Mun v. University of Alaska at Anchorage
| Decision Date | 29 June 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. A03-244 CV (JWS).,A03-244 CV (JWS). |
| Citation | 378 F.Supp.2d 1149 |
| Parties | John MUN, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA AT ANCHORAGE; Rick Weems; Ron Kamahele; and Mary Howard, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Alaska |
At docket 27, the University of Alaska at Anchorage ("UAA"), Rick Weems, and Mary Howard move for summary judgment on Counts II and III of John Mun's complaint. The motion is opposed. At docket 45, Mun moves to strike material submitted in support of the summary judgment motion. That motion is opposed. Briefing on both motions has been completed. Oral argument has not been requested on either motion, and it would not assist the court.
Mun has worked for UAA for a number of years, but three disputes have punctuated his tenure. The first dispute centered on his being denied overtime pay when he was Facilities Scheduling Coordinator and Curriculum Advising and Program Planning Coordinator ("CAPP Coordinator").1 The second dispute arose when he applied for a promotion to Director of Summer Sessions in August of 2001 but did not get it.2 The third dispute arose in 2003 after UAA eliminated a position, Curriculum Manager, for which Mun wanted to apply.3
As a result of these disappointments, Mun filed three grievances with UAA.4 In the first, filed on or about October 22, 2002,5 he complained about not receiving overtime pay. In the second, filed on January 7, 2003, he alleged that Weems, UAA's Chief Enrollment Officer, retaliated against him for complaining about not receiving overtime pay.6 He also alleged that he received less pay than people who do not share his Korean ancestry.7 In Mun's third grievance, filed on August 19, 2003, he alleged that his immediate supervisor, Howard, discriminated against him because of the first grievance he filed.8 UAA denied all three grievances.
Besides filing three grievances with UAA, Mun filed two charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). In the first charge, filed on June 20, 2003, he alleged that UAA discriminated against him on the basis of his race and religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII").9 The EEOC concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to establish that UAA had violated Mun's rights under Title VII.10 In the second charge, filed on November 17, 2003, he again alleged that UAA had discriminated against him, and also that it had retaliated against him for opposing UAA's alleged discrimination.11 The parties have not indicated whether the EEOC has finished reviewing Mun's second charge.
On October 17, 2003, between filing his first and second charges with the EEOC, Mun filed a complaint against UAA, Weems, and Howard in this court.12 In Count II of the complaint, Mun alleges that UAA, Weems, and Howard discriminated against him on the basis of his race and religion in violation of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. He alleges that they denied him promotions; overtime pay; equal pay; and subjected him to a hostile work environment.13 In Count III of the complaint, Mun alleges that UAA, Weems, and Howard violated Title VII by retaliating against him for filing a grievance about their alleged discrimination.14 He claims that the retaliation included prohibiting him from participating in UAA's governance proceedings and subjecting him to a hostile work environment.15
At dockets 44 and 51, the court addressed several of the claims presented in Counts II and III of Mun's complaint. At docket 44, the court dismissed Mun's Title VII claims against Weems and Howard because only their employer, UAA, may be held liable for Title VII violations. At docket 51, the court dismissed Mun's equal protection claim against UAA because it is an instrumentality of the State of Alaska and the statute authorizing Mun's claim, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, does not extend to instrumentalities of state governments.
All told, four claims remain: 1) a Title VII discrimination claim against UAA; 2) a Title VII retaliation claim against UAA; 3) an equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Weems; and 4) an equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Howard.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 the court has subject matter jurisdiction over Mun's Title VII claims and his equal protection claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, a prerequisite to the court's exercising its subject matter jurisdiction over Mun's Title VII claims is his having presented those claims to the EEOC for its review.16 It is not clear whether the EEOC has finished reviewing the second charge that Mun filed, but the agency did fully vet the first charge. That charge contained the same claims that Mun presents in the complaint he filed in this court. Because the EEOC has reviewed those claims, the court has subject matter jurisdiction over them.
Additional facts are noted in the discussion section below.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment should be granted when there is no genuine dispute about material facts and when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party has the burden to show that material facts are not genuinely disputed.17 To meet this burden, the moving party must point out the lack of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's claim, but need not produce evidence negating that claim.18 Once the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party must demonstrate that a genuine issue exists by presenting evidence indicating that certain facts are so disputed that a fact-finder must resolve the dispute at trial.19 The court must not assess the credibility of this evidence, and must draw all justifiable inferences from it in favor of the nonmoving party.20
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against their employees on the basis of their "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."21 To avoid summary judgment on his claim that UAA discriminated against him on the basis of his race and religion, Mun must run the analytical gamut constructed by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.22 Under McDonnell Douglas, Mun must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination.23 If he does that, the burden of production shifts to UAA to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct.24 If UAA articulates such a reason, the burden shifts back to Mun to offer evidence showing, directly or indirectly, that the reason is pretext for illegal discrimination.25 Mun can demonstrate pretext directly by showing that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated UAA than the reason it offers.26 Mun can demonstrate pretext indirectly by showing that UAA's reason is not credible.27 In establishing pretext, Mun may rely on the evidence he offers to make his prima facie case or other evidence,28 but whatever evidence he relies on must be "specific, substantial evidence of pretext."29
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Mun must offer evidence that creates "an inference of unlawful discrimination."30 Evidence creating that inference includes direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent.31 The evidence must show that Mun 1) belongs to a protected class; 2) was performing according to UAA's legitimate expectations; 3) suffered an adverse employment action; and 4) was treated less favorably than similarly-situated employees.32
Mun supports his claim that UAA discriminated against him on the basis of his race by alleging that he was denied a promotion to Director of Summer Sessions and the opportunity to apply for a promotion to Curriculum Manager; denied overtime pay; denied equal pay; and subjected to a hostile work environment.
(1) Director of Summer Sessions
A Title VII claim based on a discrete act of discrimination is "time barred" if it is not filed with the EEOC within time limits provided by Title VII.33 Claims filed first with a state agency with the power to remedy the discrimination must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the discriminatory act.34 Claims filed directly with the EEOC must be filed within 180 days of the discriminatory act.35 These deadlines may be equitably tolled.36
Mun's claim is time barred. Mun applied for Director of Summer Sessions in early August 2001.37 His application was rejected on August 30, 2001.38 He did not file discrimination charges with the EEOC until June 20, 2003, well after either the 180-day or the 300-day deadline for doing so.
Mun offers three reasons why his claim is not time barred. First, he asserts that he did not know that he had been discriminated against until long after his application was rejected. Mun declares that UAA withheld "crucial information" about his application until 39 If this assertion is true, his claim would not be time barred. Second, Mun argues that his claim is timely under the "continuing violations" doctrine. Third, Mun claims that UAA officials told him he could not file a charge with the EEOC until he had exhausted UAA's grievance procedures, and that those representations are grounds for equitably tolling the deadline for filing charges with the EEOC.
None of Mun's arguments is persuasive. Mun's vague reference to "crucial information" is not a "specific fact," as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), that creates a genuine issue about whether UAA withheld information necessary to Mun's understanding that he had been discriminated against. If that information truly were crucial, he could have described it with ease and specificity.
Mun's "continuing violations" argument also is unavailing. His claim is based on UAA's denying his application for...
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