Mullins v. State

• Decision Date: 10 May 2017
• Docket Number: No. 06-16-00092-CR,06-16-00092-CR
• Citation: Mullins v. State, No. 06-16-00092-CR (Tex. App. May 10, 2017)
• Parties: ROYAL LYNN MULLINS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

ROYAL LYNN MULLINS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

No. 06-16-00092-CR

Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

Date Submitted: March 28, 2017

May 10, 2017

On Appeal from the 196th District Court Hunt County, Texas

Trial Court No. 30,544

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss MEMORANDUM OPINION

On the night Curtis Wayne Gray, Sr. (Gray),¹ died, Janice Stanley told Greenville attorney, Royal Lynn Mullins, by telephone that Gray had broken into her Greenville residence. In response, Mullins took two pistols with him to Stanley's house, went inside, and shot Gray at least six times, including two shots meted out after Gray was apparently crawling on the floor—one of which shots was to Gray's back and the other of which was to the top of his head. Mullins claims, however, that all the shots were fired in self-defense² or in defense of Christina Huey,³ Stanley's friend. The jury rejected Mullins' defensive claims and found him guilty.⁴

On appeal, Mullins argues that insufficient evidence supports the jury's rejection of his self- and third-party-defense claims, that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of prior acts of violence by Gray, and that the trial court erroneously admitted testimony regarding the training of police officers, including training concerning the use of force.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court because (1) sufficient evidence supports the jury's rejection of Mullins' justification defenses, (2) Mullins failed to preserve his claim of error in excluding evidence of Gray's prior violent acts, and (3) any error in admitting evidence of police training was harmless.

(1) Sufficient Evidence Supports the Jury's Rejection of Mullins' Justification Defenses

Mullins argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because no reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense or in the defense of a third person. When a defendant raises self-defense or defense of third persons, he or she has the initial burden to produce some evidence supporting the defense. Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Dearborn v. State, 420 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Once evidence is produced, the burden of persuasion shifts to the State to disprove the defense. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594; Dearborn, 420 S.W.3d at 372. The State is not required to produce evidence rebutting the defense, but rather must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594; Dearborn, 420 S.W.3d at 372. The jury's guilty verdict is an implicit finding that the jury rejected the defense. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594; Dearborn, 420 S.W.3d at 372.

Since the State had the burden of persuasion to disprove justification beyond a reasonable doubt, we evaluate the legal sufficiency of the evidence by reviewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment to determine whether any rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt against the defendant on the self-defense and third-party defense issues. Hernandez v. State, 309 S.W.3d 661, 665 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref'd); see Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); Kirk v. State, 421 S.W.3d 772, 776 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. ref'd.; McCurdy v. State, No. 06-12-00206-CR, 2013 WL 5433478, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication).⁵ In examining legal sufficiency, we defer to the jury's role "to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony and may "believe all of a witnesses' testimony, portions of it, or none of it." Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). We give "almost complete deference to a jury's decision when that decision is based on an evaluation of credibility." Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

In our review, we consider "events occurring before, during and after the commission of the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common design to do the prohibited act." Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). Each fact need not "point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction." Id. Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are equally probative in establishing the guilt of a defendant, and guilt can be established by circumstantial evidence alone. Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (citing Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49(Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). In our review, we consider all the evidence admitted at trial, even improperly admitted evidence. Thomas, 444 S.W.3d at 8; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.

Under the statutes on self-defense and defense of third persons, the use of deadly force is justified if certain circumstances are met. Morales v. State, 357 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). For both defenses, the use of deadly force is justified

(1) if the actor would be justified in using force against the other under Section 9.31; and

(2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary:

(A) to protect the actor [or the third person] against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force; or

(B) to prevent the other's imminent commission of . . . ., murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, . . . .

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 9.32(a), 9.33(1) (West 2011). In the defense of a third person, the defendant must also "reasonably believe[] that his intervention is immediately necessary to protect the third person." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.33(2). The use of force is justified under Section 9.31 "when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(a).⁶ When self-defense or defense of a third person is asserted, "the reasonableness of the defendant's actions [is viewed] solely from the defendant's standpoint." Ex parte Drinkert,821 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (citing Bennett v. State, 726 S.W.2d 32, 37-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)).

The testimony at trial revealed that Gray and Stanley had lived together for about four years in a house owned by Stanley's sister, Jamie Hibbs, located at 3818 Spencer Street in Greenville. Both Gray and Stanley drank and used crack cocaine and other drugs. Throughout their relationship, Gray and Stanley argued, would sometimes engage in physical altercations, and had periods of separation. Curtis Gray, Jr., (Curtis) testified that, while he never saw a physical confrontation between them, he was aware of one that resulted in Gray going to jail.

Gray and Stanley occasionally worked for Mullins. Curtis testified that, besides Stanley working for Mullins, she had a personal and sexual relationship with Mullins and that Mullins often gave her money, food, water, and drinks. Mullins was seen at Stanley's house at least weekly.

There were many witnesses and much evidence at this trial, much of it revolving around Mullins' defensive issues. Our review of the whole record convinces us that the principal witnesses bearing on those defensive issues were Huey, Mullins, and Stanley and that their testimony alone demonstrates the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's rejection of Mullins' claims that he acted in self-defense or in defense of Huey. While the picture is furtherclarified by other witnesses, including Curtis,⁷ Greg Hughes,⁸ Eric Camp,⁹ Steve Walden,¹⁰ Felicia White,¹¹ Michael Duff,¹² Elizabeth Ventura,¹³ and Terry McElwrath,¹⁴ our narrative focuses on the testimony from Huey, Mullins, and Stanley.

Huey testified that Stanley kept calling her all day on July 29 wanting Huey to go with her, but Huey refused. Around 6:00 p.m., Stanley called again crying, and Huey went to her house. She testified that Stanley and Mullins had been to Dallas and bought a security camera that was being installed by a man she did not know. Stanley told her Mullins was going to pick her up and she did not want to leave the man alone at her house. After Mullins picked Stanley up, Huey stayed at Stanley's house and drank vodka. When Stanley returned, she called Gray and told him to come over because it was her birthday and she had alcohol. Huey said that when Gray came over, they were all three drinking when Stanley suddenly got up and went outside. Huey followedher and overheard Stanley on the telephone with Mullins, telling him that Gray had broken into her house.

Huey also testified that Stanley asked Huey to tell Gray he needed to leave, and then left with Mullins. Huey did so, but Gray refused, and they argued, so she called 9-1-1 around 12:30 a.m. on July 30. Huey acknowledged that she told the 9-1-1 operator that Stanley did not want Gray there and that Stanley was scared of Gray. Huey explained that she did not believe this, but Stanley wanted people to think she was scared. She testified that she was not in fear of Gray when she made the call. She said that, when the police came that time, they did not make Gray leave the house. After the police left, Stanley returned and told Gray he needed to leave. All three of them went back into the house, but Stanley continued to come...