Muncher v. NCR Corp.
Decision Date | 27 June 2017 |
Docket Number | Case No.: 2:16-CV-782-VEH |
Parties | STEVEN A. MUNCHER, Plaintiff, v. NCR CORPORATION, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
This is a civil action filed by the Plaintiff, Steven A. Muncher, against the Defendant, NCR Corporation ("NCR"). The First Amended Complaint in this case was filed on August 19, 2016. (Doc. 23). As alleged in the First Amended Complaint:
[The] Plaintiff seeks to recover bonuses in the total amount of $210,681.00 which NCR has wrongfully withheld and refused to pay for the year 2015. [The] Plaintiff is entitled to these bonuses based upon the "2015 T&T Sales Compensation Program Additional Earnings Opportunity" (the "Additional Earnings Opportunity" or "AEO"). The AEO provided for significant bonuses in 2015 in addition to the existing bonus program known as the "Solution Compensation Plan" ("SCP") for sales representatives. At all times throughout 2015, [the] Plaintiff was a sales representative who was fully eligible for the additional bonuses under the AEO and [the] Plaintiff fully earned his AEO bonus.
(Doc. 23 at 4). Arising from these (and other) allegations, the First Amended Complaint sets out claims for breach of contract (Count One), fraudulent inducement (Count Two), suppression and concealment (Count Three), and "attorneys' fees" (Count Four).
The case comes before the Court on the Defendant's Partial Motion To Dismiss, filed pursuant to Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (doc. 27), and the Plaintiff's Motion To Amend the Complaint to add one additional Count for liability under the Alabama Sales Representative's Commission Act, ALA. CODE § 8-23-3, (the "ASRCA" or the "Act") (doc. 51).1 Both motions are under submission. For the reasons stated herein, both motions will be DENIED.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the complaint provide "'a short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 103, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957) (footnote omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)),abrogated by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) ( ).
While a plaintiff must provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief, Rule 8 does not mandate the inclusion of "detailed factual allegations" within a complaint. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, 78 S. Ct. at 103). However, at the same time, "it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). "[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563, 127 S. Ct. at 1969.
"[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. (emphasis added). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680, 129 S. Ct. at 1950-51.
A claim is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965).
Ziemba v. Cascade Int'l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Brooks v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1371 (11th Cir. 1997).
"[I]t is sufficient to plead the who, what, when, where, and how of the allegedly false statements and then allege generally that those statements were made with the requisite intent." Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir. 2008).
The Eleventh Circuit has stated:
A district court has discretion to deny leave to amend, but "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). "In making this determination, a court should consider whether there has been undue delay in filing, bad faith or dilatory motives, prejudice to the opposing parties, and the futility of the amendment." Local 472 of United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. of U.S. & Canada v. Ga. Power Co., 684 F.2d 721, 724 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962)).
Scopellitti v. City of Tampa, No. 15-15394, 2017 WL 343518, at *4 (11th Cir. Jan. 24, 2017). "A proposed amendment may be denied for futility when the complaint as amended would still be properly dismissed." Coventry First, LLC v. McCarty, 605 F.3d 865, 870 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted). When a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim, a plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the complaint before the district court dismisses the action with prejudice." Evans v. Georgia Reg'l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The First Amended Complaint alleges:
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