Munday v. Beaufort Cnty.

• Decision Date: 14 July 2022
• Docket Number: 9:20-cv-02144-DCN-MHC
• Parties: CHERYL A. MUNDAY and MARGARET DEVINE, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BEAUFORT COUNTY, PHILIP FOOT, QUANDARA GRANT, JOHN DOES 1-5 and JANE DOES 1-5, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

CHERYL A. MUNDAY and MARGARET DEVINE, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v.
BEAUFORT COUNTY, PHILIP FOOT, QUANDARA GRANT, JOHN DOES 1-5 and JANE DOES 1-5, Defendants.

No. 9:20-cv-02144-DCN-MHC

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division

July 14, 2022

ORDER

DAVID C. NORTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

The following matter is before the court on United States Magistrate Judge Molly H. Cherry's report and recommendation (“R&R”), ECF No. 49, that the court grant plaintiffs Cheryl A. Munday (“Munday”) and Margaret Devine's (“Devine”) motion for class certification, ECF No. 31. For the reasons set forth below, the court adopts the R&R with certain clarifications and grants the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

The R&R ably recites the facts, and the parties do not object to the R&R's recitation thereof. Therefore, the court will only briefly summarize material facts as they appear in the R&R for the purpose of aiding an understanding of the court's legal analysis.

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This case involves certain procedures used for female pre-classification detainees at the Beaufort County Detention Center (“BCDC”).^[1] Defendant Beaufort County (the “County”) operates BCDC. Defendant Philip Foot (“Foot”) is the Assistant County Administrator for the Public Safety Division who oversees the BCDC. Defendant Quandara Grant (“Grant”) is a colonel and the director of the BCDC. BCDC's practice has been to house female pre-classification inmates in general population while placing male pre-classification inmates in a separate pre-classification cell outside of general population. On February 27, 2015, BCDC began conducting strip and visual body cavity searches on any pre-classification detainee placed in general population. ECF Nos. 31-4 and 31-5. Accordingly, because female pre-classification detainees were held in general population, BCDC conducted a strip and visual body cavity search on every female preclassification detainee awaiting bond. BCDC did not, however, do so for similarly-situated male pre-classification detainees prior to May 5, 2020, as they were housed in a separate pre-classification cell outside of general population. There is generally no dispute between the parties that this practice was in effect at BCDC between February 27, 2015 and May 5, 2020.

Munday and Devine (together, “plaintiffs”) were arrested in March 2018 and January 2019, respectively, for driving under the influence. The charges against both were later dismissed. After the respective arresting officers transported each plaintiff to BCDC to begin the booking process, both underwent a full body pat down followed by a strip search and visual body cavity search. On March 6, 2020, plaintiffs initiated this

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action asserting various state and federal claims against BCDC, the County, Foot, Grant, defendants John Does 1-5, and defendants Jane Does 1-5 (together, “defendants”) on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g) (D.S.C), all pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to Magistrate Judge Cherry. On December 1, 2022, plaintiffs filed their motion for class certification. ECF No. 31. In that motion, plaintiffs sought to certify a class solely for their claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. On May 2, 2022, Magistrate Judge Cherry issued the R&R, recommending that the court grant the motion. ECF No. 49. On May 16, 2022, defendants objected to the R&R. ECF No. 55. Plaintiffs did not file objections or respond to defendants' objections, and the time to do so has now expired. As such, the matter is now ripe for the court's review.

II. STANDARD

This court is charged with conducting a de novo review of any portion of a magistrate judge's R&R to which specific, written objections are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party's failure to object is accepted as agreement with the conclusions of a magistrate judge. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985). The recommendation of the Magistrate Judge carries no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination rests with this court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). However, de novo review is unnecessary when a party makes general and conclusory objections without directing a court's attention to a specific error in a magistrate judge's proposed findings. Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982).

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In the absence of a specific objection, the court reviews the R&R only for clear error. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

The class action is “an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.” Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-701 (1979). Class certification is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, under which a proposed class must both satisfy the prerequisites for certification outlined in Rule 23(a) and constitute one of the permissible “types of class actions” under Rule 23(b). Rule 23(a) provides that one or more members of a class may sue as representative parties on behalf of all only if:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class

Further, Rule 23(b) requires that class certification be appropriate based on one or more of the following circumstances: (1) individual actions would risk inconsistent adjudications, or adjudications dispositive of non-parties; (2) class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief is sought and appropriate; or (3) legal or factual questions, common to the proposed class members, predominate over questions affecting individual members. Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., 348 F.3d 417, 423 (4th Cir. 2003). In addition to these explicit requirements, “Rule 23 contains an implicit threshold requirement that the members of a proposed class be ‘readily identifiable,'” which courts often refer as to the “ascertainability” requirement. EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 358 (4th Cir. 2014).

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The party seeking certification carries the burden of demonstrating that each of the requirements for class certification is satisfied. Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 362 (4th Cir. 2004). That burden requires the party seeking certification to “do more than plead compliance with” Rule 23, meaning that it must actually “present evidence that the putative class complies with Rule 23.” Adair, 764 F.3d at 357. Though class certification should not be “conditioned on the merits of the case,” Clark v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 2001 WL 1946329, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 19, 2001), “a district court may need to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question,” Adair, 764 F.3d at 357 (quoting Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, “[a]lthough Rule 23 does not give district courts a ‘license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage,' a court should consider merits questions to the extent ‘that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.'” Id. (quoting Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 464 (2013)).

District courts are to “give Rule 23 a liberal rather than a restrictive construction, adopting a standard of flexibility in application which will in the particular case best serve the ends of justice for the affected parties and . . . promote judicial efficiency.” Gunnells, 348 F.3d at 424. Ultimately, the court “has broad discretion in deciding whether to certify a class, but that discretion must be exercised within the framework of...