on Ruth...