Mullowney v. Hobby, Civ. A. No. 6-54.
Citation | 134 F. Supp. 419 |
Decision Date | 31 May 1955 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 6-54. |
Parties | Edmund H. MULLOWNEY, Plaintiff, v. Oveta Culp HOBBY, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
Thomas M. Davies (Davis, Healey, Davies & Wilson), Lincoln, Neb., for plaintiff.
Donald R. Ross, U. S. Atty., and William C. Spire, Asst. U. S. Atty., Omaha, Neb., for defendant.
Within the allowance, and jurisdictional grant, of Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 405 (g), the plaintiff brings this action against the defendant in her official capacity. No question is, or upon the record could be, tendered concerning the timeliness of the institution of the suit or the validity of process or its service.
The action arises in this setting. Plaintiff was born January 15, 1875 in Wisconsin. For many years he has resided in Lincoln, Nebraska. He consistently made his federal income tax returns upon the basis of his cash receipts. On November 12, 1952 he filed with Social Security Administration a written application on approved form for Federal old-age and survivors insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq. By letter dated June 10, 1953, plaintiff was notified of the denial by the Administrator of his claim. The denial was thus explained in the notice:
On August 10, 1953, plaintiff requested hearing before a referee which was granted, and was held on September 15, 1953 at Lincoln. On October 30, 1953 the referee made and entered a decision upon the issue against plaintiff, who, on November 5, 1953 filed with the Office of Appeals Council, Social Security Administration, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, a request for review of the referee's decision. That request for review was denied by Office of Appeals Council on November 24, 1953; by letter of which date, with accompanying copy of the actual denial, plaintiff was notified of such action. This suit followed.
The complaint sets up the foregoing history and prays "that the court reverse the decision of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social Security Administration, and allow plaintiff's application for old-age Insurance Benefits under the provisions of the Social Security Act." The defendant's answer prays for the dismissal of the complaint and the affirmance of the challenged decision. It denies the court's jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed for and cites Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) as the limitation upon the court's authority; submits the transcript of the record on which the decision was made and the findings and conclusions of the defendant; admits and alleges the proceedings had upon the plaintiff's claim as already outlined and alleges that, to have been a fully insured individual under Social Security Act, the plaintiff must have had a minimum of six quarters of coverage as those terms are defined in said Act; that his services prior to October 18, 1949 were not rendered in "employment" covered by the Act; that his remuneration for such services did not constitute wages within the meaning of the Act; that the amounts reported by plaintiff as self-employment income for 1951 and 1952 did not constitute net earnings from self-employment as that term is defined in Section 211(a) of the Act, but must be treated as return on capital assets acquired in 1949; that the defendant's findings are supported by substantial evidence and are conclusive; and that upon the facts found by the referee and the law the defendant correctly decided that plaintiff was not entitled to the old-age insurance benefits for which he had applied.
By stipulation of the parties, allowed by the court, the action was submitted upon the record tendered with the answer and upon typewritten briefs. Briefs have been delivered and the case is ready for ruling.
The essential findings of the Referee, which, upon denial by the Office of Appeals Council of the request for review, became the defendant's findings are set out in an extended verbatim excerpt from the Referee's decision as a footnote hereto.1
It is in order, first, to recognize the limitations imposed by statute upon the jurisdiction and scope of inquiry of the court in this case. Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) authorizes the institution and prosecution of such proceedings for review. It then provides, among other things:
.
Both parties freely recognize that the present ruling must be in the nature of a review of the record brought here with the defendant's answer, and that the court is bound by the mandate of the statutory sentence last quoted.
By Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(a) (1-3) it is provided that:
Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 416(a), also referred to, thus defines "Retirement Age":
"(a) The term `retirement age' means age sixty-five."
Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 415(a) follows:
Certain terms are statutorily defined or explained in the Act itself. They may now be noted.
The terms "`net earnings from self-employment'" and "`self-employment income'" are defined by the following language from Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 411 (a, b):
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Rhodes v. Flemming
...152 F.2d 43; Social Security Board v. Warren, 8 Cir., 142 F.2d 974; Holland v. Altmeyer, D.C. Minn., 60 F.Supp. 954; Mullowney v. Hobby, D.C.Neb., 134 F.Supp. 419; Irvin v. Hobby, D.C.N.D.Iowa, 131 F.Supp. 851. On the other hand, "courts must now assume more responsibility for the reasonabl......
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...1956-2 C.B. 537, adopted Aug. 13, 1956, amended by T.D. 6691, 1963-2 C.B. 347, and by T.D. 7333, 1975-1 C.B. 279. See Mullowney v. Hobby, 134 F.Supp. 419 (D. Neb. 1955) (payments received after 1950 with respect to contracts acquired in 1949 not self-employment income, as the market value o......
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