Mummelthie v. City of Mason City, Iowa

• Decision Date: 09 January 1995
• Docket Number: No. C 93-3030.,C 93-3030.
• Citation: 873 F. Supp. 1293
• Parties: Carol A. MUMMELTHIE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF MASON CITY, IOWA, and Alberta Carlene Davis, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

873 F. Supp. 1293

Carol A. MUMMELTHIE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF MASON CITY, IOWA, and Alberta Carlene Davis, Defendants.

No. C 93-3030.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Central Division.

January 9, 1995.

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Richard N. Tompkins, Jr., Mason City, IA, for plaintiff.

H.P. Folkers of Mason City, IA, for defendants.

                I.   PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ........................................................ 1302
                     A. Procedural History ........................................................ 1302
                     B. Identification Of Plaintiff's Claims ...................................... 1303
                        1. Lack Of A Jurisdictional Statement ..................................... 1303
                        2. Plausible Federal Claims ............................................... 1305
                II.  STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ............................................... 1306
                III. FINDINGS OF FACT ............................................................. 1308
                     A. Undisputed Facts .......................................................... 1308
                     B. Disputed Facts ............................................................ 1309
                

IV.  LEGAL ANALYSIS ............................................................... 1310
                     A. Procedural Requirements Of The ADEA ....................................... 1310
                     B. The Exclusivity Of Federal Anti-Discrimination Statutes ................... 1312
                        1. Principles of Exclusivity .............................................. 1312
                        2. An Overview Of Determinations Of The ADEA's Exclusivity ................ 1315
                          a.  The Zombro Decision ................................................. 1317
                           b.  Decisions Making An "Independent" Analysis Of ADEA Exclusivity ..... 1319
                        3. Title VII And § 1983 Claims ....................................... 1321
                     C. Another Look At The Exclusivity Of The ADEA ............................... 1323
                        1.  The Analogy Between Title VII And The ADEA ............................ 1323
                        2.  Language And Legislative History Of The ADEA .......................... 1324
                        3.  The "Sea Clammers Doctrine" ........................................... 1327
                        4.  Coexistence Of Remedies ............................................... 1327
                     D. The Constitutional Claims ................................................. 1329
                        1.  The Due Process Claim ................................................. 1329
                        2.  The Equal Protection Claim ............................................ 1332
                     E. Municipal Liability Under § 1983 .......................................... 1336
                V.   CONCLUSION ................................................................... 1338
                

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BENNETT, District Judge.

This motion for summary judgment requires the court to consider a nettlesome but fundamentally important question that has as yet been only infrequently litigated: Does the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., provide the exclusive federal remedy for claims of age discrimination in employment by a municipal employee? The great weight of recent authority holds that the ADEA provides the exclusive federal remedy for age discrimination in employment, thus foreclosing an independent constitutional claim under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, from its independent analysis of the exclusivity of the ADEA, this court finds that it must respectfully disagree with recent authority, and hold that the ADEA does not provide the exclusive remedy for age discrimination in employment where that discrimination violates independent, federal constitutional rights. Thus, a claim of age discrimination in employment pursuant to § 1983 is not foreclosed by the ADEA when the claim is based on violation of constitutional rights.

Defendant employers, a city and the city clerk, have moved for summary judgment on an employee's lawsuit arising from the employee's failure to be promoted to the position of deputy city clerk. The employee's complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleges violation of the right to due process for failure to promote the employee and age discrimination in violation of the right to equal protection. The employers' motion for summary judgment asserts that the employee's age discrimination claims are barred by failure to comply with the prerequisites for suit under the ADEA. The employers also assert that the employee has no property interest in a promotion upon which to mount a due process claim, and that no age discrimination occurred implicating equal protection. The employee asserts genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment, and that there is no requirement that she exhaust administrative remedies before filing claims for violation of her federal constitutional rights.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Carol A. Mummelthie filed her complaint in this action, styled a "Petition," on April 30, 1994, against her employer, the City of Mason City, Iowa (the City), and Alberta Carlene Davis, the Clerk of the City, as the result of Mummelthie's failure to be promoted to the position of Deputy City Clerk. Defendants answered the complaint on August 2, 1993, following acknowledgement of service on July 22, 1993, by the Mayor of Mason City.

The court has considerable doubt that acknowledgement of service by the Mayor effected proper service on defendant Davis. However, Davis has answered the complaint, thus submitting to the jurisdiction of this court, without challenging the effectiveness of service upon her either in her answer or by pre-answer motion. Therefore, the court concludes that Davis has waived any challenge to personal jurisdiction over her in this case. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h); White v. National Football League, 41 F.3d 402 (8th Cir.1994) ("Like other such rights, therefore, the personal jurisdiction requirement can be waived. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 703, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 2105, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982). Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h) contemplates the involuntary waiver of a defense of lack of personal jurisdiction if it is not included in a motion or in a responsive pleading. We have held, moreover, that the rule `sets only the outer limits of waiver; it does not preclude waiver by implication,'" quoting Yeldell, infra); Yeldell v. Tutt, 913 F.2d 533, 539 (8th Cir.1990).

On May 27, 1994, defendants moved for summary judgment on the entirety of Mummelthie's complaint. Mummelthie failed to file any timely response to the motion for summary judgment. On October 4, 1994, in the interest of justice, this court ordered Mummelthie to respond to the motion for summary judgment within ten days, stating that failure to do so might result in the granting of defendants' motion and dismissal of the case. Mummelthie ultimately filed a resistance to the motion for summary judgment on October 17, 1994. No party has requested a hearing on defendants' motion for summary judgment as required by N.D.Ia. LR 14(c).¹ Therefore, the court considers that this matter is now fully submitted and will enter its ruling.

B. Identification Of Plaintiff's Claims

The complaint in this matter is not a model of artful pleading. Consequently, the court and the parties have been at some pains to ascertain the nature of Mummelthie's claims. Mummelthie's complaint states in pertinent part that

on or about September 1, 1992, the defendants, or each of them, deprived the plaintiff of a right protected by the Constitution or the laws of the United States by depriving her of a promotion to the position of deputy or assistant clerk for the City of Mason City.

Complaint, ¶ 4. The complaint asserts further that defendants acted under color of state law, Complaint, ¶ 5, that defendants were the proximate cause of Mummelthie's injuries, Complaint, ¶ 6, and asserts various items of damages. Complaint, ¶ 7. Finally, the complaint states that

this action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the damages exceed the jurisdictional amount under Federal law.

Complaint, ¶ 8.

1. Lack Of A Jurisdictional Statement

There is no other assertion of jurisdiction in the complaint. The references to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to violation of rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States suggest that the complaint asserts federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331; however, the reference to the "jurisdictional amount under Federal law" suggests an element necessary only for diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Plainly, there is no diversity jurisdiction here, because all parties are citizens or residents of the state of Iowa or governmental entities within it. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). For jurisdiction to rest on 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), diversity of citizenship must be complete. No plaintiff may be a citizen of any state of which any defendant is a citizen. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch. 267 7 U.S. 267, 2 L.Ed. 435 (1806). That is, all of the parties on one side of the lawsuit must be of diverse citizenship from all of the parties on the other side of the lawsuit. Montana Mining Co. v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co., 204 U.S. 204, 213, 27 S.Ct. 254, 256, 51 L.Ed. 444 (1907); see also American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 541, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951). The court believes that federal question jurisdiction was intended on the basis of allegations of violation of rights secured by the Constitution.

Claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, statutes providing for causes of action for violation of federal constitutional...